I don't know what business model they are using, but there are some choices:
1. "We'll lose money on every flight, but make it up on volume." Not going to work - see People Express.
2. "We'll keep the prices low until the competition goes out of business, then jack them right back up again." See Independence Air. NWA, UAL, and others lowered prices to match them, added new routes to compete - and they all went away before the ink on Independence Air's Chapter 11 was dry. Of course, it doesn't work if you run out of money first.
3. "We need cash now. Get those planes moving at any price." See Chrysler! Usually a short term sustaining mode, but not a recipe for long term success.
4. "We can sell at those prices if we assume that aircraft values will go up by 2011." No aircraft depreciation, no depreciation expense. Fine if it turns out to be true, although the accounting board might complain (see thread on Netjets loss due to aircraft writedowns)
So...IMO XOJet's pricing could work - if their financiers are patient and the market turns.
Interesting analysis, but I'm not sure I understand your conclusion. If you are suggesting that #1-#3 clearly demonsrtrate failed business models, are you suggesting that #4 might work for them? If so, I'd like to understand your thoughts better, given that aircraft valuations are at an all time low, and XOJet paid almost full retail price (according to Cessna's publicly stated comments) for all of their Citation X's. How likely is it that values will rise that substantially to where in 2011 a three year old airplane will be as much as they paid for it in 2008 when they were contracted at a price several years ago during the market's all time high?
In any case, thanks for providing some meaningful analysis on this topic. I was starting to wonder if anyone would ever provide any intelligent conversation about this topic, rather than all the rhetoric and emotion that we've seen on this thread so far.