CrewPASS Now!...EVERYONE PLEASE READ!

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Do you think you can post the Q&A and the White Paper for us non-ALPA folks?

Air Line Pilots Association, Int’l
A Proposal for Creating CrewPASS
A Biometric-Based
Flight Crew Security Screening System
I. Executive Summary
A current weakness of the U.S. aviation security
system is that it may allow uniformed flight crew
imposters to pass through passenger security
screening checkpoints and illegally gain access
to airport secure areas. While passenger screening
checkpoints may be adequate for detecting
improvised explosive devices and metallic weapons,
they are incapable of determining whether
someone wearing a flight crew uniform is currently
employed as an airline pilot, and is the
person he or she claims to be.
Although access control systems are required at
Transportation Security Administration (TSA)-
regulated airports, and those systems are suitable
for identifying and verifying the employment status
of domiciled employees, they do not include
transient crewmembers.
The Air Line Pilots Association, International
(ALPA) convened a small industry working group
in February 2007 to develop a proposal to address
this security deficiency. This proposal,
based on the highly successful
and efficient Cockpit Access
Security System (CASS), is called
Crew Personnel Advanced Screening
System, or CrewPASS.
CASS uses the employee databases
of participating airlines to electronically
confirm the identity and
employment status of pilots so that
they may gain access to the
jumpseats of airplanes belonging to
companies other than their own.
CrewPASS would extend the
CASS concept to discrete crew portals and security
screening checkpoints to electronically
screen flightcrew members quickly, efficiently,
and effectively, thereby addressing the current
security deficiency. CrewPASS would not require
purchasing or issuing new identification cards;
existing airline ID credentials would suffice to
guarantee that flightcrew members have passed
all required background checks and are employed
by a U.S. airline.
CrewPASS is intended to be operated as a prototype
and, pending a successful test, become a
standing, TSA-operated program. CrewPASS is
expected to become a very successful, low-cost
and effective example of how government and industry,
working together, can improve security and
efficiency to the benefit of the traveling public,
the airlines, and their employees.
II. Policy Considerations
The TSA’s CASS program permits identified
flightcrew members to obtain access to the most
security-sensitive area of any airport—
an airliner cockpit. CrewPASS
would permit flightcrew members to
obtain access to less security-sensitive
areas of the airport, such as the
passenger terminal.
CrewPASS would significantly enhance
security by providing a realtime
match of an employee’s photo
stored in an airline database with the
crewmember possessing an airline ID
bearing the same photograph.
CrewPASS would virtually eliminate
the possibility of a uniformed terror?
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CrewPASS Proposal
ist being processed through screening as an armed
flightcrew member.
Section 106(h)(4)(E) of the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act (ATSA) reads, in part, “The
Undersecretary . . . may provide for the use of
biometric or other technology that positively verifies
the identity of each employee . . . who enters
a secure area of an airport.” CrewPASS would be
developed and implemented in concert with this
Congressional authorization.
The Senate Commerce Committee approved language
in February 2007 that was included in the
Senate’s Aviation Security Improvement Act (S.4)
to require the TSA to develop a system to enable
crews to be electronically screened at the screening
checkpoint (see Appendix 1). This legislation
is pending in conference with the U.S. House of
Representatives. The House staff members have
indicated that this provision will likely remain in
the final bill.
The TSA Administrator stated his intentions in
May 2006 to provide a biometric credential for
crewmembers “as soon as possible” (see Appendix
2). ALPA offers the CrewPASS concept as
an identity solution for the Administrator that is
(1) highly secure, (2) maximizes use of existing
equipment, (3) minimizes cost, and (4) is biometric-
based.
Depending on how CrewPASS is ultimately configured,
it could require TSA personnel to check
crewmembers’ identification. The TSA recently
indicated that it wants to assume that function
from the airlines and asked for $60 million to hire
2,000 federal workers who would check photo IDs
