High Performance Twins

[414Flyer]

Most of that is stupid pilot tricks, like taking off with only 1 engine from a 3000 ft runway, that ends in the ocean (he got the darwin award!!). Or running out of gas.
Unfortunately many have been CFIT.

Like starting the front engine, and forgetting to start the rear engine.

 

[sky37d]

Like starting the front engine, and forgetting to start the rear engine.

Yeah, or trying to take off knowing the rear engine was dead.

I wonder if the Adams will have the same problems.

 

[bertengineer]

In God We Trust

A number of guys that I know, mentally go through engine out proceedures right before standing the throttles up. Not me. I have a little prayer which goes " Dear God, let both of these mothers run for the next two minutes".

AWESOME!!! LOL

 

[Lead Sled]

Most of that is stupid pilot tricks, like taking off with only 1 engine from a 3000 ft runway, that ends in the ocean (he got the darwin award!!). Or running out of gas.
Unfortunately many have been CFIT.

I have had to feather the rear prop in flight, and land single engine. Twice. It was a non-event, just a big slow single engine airplane.

I am a fan of the Skymaster. I flew my first one, a fixed-gear 336, 30 years ago as a air tour pilot at the Grand Canyon. I remember a 135 checkride that I took with a fed...

He wanted to see if we could takeoff with the rear one at idle. We were at LAS and taxied out to runway 25. It was no problem, but them we had what? 10,000 feet of runway. The airplane flew like a over grossed Cessna 150. After we got airborne we simply advanced the other throttle.

All that being said, the theoretical advantage of the centerline thrust design has not led to a dramatically improved accident picture for the Skymaster. I did a little research, The publications Aviation Consumer and Aviation Safety ranked the Skymaster fifth out of eight comparable twins in total accident rate in two separate studies. An NTSB study of fatal engine-failure accidents ranked the Skymaster 16th out of 20. Only notoriously “hot” airplanes like the Aerostar have worse records.

As you mentioned, several of the Skymaster’s fatal engine-failure crashes occurred when the rear engine quit on takeoff, and the pilot apparently failed to notice the failure and continued the takeoff. Such accidents have plagued the Skymaster for years; Cessna eventually revised the takeoff checklist to require advancing the rear throttle first for takeoff.

I think that, regardless of where the engines are located, the statistics seem to point out that many pilots aren't up to handling any sort of engine induced problem on twins. Like I said in an earlier post, light twin pilots have to be in peak form, at the top of their game. A lot of them aren't. When the inevitable engine failure occures they are the ones that make the headline on the evening news. It's obvious that a simple 1-hour BFR with its carefully choreographed engine failure exercises aren't hacking it. That's the reason that insurance companies are requiring annual simulator training.

'Sled

 

[rumpletumbler]

He wanted to see if we could takeoff with the rear one at idle. We were at LAS and taxied out to runway 25. It was no problem, but them we had what? 10,000 feet of runway. The airplane flew like a over grossed Cessna 150. After we got airborne we simply advanced the other throttle.

Did put those barn doors in the air with it single engine? 337's always look like they lose an engine to me when they raise the gear.

 

[Tinstaafl]

Have a little bit of time in C337 from a number of years ago. There was so much drag while the gear cycled the drill was to leave the gear down initially if low.

I seem to remember the rear engine was 'critical' in the sense that performance was worse on the front engine alone than on the rear. Mind you it was some years ago so it I might not be remembering correctly.

As long as the reduced performance was recognised AND the engine instruments used to confirm a failure then they were very easy to deal with. Just like an underpowered C210 on a very, very hot day. No asymmetrics to counter.

 

[Vector4fun]

Many, many years ago when I worked the ramp, there was a Dr. who used to call the FBO about once a month, tell them he had a trip scheduled in 30 min, and have somebody drag his C337 out of the hanger and "Check it out". So one of us line guys would get the keys, pull it out, fire it up taxi out front, do a mag check, cycle the props, and look for some red lights or something. (It wasn't like any of us had any flight experience or training in Skymasters) Then the good Dr. would show up in about 20 min, fire up and blast off without so much as winking at a checklist.

There was another guy who had a Twin Bo. He apparently only got the urge, (or courage) to fly about three times a year, always drunk. He'd drive to the T-hanger, open the doors, climb in, fire it up, then drive it out of the hanger over the chocks! . He finally got busted by the Feds for buzzing cars on a causeway, (while drunk, natch.)

30 years ago, I almost never saw a pilot pre-flight a cabin class twin. I almost never saw one watch me fuel or service their plane. Most just hopped in and blasted off. There's a reason why twin fatalities were so high then. I'm not in a position to watch much nowadays.

 

[apcooper]

I'd like to advance this discussion while we're all in this. There is a rule of thumb I was taught when flying a twin. Always fly it as if it was ALREADY on one engine. For example if flying an ILS use no flaps until ldg assured. After takeoff don't reduce power until at least 1000 ft cause if you lost one while reducing power the engine out procedure would be more complicated!

