I'm bored, so it's up onto the soap box again....
My $.02 on airline economics
-or-
Why not to have a heart attack over $29 fares.
Revenue and cost are almost completely seperate from each other. Ticket prices are
not set to be higher than cost, they are set to maximize revenue. Read that again, as way too many people miss that point. A $29 ticket makes perfect sense if it maximizes revenue, even if it is far below cost. That max revenue can be far below cost is a different matter related more to market pressure, brand awareness, demand, etc. If max revenue is far below cost, feel free to have a heart attack.
There are many techniques to maximize revenue on a flight. Selling ultra low-fare tickets is one way to fill otherwise empty seats. $29 is, after all, much better than $0. FlyI sells these fares on Tues, Weds, and Sat and limits the number available on each flight. One major issue is that ultra low-fares cannot be so common that the average consumer expects them and will purchase only them. Hence they are offered infrequently (during sale periods), on low-traffic days (T,W,Sa), and in proportion to typical flight loads (more available on low selling flights).
So how does having lower fares increase revenue? The most obvious answer is buy increasing load factor. For an RJ, 50 sales at $69 is vastly superior to 35 sales at $89 ($3450 vs $3115). Since airlines so quickly match fares, increased loads is less a factor of gaining market share than of increasing the number of travelers. At $.20 CASM (unrealisticaly high) an RJ runs $10/mile, so these hypothetical flights would break even at 345 and 311 sm (CASM is measured in statute miles). They are not quite a "money pit," but the dynamics of RJs versus large aircraft is a topic best left for another soap box
The $29 fare has another side benefit - it increases interest in the airline. A few months ago FlyI had a huge sale to announce Las Vegas service, with $29 advertised everywhere. Everyone moaned that FlyI could not possibly survive if it sold it's seats so cheaply. But in the days that followed records were set for most seats sold and highest revenue generated. The average ticket sale price was $100, $30 higher than normal (this information from the SVP of Marketing visiting the crew room). Perversly, the lowest fares ever offered by FlyI generated the highest average yield sales. Marketing is fun, aint it?
As for the long term prospects of FlyI - things are improving month over month, but I don't think it will improve to the point of profitability before cash runs out, and the airline has leveraged everything it has so when cash goes, the airline goes. The airline is operating efficiently, operating costs are about as efficient as they can get, and the non-operating costs that led to the famously high CASMs (most related to the rebranding) have dropped substantially. Yields are slowly climbing, loads are slowly climbing. Break even load factor is now probably below 100%. It's been suggested that the A319s are independently profitable with about 80% load factor, though the CRJs are losing money at 67% full. The fleet reduction had the desired effect, which was to improve the ratio of money making A319s to money losing CRJs, while modestly improving the economics of the remaining CRJs. FlyI is losing money at a substantially lower rate than 4Q04, and is losing less money each month. The potential for profit is absolutely there. The name recognition is getting there. Kerry Skeen is on Nightly Business Report commenting on USAir-AWA, for what that's worth. Any passenger that has experienced United's G gates and FlyIs A gates will pick FlyI every time, and most of the United competition is from the G gate regionals. But will it make money before it runs out of it? Who the hell knows!
But if they go bankrupt, I hope they get the same Virginia judge that USAir has. Then they'll never go out of business!
-Tailwinds