No arguement, Mar. But we're not talking about the nicities of the traffic pattern. We're talking about having an emergency and getting on the ground right now...vs. getting to a runway with crash rescue, or close to shore...etc. Chances are that had each of those aircraft simply put themselves on the ground directly underneath the point where the emergencies first occured, or were recognized, they wouldn't have fared any better.
Radial engines are unique in certain aspects, in that fires can start which cannot be put out. That's typically true of most oil fires. Bust a governor base, rupture an oil return line, punch a hole in the case or lift a jug and shed oil to the collector, and you may have a fire that can't be extinguished. A really hot one, and not one with a few pints of fluid, but 50 gallons or more. Certainly something to be considered serious.
You can certainly understand, however, the potential ramifications for getting your DC-6 stopped in the terrain you typically overfly, vs. getting to help. You're also in situations personally where help may be hours, days, or weeks away...something not generally experienced in the lower 48. In many cases, there really is nowhere for you to go. The same may apply to a transoceanic operation.
Still, the fact remains that to get down, one has a certain amount of time. One can use that time getting to a spot directly beneath the airplane (seldom a wise choice), or one may point the airplane in the direction of help and get there.
The basic rule of thumb on a burn (and this is very general) is that it doubles in size every minute. That's with no intervention. Alter the burn conditions and the rule is changed. Cut off fuel, alter airflow, etc, then the rules change.
While it's dramatic to think that a fire could become unmanagable in 15 minutes, it's also realistic...but it's also worth remembering that in many such cases, the outcome would have been the same no matter what course of action was taken. Therefore, in such situations, there's no value in pointing to the event as a need to do something different than they did...if nothing would have saved them (and chances are, nothing would), then we can only look at the best options for the next time around. In virtually all cases, the best option is getting close to help.
One needn't fly a traffic pattern; one might land downwind straight in. One might even belly in short of the runway, being closer to crash rescue than one would have been before...but anything that can be done to enhance survivability and a successful outcome is important, and necesary. It's just that very seldom is that "anything" an emergency descent to a forced landing.
Pilots have had it drilled into them time and time again, and in most cases, it's unwarranted and wrong, and based not in reality.
When looking at examples of hot wings going bad fast, look at the transcripts for the last Shuttle failure. A rather extreme example...but there's not a darn thing they could have done to mitigate that, including trying to get down any faster. It really wouldn't have mattered what they did. In such a case, the crew actions become a mute point; the outcome was decided in many of these cases long before the crew took action.
The situations to which I refer assume that the crew still has a fighting chance.
Radial engines are unique in certain aspects, in that fires can start which cannot be put out. That's typically true of most oil fires. Bust a governor base, rupture an oil return line, punch a hole in the case or lift a jug and shed oil to the collector, and you may have a fire that can't be extinguished. A really hot one, and not one with a few pints of fluid, but 50 gallons or more. Certainly something to be considered serious.
You can certainly understand, however, the potential ramifications for getting your DC-6 stopped in the terrain you typically overfly, vs. getting to help. You're also in situations personally where help may be hours, days, or weeks away...something not generally experienced in the lower 48. In many cases, there really is nowhere for you to go. The same may apply to a transoceanic operation.
Still, the fact remains that to get down, one has a certain amount of time. One can use that time getting to a spot directly beneath the airplane (seldom a wise choice), or one may point the airplane in the direction of help and get there.
The basic rule of thumb on a burn (and this is very general) is that it doubles in size every minute. That's with no intervention. Alter the burn conditions and the rule is changed. Cut off fuel, alter airflow, etc, then the rules change.
While it's dramatic to think that a fire could become unmanagable in 15 minutes, it's also realistic...but it's also worth remembering that in many such cases, the outcome would have been the same no matter what course of action was taken. Therefore, in such situations, there's no value in pointing to the event as a need to do something different than they did...if nothing would have saved them (and chances are, nothing would), then we can only look at the best options for the next time around. In virtually all cases, the best option is getting close to help.
One needn't fly a traffic pattern; one might land downwind straight in. One might even belly in short of the runway, being closer to crash rescue than one would have been before...but anything that can be done to enhance survivability and a successful outcome is important, and necesary. It's just that very seldom is that "anything" an emergency descent to a forced landing.
Pilots have had it drilled into them time and time again, and in most cases, it's unwarranted and wrong, and based not in reality.
When looking at examples of hot wings going bad fast, look at the transcripts for the last Shuttle failure. A rather extreme example...but there's not a darn thing they could have done to mitigate that, including trying to get down any faster. It really wouldn't have mattered what they did. In such a case, the crew actions become a mute point; the outcome was decided in many of these cases long before the crew took action.
The situations to which I refer assume that the crew still has a fighting chance.