S-3 Sir
Well, this has been an interesting exchange! I have been lurking on this site for a while now, but never registered or posted. I guess I felt compelled to finally pipe in on this one, thanks for the kick in the pants!
Not that it's any of my business, or that I have any real insight to add, but since this topic falls under my current line of work I decided to add my .02 cents worth.
I can understand the desire to know what happened in any mishap. As pilots with a healthy sense of self preservation we naturally want to know what mistakes were made so that we can better understand how to keep ourselves safe. Since the military is a publicly funded entity there is also a certain sense of entitlement to full disclosure as a taxpayer. (and it was pretty obvious to me at least that exagony felt this way, as opposed to valuing dollars over human life)
If a tragedy befell anybody we knew personally we would also want a better understanding of the issues to help us with the grieving process.
I have read the S.I.R. on this one, (as I'm sure others here may have as well) and can attest to the basic accuracy of the short summary posted above. There are more detailed causal factors in the report of course, but nothing that would provide any great insight or lasting benefit to aviation as a whole. Typically human errors tend to repeat themselves.
An important point to make is that we don't keep secrets. The causes and recommendations are shared, just not outside the Navy. The Safety Center ultimately determines final distribution of the reports, but in this case the report went out to all of Naval Aviation. It's not a coverup.
The reasons for privilege have been discussed already to some extent, but I wanted to add just a little for the non-ASOs in the crowd...
From the 3750:
"Military and federal courts grant protection under Executive Privilege to information given under promises of confidentially, and to the analysis, conclusions and recommendations of the AMB and endorsers."
And also:
"The Naval Aviation safety program has long benefited from the willingness of our personnel to confide in AMBs and ASOs."
In short, the concept of privileged information exists precisely to PREVENT a coverup by the individuals involved. And it's not just fear of punishment. People are rarely punished for honest mistakes. Rather it is to protect our military members from a litigous society.
If a Safety Investigation Report were made public and widow "A" learns that technicial "B" installed part "C" backwards because the manual was confusing, you can bet that the matter would end up in civil court. How willing would technician "B" be to admit to a mistake with that possibility? All involved would clam up and call their lawyers. Kind of hard to prevent future mishaps by examining the causal factors and implementing corrective action when everyone is taking the 5th.
So, we grant them confidentiality in writing and ask for the truth. We usually get it. To release any privileged information is to betray that confidentiality and put the future success of the Naval Aviation safety program in jeopardy.
I hope that this may help some of you understand the underlying reasons a little better.