FN FAL
Freight Dawgs Rule
- Joined
- Dec 17, 2003
- Posts
- 8,573
What are you saying, that a manufacturer of jets incurs no liability for not producing a POH or checklist for their aircraft?Lead Sled said:You don't have much jet time do you?
'Sled
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What are you saying, that a manufacturer of jets incurs no liability for not producing a POH or checklist for their aircraft?Lead Sled said:You don't have much jet time do you?
'Sled
That's not what I'm saying at all. They are produced because of certification requirements and the FARs require that they be used. The liability issue arises if they are not provided or used.FN FAL said:What are you saying, that a manufacturer of jets incurs no liability for not producing a POH or checklist for their aircraft?
So you're saying the FAA bears the liability for a faulty manufacturer's checklist that they certified and required by the FARS? And that because the FAA certified and required the checklist, that the aircraft manufacturer is let out of the liability to produce an accurate publication?Lead Sled said:That's not what I'm saying at all. They are produced because of certification requirements and the FARs require that they be used.
REALLY? So if the manufacturer of the aircraft provides pilots with a faulty checklist, the liability issue only arises if they are not provided the checklist or if the pilots don't use the faulty checklist?Lead Sled said:The liability issue arises if they are not provided or used.
'Sled
NTSB Identification: DCA93GA042 .
The docket is stored on NTSB microfiche number 50003.
14 CFR Public Use
Accident occurred Monday, April 19, 1993 in ZWINGLE, IA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 5/10/1994
Aircraft: MITSUBISHI MU-2B-60, registration: N86SD
Injuries: 8 Fatal.
WHILE CRUISING AT FL 240, A PROPELLER (PROP HUB ARM ON THE LEFT PROP FAILED, RELEASING THE PROP BLADE, WHICH STRUCK A 2ND BLADE, BREAKING OFF ITS TIP. THIS RESULTED IN A SEVERE ENGINE VIBRATION & SHUTDOWN OF THE LEFT ENGINE.
THE LEFT ENGINE WAS FORCED DOWNWARD & INBOARD ON ITS MOUNTS. THE CABIN DEPRESSURIZED, POSSIBLY FROM BLADE CONTACT.
THE FLIGHT CREW MADE AN EMERGENCY DESCENT & RECEIVED A VECTOR TO DIVERT FOR AN ILS APPROACH TO DUBUQUE. THE AIRPLANE WAS INCAPABLE OF MAINTAINING ALTITUDE & DESCENDED IN INSTRUMENT CONDITIONS.
SUBSEQUENTLY, IT COLLIDED WITH A SILO & CRASHED ABOUT 8 MILES SOUTH OF DUBUQUE. AN INVESTIGATION REVEALED THE LEFT PROP HUB FAILED FROM FATIGUE THAT INITIATED FROM MULTIPLE INITIATION SITES ON THE INSIDE DIAMETER SURFACE OF THE HOLE FOR THE PILOT TUBE.
THERE WAS EVIDENCE THAT THE FATIGUE PROPERTIES OF THE HUB WERE REDUCED BY A COMBINATION OF FACTORS, INCLUDING MACHINING MARKS OR SCRATCHES, MIXED MICRO- STRUCTURE, CORROSION, DECARBURIZATION, AND RESIDUAL STRESSES. (FOR FURTHER INFO, SEE BLUE COVER RPRT: NTSB/ARR-93/08.)
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
THE FATIGUE CRACKING AND FRACTURE OF THE PROPELLER HUB ARM. THE RESULTANT SEPARATION OF THE HUB ARM AND THE PROPELLER BLADE DAMAGED THE ENGINE, NACELLE, WING, AND FUSELAGE, THEREBY CAUSING SIGNIFICANT DEGRADATION TO AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE AND CONTROL THAT MADE A SUCCESSFUL LANDING PROBLEMATIC.
THE CAUSE OF THE PROPELLER HUB ARM FRACTURE WAS A REDUCTION IN THE FATIGUE STRENGTH OF THE MATERIAL BECAUSE OF MANUFACTURING AND TIME-RELATED FACTORS(DECARBURIZATION, RESIDUAL STRESS, CORROSION, MIXED MICROSTRUCTURE, AND MACHINING/SCORING MARKS) THAT REDUCED THE FATIGUE RESISTANCE OF THE MATERIAL, PROBABLY COMBINED WITH EXPOSURE TO HIGHER-THAN NORMAL CYCLIC LOADS DURING OPERATION OF THE PROPELLER AT A CRITICAL VIBRATION FREQUENCY(REACTIONLESS MODE), WHICH WAS NOT APPROPRIATELY CONSIDERED DURING THE AIRPLANE/PROPELLER CERTIFICATION PROCESS.