I think mulit-engine pilots need to be trained on far more adverse emergencies than just simple engine failures. How about if a prop blade is thrown off, how bout a single engine ILS to 200ft on a dark stormy rainy night or the windscreen being blown off in night IMC that renders all pitot static insturments inop!! What would you do if these happened to YOU!?? Could you handle it? Would you know what to do and not panic. I know I know, these are far fetched and will probably never happen in an entire lifetime of flying, but again they could according to Murphy. No one thought a DC-10 would lose all hydraulics and crash land in Sioux City. By playing the "what if" game and taking recurrent training seriously you are far more likely to die chocking on food or in a hotel fire than in an aircraft accident. Treat it like lifting weights. See what you can handle in an advanced simulator before you max out and crash!! Just my $0.02

 

[FN FAL]

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20041020X01663&key=1

Review of information on file with the FAA Airman's Certification Division, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, revealed the commercial pilot was issued a commercial pilot certificate on November 2, 2000, with ratings for airplane single engine land, airplane multiengine land, and instrument airplane. In addition the pilot held a flight instructor certificate issued on June 17, 2003, with ratings for airplane single engine land, airplane multiengine land, and instrument airplane. The pilot also held an advanced ground instructor certificate issued on September 11, 2000. The pilot held a first class medical certificate issued on June 13, 2003, with the restriction must wear corrective lenses.

Review of the pilot's logbook revealed his first flight in the Cessna 414 was on April 12, 2002. The pilot's last logbook entry was on December 6, 2003. The pilot's total time including the flight from Tampa, Florida, to the accident site is 4,845 hours. The pilot had a total of 341.5 multiengine hours. The pilot had flown 160.1 hours in the Cessna 414 of which 155.7 hours were as pilot-in-command. The pilot had flown one flight in the Cessna 414 in icing conditions before the accident flight. The pilot's last logbook instrument flight in the Cessna 414 was on November 24, 2003.

I'm not saying a private pilot couldn't build up a bunch of flight hours before getting into commercial and cfi ratings, but the timeline seems a little odd...without knowing when he got his private, it would be a little hard to tell.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The Greeneville 1100 weather observation was wind was 260-degrees at 8 knots, gusting to 14 knots, visibility 10 miles, ceiling overcast at 900 feet, temperature 32-degrees Fahrenheit, dew point temperature 29-degrees Fahrenheit, altimeter 29.97.

The Area Forecasts for eastern Tennessee was for ceilings broken at 2,500 feet agl with tops to 10,000 feet.

The Tri Cities Airport located 26 miles northeast of the accident site reported overcast skies at 1,700 feet above ground level (agl). The Terminal Forecast at Tri-Cities Airport was for winds from the 270 degrees at 15 knots, visibility better than 6 miles, ceiling overcast at 2,000 feet, with temporary condition between 0700 and 1100 of 5 miles in light snow showers and a ceiling overcast at 1,500 feet.

The National Weather Service issued AIRMET Zulu for occasional moderate rime to mixed icing in clouds and in-precipitation below 6,000 feet for portions of Tennessee and Kentucky. AIRMET Sierra was issued for IFR conditions and mountain obscuration. The Current Icing Potential (CIP) product indicated a high probability of icing at 3,000 and 6,000 feet.

The upper air data obtained from the Nashville Regional Forecast Office revealed an inversion with relative humidity greater than 75 percent existed from the surface to about 5,000 feet. A high potential for icing existed below the base of the inversion from 1,231to 4,400 feet with the high relative humidity there was an 86 percent probability of light rime to mixed icing.

Numerous pilot reports were recorded over Tennessee surrounding the time of the accident. A wide range of icing reports from light to moderate rime to mixed icing was reported below 6,500 feet. Cloud tops were reported in the range of 6,000 to 8,000 feet in the immediate area.

The pilot filed an IFR flight plan on December 10, 2003, for the flight from Columbus, Ohio to Greeneville, Tennessee, through the use of the Direct Users Access Terminal computer briefing (DUAT). In addition the pilot received a pre-flight weather briefing for the IFR flight on December 11, 2003. No deficiencies were noted in the DUAT briefing.

A witness, who was located next to a mailbox at 3055 Whitehouse Road, stated he observed a twin-engine airplane, with the landing gear down, in straight and level flight between 200-250 feet above the ground. He initially thought the airplane had departed from the Greeneville Airport. The airplane was heading almost due north when it made a sharp left turn; estimated at a 60-degree angle of bank. The airplane collided with trees and the ground followed by a ball of fire.

Review of RAM Aircraft Corporation, Airplane Flight Manual Supplement for the Cessna 414, states on page 7, with zero thrust at 6,765 pounds, that with the gear down and flaps at 15-degrees the airplane will stall at 94 miles per hour (mph) with a 20- degree angle of bank. The airplane will stall at 104 mph with a 40-degree angle of bank. and 129 mph with a 60-degree angle of bank. Review of radar data obtained from Indianapolis Center and Atlanta center revealed that N1592T ground speed in a left turn at 1046:33 was 100 knots, and was 68 knots at 1046:43.

