Houston G3 CVR Transcript Part I

[Donsa320]

Michael,

Loss of situational awareness is a really bad deal, partly because you can be pretty far gone by the time you realize that things aren't right. The fact that there were cues present to tell them that they weren't where they thought they were (i.e. dme was too far off, tower giving them a low altitude alert, 117.1 instead of 109.9 tuned in both navaids, whatever FMS information they had available, strong ident for H-U-B instead of I-H-O-U {whatever that ils ident is, don't know off the top of my head}, etc etc etc) just means that the accident could have been averted if the cues had been reconized. Most accidents could be averted, if the error chain had been broken at some point, and this thread is correctly identifying places that it could have been broken. Sadly, neither of these guys was able to do that.

(edit: as far as the GS goes, someone above suggested that the crew may have interpreted a fast/slow flag as a GS indication... I haven't flown a Gulfstream but it seems plausible. They apparently were unfamiliar with the presentation, wanted a GS, found something that looked right, and went with it instead of confirming.)

What can we learn? That no matter how experienced you are, you still CAN make terrible mistakes. That the basics like tune-identify-monitor matter every time that you're in IMC, even when everything else is laid back & relaxed. That using all available tools to confirm your position isn't just for the "tough" situations but for every flight. That there's no substitute for being proficient in the aircraft you're flying today... and if you're a little "off your game" for whatever reason (tired, unfamiliar layout, been off for a while), then it's doubly important to pay attention to everything you have to make sure it's all working like you think it is.

And, if things don't feel right, stop pressing on at full speed in spite of it, but instead slow down and get reoriented so that you KNOW your actual position is where you need to be, instead of hoping for the best.

Remember, nobody is "so good" that it can't happen to you.

Wow, note that the VOR ID is "HUB" and the localizer is "I-HUB"....what a trap that is, jeez!

~DC

 

[FN FAL]

Out of respect I will make no comments about this crew. I will learn from what happened and hope that someday no one has to read a transcript of me.

Respect? They murdered a flight attendant and demolished a multi million dollar aircraft. Sounds like superhero material to me.

 

[ultrarunner]

I have read this transcript a couple of times, and it would appear that after they tuned in the LOC freq of 109.9, they then changed to the VOR freq.

Why? What was the significance of the FO wanting the "...RMI's to be the same..."????

Who the heck cares. Looking at the plate, I can't see that the pointers were needed to identify anything, nor the DME from the VOR. It appears the LOC had it's own DME.

Why did the FO want VOR RMI information?


Additionally, Enigma brought up an important issue where the FAA/FSDO's are really missing the boat with the 135 opperators. And that is lack of oversight for aircraft differences training.

I can't tell you how many times and operator will bring on some new plane they already have opperating authority for that has been modded up, different EFIS, different FMC's,....etc....and throw the crews right in it.

Real bogus. And another reason people will get the impression that 135 Charter is second-rate.

 

[mar]

Just between you and me

It's not just 135 operators.

I've worked for three 121 operations. Same story.

As someone else said: Always go with your gut.

 

[kevdog]

Hey, is it me or does it seem that 91/135/Corp. jets crash a lot more than airlines (who fly a lot more). The NTSB report did not state the pilots backgrounds like they usually do. I wonder what kind of training the co-pilot had. Was he just a fill the seat guy or did he have training and/or type in the plane?

I was going to work for a corporate gig as a co-pilot and it blew my mind the training was inhouse basically as you flew.

 

[ultrarunner]

I belive it was reported in the original thread that both these guys had something like 80 years of professional piloting and 10's upon 10's of thousands of hours between them....

for whatever that's worth at this point....

As for your other points, I believe your first sentence would be correct.

As for a 'fill the seat guy'. I don't believe that to be true. This was a 135 gig, so I'm sure these guys met the requirements of the operators training manual.

 

[Cardinal]

They murdered a flight attendant

Ahem, "killed." We pilots need not hasten the criminalization of air accidents. The legal system will eventually take care of that for us, as has been seen overseas. Read E. Gann's Band of Brothers.

 

[ultrarunner]

On a similar topic, were there any criminal lawsuites filed in the GIII fatal accident at ASE?

And what is the status on the civil lawsuits?

I have not been able to find a link.

thanks.

 

[FN FAL]

Ahem, "killed." We pilots need not hasten the criminalization of air accidents. The legal system will eventually take care of that for us, as has been seen overseas. Read E. Gann's Band of Brothers.

Since when did a state never have the authority to charge someone with criminal negligence in a wrongful death, even when the negligence occured while operating an aircraft?

 

[ms6073]

On a similar topic, were there any criminal lawsuites filed in the GIII fatal accident at ASE?

Thats one I have not heard before, what exactly is a criminal lawsuit?