Table 5. Degree of injury sustained from 60 commercial aviation accidents with organizational cause factors, 1990-2000. [/FONT]
[/FONT][/FONT][FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]Assessing the assigned findings for the accident sequence of events led to a more comprehensive analysis of the organizational factors. Specifically, the 60 accidents were associated with 70 organizational factors as identified by the NTSB during the original investigation. Based on both the descriptors provided by the NTSB and a review of the narratives associated with each factors, we were able to cluster these organizational factors cluster around 10 broad categories:[/FONT]
[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]8. Faulty documentation (4%)[/FONT][FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]Ex: Inaccurate checklists, signoffs, record keeping [/FONT][FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]NYC94FA123 [/FONT]
[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]Accident occurred 7/13/1994 [/FONT]
[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]Atlantic City[/FONT][FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman], NJ[/FONT]
[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]EGQA [/FONT]
[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]Lear LR-35 [/FONT]
[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]Non-scheduled, Part 135[/FONT]
[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]The takeoff was aborted because the pilot could not maintain directional control. The plane did not stop on the remaining runway. Improper maintenance, [/FONT][FONT=BNDEMJ+TimesNewRoman,Bold]incorrect checklist provided to aircrew (“reversed thrusters armed” missing on the checklist), and lack of pilot experience were factors in this accident. [/FONT]
[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]MIA96FA059 [/FONT]
[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]Accident occurred 1/7/1996 [/FONT]
[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]Nashville[/FONT][FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman], TN[/FONT]
[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]Airtran Airlines, Inc – VJ6A [/FONT]
[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]Doug DC-9-32 [/FONT]
[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]Scheduled, Part 121[/FONT]
[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]The flight crew’s improper procedures and actions in response to an in-flight abnormality resulted in the inadvertent in-flight activation of the ground spoilers during the approach to landing and the airplane’s excessively hard impact in the runway approach light area. [/FONT][FONT=BNDEMJ+TimesNewRoman,Bold]The incomplete procedural guidance contained in airline quick reference handbook and checklist, [/FONT][FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]crews’ inadequate knowledge and understanding of aircraft systems and airline’s failure to incorporate cold weather nosegear servicing procedures in it operations and maintenance manuals were major causes of the accident. [/FONT]
[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]NYC96FA174 [/FONT]
[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]Accident occurred 8/25/1996 [/FONT]
[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]Jamaica[/FONT][FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman], NY [/FONT]
[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]TWA [/FONT]
[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]LKHEED L-1011 [/FONT]
[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]Scheduled, Part 121[/FONT]
[FONT=BNDEJI+TimesNewRoman]The flight crew failed to complete the published checklist and to adequately crosscheck each other, resulting in their failure to detect that the leading edge slats had not extended. This caused the tail to contact the runway during the computer-driven, auto-land flare for landing. Inadequate inspection procedures for the slat drive system, and the [/FONT][FONT=BNDEMJ+TimesNewRoman,Bold]operator's inadequate checklist, which did not include having the Flight Engineer monitor the double needle slat gauge were causes of the accident.[/FONT]
TiredOfTeaching said:Half those egotists have never had to see what it looks like when your going down with nothing creating any thrust. I have and it hard to make your brain work, it's more a reaction than a thought out plan of action.
I'll say it for you again. Checklists and POH's sole purpose is limit liabilty of the manufacturer. Your not following them, places the liability on you...the negligent pilot.
avbug said:Thanks for clarifying that. It's what I thought you said.
What an utterly stupid thing to say.
FN FAL said:Why would you continue to hold? Out of courtesy to the other people who do not have an emergency? Or just to give you something to do until the second engine went fubar?
.........
How long are you going to fly around with this "simple" engine failure, devoting all this time and effort trying to get the engine relit? What if you get it re-lit and the insides come unglued, placing you in a position where the prop can't be feathered, the engine comes out of the engine mounts or exhaust gasses cut your wingspar?
Checklists and POH's sole purpose is limit liabilty of the manufacturer. Your not following them, places the liability on you...the negligent pilot.