and observe passenger behaviors and anomalies.
ARINC and Continental Airlines have volunteered
to support development of the CrewPASS prototype.
The TSA should bear all installation and operating
costs as part of the overall security
screening function that it now performs.
The TSA and several aviation industry organizations
announced on April 18, 2007, their plans to
implement six measures to bolster employee
screening by using a risk-based approach (see
Appendix 3). CrewPASS could make a solid and
immediate contribution to this new initiative.
Random security screening now being conducted
at airports will provide an additional layer of security
to CrewPASS.
Congress has announced its desire to require 100
percent screening of all airline and airport workers
who are admitted to secure areas (see Appendix
4). CrewPASS should go far in addressing
those Congressional concerns. If proper identity
and employment status are not confirmed for all
workers who board or service an aircraft, more
expensive and time-consuming measures, such as
additional aircraft searches and inspections, could
become necessary to ensure that aircraft security
is maintained.
CrewPASS would significantly enhance
security by providing a real-time match
of an employee’s photo stored in an
airline database with the crewmember
possessing an airline ID bearing the
same photograph.
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Air Line Pilots Association, Int’l
The TSA currently permits pilots to gain access to
secure areas at several U.S. airports via identity
checks at crew-only portals. CrewPASS would
permit the expansion of that policy and make such
access available at any airport where CASS is used.
III. Background
Airport security screening was established in the
United States in the early 1970s as a direct result
of the Cuban hijacking crisis. From its inception,
the focus of checkpoint screening in the United
States was to find potentially dangerous objects
carried by passengers that might threaten the security
of an airliner, passengers, and flight and
crews. Given the type of threat posed in the 1960s
and 1970s by homesick Cubans who had no desire
to commit suicide and mass murder, this was
a rational and quite effective approach.
However, on December 7, 1987, a Pacific Southwest
Airlines customer service agent who had
been fired used an expired company identification
card to bypass a security-screening checkpoint
in Los Angeles and board PSA Flight 1771
with a handgun. The fired employee reportedly
killed the flight’s pilot before the airliner crashed
into the ground near San Luis Obispo, Calif.; 43
people died in this tragedy
In response to that event, the FAA amended Federal
Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part 108 in 1989
to prohibit airline employees bypassing security
screening checkpoints. The FAA also revised FAR
Part 107 to require major U.S. airports to install
computerized systems, or their equivalent, for
controlling access to airport secure areas. The
electronic access control systems developed under
the broad guidelines of FAR 107.14 relied on
a local database to confirm an individual’s employment
and authorization to enter a secure area
before granting access. Regrettably, these systems
were not required to be interoperable.
In 1993, Congress appropriated $2 million to develop
and implement the Transient Crew Security
System, which was designed to make different airport
security systems interoperable for the benefit
of transient airline crewmembers. The FAA dubbed
the prototype the Universal Access System (UAS).
The agency successfully developed standards and
performed limited proof-of-concept testing at a few
U.S. airports with the help of two major airlines
from 1994 until 1997. UAS was based on magnetic
stripe technology, however, and though some
airlines expressed an interest in deploying it, the
maturation of “smart” card and biometric technologies
in the late 1990s were among the several factors
that weighed against doing so.
The tragic events of Sept. 11, 2001, refocused the
U.S. government’s attention on the need for better
worker identity management. The Transportation
Worker Identification Card (TWIC) is a biometric-
based smart card that began development more
than 5 years ago for various modes of transportation.
The TSA has not determined whether it will
deploy TWIC for use by the aviation industry. The
TSA has stated that if TWIC is eventually deployed,
any use of the system for the purpose of gaining
access to secure areas will be strictly up to the airport
operator community; no national policy on its
use will be issued.

