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Final Report on N704CK over-run

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Amazing!!! A scenario that is played out over and over in the simulator, an engine failure after V1 yet prior to VR. Very difficult to understand, when you consider the Captain would have had to take his right hand off of the yoke, re-grab a fist full of throttles and execute the RTO.

Yeah, maybe it is not exactly like the one you get everytime in the SIM. Imagine what is going through your mind in a nano second when you here a loud explosion right at V1, you are used to the normal; boom, boom, boom, but this one is different. There is Hazmat down stairs, vehicle, who knows what else! We all are the first to eat our own sitting back and reading the Hazard Report. Statistics are still high for RTO at or above V1. Human nature.......
 
It's always interesting to read these kind of detailed reports.

One thing that came to mind was the OPS takeoff data with only 897 feet of stopping margin. Would that sort of margin, particularly on a wet runway (even though the crew stated that it appeared that the runway was dry), ordinarily prompt you to go with a max power setting as opposed to reduced? I've only used tabulated runway analysis for the past 12 years, which doesn't supply margin info (at least not directly, anyway) and rely on more gut feel on what takeoff power to use, except of course in cases where max is required by the COM.

The only other thing was that the report didn't discuss why the captain didn't use reverse thrust. Uncertainty as to which engine was the problem is about the only thing I can think of, but it's still odd especially given that Kalitta's procedures dictate it's use, and despite that fact that use of reverse isn't considered in reject performance. All four engines at reverse idle, even with one shelled, could have changed the dynamics quite a bit as to how fast they might have been going upon leaving the runway.
 
One thing that came to mind was the OPS takeoff data with only 897 feet of stopping margin. Would that sort of margin, particularly on a wet runway (even though the crew stated that it appeared that the runway was dry), ordinarily prompt you to go with a max power setting as opposed to reduced?

No.

The default calculation for that performance program is a wet runway: it always calculates stopping and the margin based on a wet runway. The runway was not wet. Therefore the stop margin for the runway conditions was greater than calculated. It's a conservative calculation.

You'll always see the red lights on takeoff in that aircraft, save for when empty.
 
No.

The default calculation for that performance program is a wet runway: it always calculates stopping and the margin based on a wet runway. The runway was not wet. Therefore the stop margin for the runway conditions was greater than calculated. It's a conservative calculation.

You'll always see the red lights on takeoff in that aircraft, save for when empty.

Boeing did as well as they could with their slide rules and the engines of the day but the fact remains that many, many runways were extended during the '70's in order to accommodate the 747. Land around established airports being at a premium and the cost of a linear foot of runway being what they are the runways were extended only enough to meet the book values of the aircraft with no margin for human error.
 
No.

The default calculation for that performance program is a wet runway: it always calculates stopping and the margin based on a wet runway. The runway was not wet. Therefore the stop margin for the runway conditions was greater than calculated. It's a conservative calculation.
That's not entirely correct. The default for KA's version of the OPS program for "Dispatch Landing" is WET, which may be overridden under specific circumstances. The default for "Takeoff" and "Operational Landing" is DRY. DRY is always used unless, of course, the actual runway condition is reported or observed to be WET.

Also, the effect of reversers is not factored in performance calculations for the Classic airplanes. Speedbrakes, however, are absolutely essential. You have to get the weight on the wheels to get full brake effectiveness
 
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That's not entirely correct. The default for KA's version of the OPS program for "Dispatch Landing" is WET, which may be overridden under specific circumstances. The default for "Takeoff" and "Operational Landing" is DRY. DRY is always used unless, of course, the actual runway condition is reported or observed to be WET.

Also, the effect of reversers is not factored in performance calculations for the Classic airplanes. Speedbrakes, however, are absolutely essential. You have to get the weight on the wheels to get full brake effectiveness

Correct.

This accident is a good lesson to us all. Do not abort above V1 unless you can no longer keep it on the runway (loss of directional control). When those hands come off the throttles at V1 I always say to myself 'We are going flying'
 
So if all this is true, why would someone make an intersection T/O in a Whale when T/O data was for full length? I was always told that was a no-no, as in FAA violation if found out about. Did I miss the part in the accident report where it says the F/E recaculated for a B1 departure?
 
I got the impression that the crew wasn't aware that they weren't using full length. The line drawing overlaid on the runway diagram doesn't indicate much runway that they left behind, and it appears that most of what was behind them was overrun/underrun. As it is, the difference between how far they went off the end and what was behind them at start of roll is pretty small, based on the pictures, anyway. I know - we could "what if" this all day, just like any accident/incident. All I know is that in years past in a previous life, I took off from what I thought was the end of the runway only to find the next day that there was about 500+ feet more available that none of us could see in the dark and on our first departure from that airport. I imagine that this crew has been to this airport at least a few times with their history with the company, so that's probably a lame excuse, but it happens...

The analysis seemed to conclude that the crew did use speedbrakes/spoilers, and I'll guess retracted them after stopping (which is part of our reject procedure, anyway, don't know about Kalitta). Still at a bit of a loss as to why they didn't use reverse.

Thanks for the clarification on the takeoff data, HK.
 
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