The RAM Aircraft Corporation maximum certificated ramp weight for the Cessna 414 is 6,800 pounds. The total aircraft weight on takeoff from Columbus, Ohio was 6,840.17 pounds. The maximum landing weight for the Cessna 414 is 6,430 pounds. The total aircraft weight at the time of the accident was 6,471.62 pounds.

The passenger stated he continued to look for ice. They broke out of the clouds at 1,700 AGL. The airport was to his right and below. About the same time the airplane came out of the clouds, the airplane started to buffet and shake. He asked the pilot, "What is it? What is it?" The pilot stated, "I think I know what it is." The pilot applied full throttle, full rpm, and mixture full rich. It appeared that the pilot was attempting to get some power to establish a climb while the airplane was descending. The passenger stated he knew they were going to crash, and he started removing the approach plate holders from both control yokes. The pilot made a "May Day" call. The airplane started going to the left and the mountain tops were getting closer. He turned around and instructed the passengers to fasten their seatbelts tighter and to put a coat or a blanket over their face. He turned around and tightened his lap belt and shoulder harness. The treetops were closer and the pilot made a comment as they collided with the mountain.

 

[FN FAL]

I don't know what it is about 414's, but they suck on circling approaches...even without ice on the airframe, they use up a whole county to turn. I never felt comfortable in a 414 in icing conditions either and this plane seems to act just like a Caravan after just light acretion of ice on the airframe.

After one particular circling manuver in a 414, I resolved never to get my self caught in a position to have to yank and bank one at low altitude.

 

[Lead Sled]

FN FAL...

Here are a couple of thought I had as I read your last post:

Some aircraft have minimum speeds to maintain in icing conditions. For example, the KA-200 has a minimum speed of 140 KIAS, the MU-2 is 160 KIAS. Fly it any slower and you run the risk of accumulating ice in places where the boots won't be able to remove it.

I've got some time in 414s, but not a lot. I always thought of them as underpowered 421s. I've got a lot of time (2000+ hours) in 421s - they do OK in ice, but like all airplanes, you need to keep your speed up.

'Sled

 

[FN FAL]

FN FAL...

Here are a couple of thought I had as I read your last post:

Some aircraft have minimum speeds to maintain in icing conditions. For example, the KA-200 has a minimum speed of 140 KIAS, the MU-2 is 160 KIAS. Fly it any slower and you run the risk of accumulating ice in places where the boots won't be able to remove it.

I've got some time in 414s, but not a lot. I always thought of them as underpowered 421s. I've got a lot of time (2000+ hours) in 421s - they do OK in ice, but like all airplanes, you need to keep your speed up.

'Sled

Yea, the 414 is a nice 3 person/full tanks of fuel, pressurized aircraft. Like most twins, they don't slow to quickly...so if you are planning to do a typical icing scenario non-precision approach, you need to consider shock cooling and how much time you have left during an approach to dirty up the aircraft and slow down (if you chose to dirty up the plane).

So, I'm not picking on this pilot, just highlighting the parts which seemed important...not passing judgement. I think he got behind on his non-precision approach and flew past the airport, then hooked it on the circle. Ice may have played a factor in this crash, but notice there is no mention by the "co-pilot" or the feds of total accumulation?

I'm also curious why the pilot accepted the last altitude given to him before vectors...If I'm above icing conditions and it looks bad at the airport, I'll request a "Pilot's Discretion" descent...if that's not do-able with ATC, then them guys can take another look at the scope and give me a turn or two untill it is do-able. The controller can't tell what or why you need a certain altitude...It's your job as PIC to tell them your needs. Don't accept a descent clearance if it's going to danger your aircraft...and for gosh sakes, if they give you a "PD" descent...use your discretion! It's amazing how many times I hear controllers having to 'splain "PD" clearances.

 

[FN FAL]

Here's a recent news article on the crash...

http://www.greene.xtn.net/index.php?table=news&template=news.view.subscriber&newsid=118041

In all fairness to the pilot, he must have been a good instructor to recieve an FAA award...

...Cessna 414 twin-engine airplane identified those killed as pilot Jochman, 49, who recently had been named a regional “Flight Instructor of the Year” by the Federal Aviation Administration;

Be careful out there!

 

[310]

If a twin has a stall speed above 61 knots or if the MTOW is 6000 lbs or greater, the twin is required to be able to climb single engine at 5000 ft (standard day). The rate is determined by the square of Vso in knots and multiplying that by .027
(example 64 knot Vso. 64 times 64 is 4096. 4096 times .027 is 110.)
A twin with a Vso of 64 must demostate a 110 fpm climb single engine at 5000 feet for certification.
But alot of twins do not have to do this, like senecas, apaches, etc.