 

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Despite these events, a genuine security need—
that of positively identifying flight crews and verifying
their employment status—remains unmet,
and the security of the traveling public is being
put at unnecessary risk. This proposal, therefore,
describes and advocates developing and implementing
the Crew Personnel Advanced Screening
System (CrewPASS), a biometric-based
system that builds on the foundation of the TSA’s
highly successful CASS.
CrewPASS would provide a much higher level of
security than is currently afforded by physical
screening of flight crewmembers while lowering
costs, enhancing efficiencies, and reducing the
length of security screening lines for the flying
public.
IV. Leveraging Trust as a
Component of Security
Airline pilots are the most heavily scrutinized civilian
employee group in the United States. Preemployment
examinations for airline pilots
include TSA-mandated criminal history record
checks, employment record checks, medical examinations,
drug and alcohol tests, psychological
examinations, and multiple interviews. Airline
pilots are continuously screened for both professional
proficiency and demeanor, are subject to
repeated criminal history checks, and are continuously
exposed to peer pressure and oversight.
They must meet stringent professional standards
and can be fired even for something as insignificant
as failing to reveal traffic violations on periodic
physical examination applications.
The hiring of an airline pilot represents the end
of a long, arduous journey for many that normally
begins with a unique vision coupled with
a tremendous desire to meet the challenges necessary
to reach the objective. A reasonably high
level of formal education is a fundamental requirement
for starting a career as an airline pilot.
Many airline pilots have had a military
aviation background, and many have been commissioned
officers, often with top-secret security
clearances requiring extensive background
checks to determine the reliability and integrity
of the candidate. This level of scrutiny continues
throughout a pilot’s career as he or she meets
various access requirements dictated by different
locations, job positions, and functional requirements.
Civilian-trained pilots meet similar
challenges, all over a long period of time.
Airline pilots normally serve a one-year probation,
during which time the company may fire the
pilot for any cause. New-hire pilots are “under
the microscope” by their management and colleagues,
but this type of scrutiny continues for the
entire period of employment.
Check rides provide opportunities for instructors
to examine not only flying proficiency but also
other factors that influence potential performance,
judgment, and stability. They examine how well
a pilot responds to the stress of inflight emergencies
in a flight simulator. All U.S. airline pilots
are subject to annual line checks by FAA-designated
examiners, and new captains must pass
check rides with FAA examiners.
All of these factors contribute to the continuous
assessment of the relative risk represented by an
airline pilot and, as a result, make him or her quite
different from other types of aviation employees.
Pilots are not security liabilities—they are assets
who enhance security and function as inflight security
coordinators. They are resource managers
who have great concern for the security of flight,
primarily for their passengers, but also because
their own lives are at stake.
Airline pilots are continuously screened
for both professional proficiency and
demeanor, are subject to repeated
criminal history checks, and are
continuously exposed to peer pressure
and oversight.
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Air Line Pilots Association, Int’l
Trust and Verify
Because pilots manipulate their airplane’s controls,
they literally hold the lives of their passengers
(plus those of their fellow crewmembers
and those of persons on the ground) in their
hands, regardless of whether the pilots have a
weapon in their possession. For that reason,
genuine security is derived by hiring trustworthy
flightcrew members and continually verifying
their trustworthiness, but otherwise letting
them do their jobs unimpeded by unnecessary
constraints. Canada and Israel both follow this
philosophy, as is evidenced by their respective
pilot security measures. Canada recently instituted
the Restricted Area Identity Card (RAIC),
which operates in the same fashion as the proposed
CrewPASS in that it verifies the identity
and employment status of pilots in lieu of physical
screening.
Israel has not had an airline hijacking in more than
30 years despite being a primary target of terrorists.
The Israeli aviation security system is not
based on physical screening of pilots; rather, Israeli
authorities trust pilots, but verify that trustworthiness
by using tools, training, and tactical
knowledge based on generations of experience.
Pilots are an important component of the aviation
security system, but the trust that they have earned
is ignored when they are required to submit to passenger
security screening, for the reasons noted
above. This situation has led to a demoralized and
frustrated pilot group that has lost confidence in
the government’s ability to provide reasonable,
rational, and effective security services. Instead of
being physically screened multiple times each day,
pilots should be recognized as part of the security
solution, not part of the problem. Physical screening
of trustworthy airline pilots, which causes
longer-than-necessary screening queues, takes
away from time that could be put to better use in
screening unknown passengers.
A better way of screening pilots is needed—and
CrewPASS is that better way. CrewPASS could
also be used to enhance security screening of other
employee groups having access to the cockpit. The
FAA specifies which groups of employees are
permitted access to the cockpit and under which
circumstances. As shown in Table 1, flight attendants,
mechanics, and other airline personnel may
be admitted to the cockpit under certain specific
circumstances, always with the concurrence of the
captain (i.e., pilot in command).
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CrewPASS Proposal
TABLE 1
Pilots Yes Yes, per FAR Parts
61, 91 and 121
No Pre-employment checks
to determine
trustworthiness
Ongoing scrutiny by
FAA personnel, medical
professionals, airline
management and other
pilots to continually
verify trustworthiness
CrewPASS verification
Flight
Attendants
Yes, for periods as
determined by the
captain; no access
to cockpit
jumpseat
No Yes Pre-employment checks
to determine
trustworthiness
Physical screening for
dangerous items
CrewPASS verification
Mechanics Yes, may occupy
jumpseat with
captain’s
permission per
FAR 121.547
No Yes Pre-employment checks
to determine
trustworthiness
Physical screening for
dangerous items
CrewPASS verification
Management
Personnel
Yes, may occupy
jumpseat with
captain’s
permission per
FAR 121.547
No Yes Pre-employment checks
to determine
trustworthiness
Physical screening for
dangerous items
CrewPASS verification

 

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V. Technical Description of
CrewPASS
Prototype Version
Shortly after Sept. 11, 2001, the FAA stopped allowing
cockpit jumpseat access to flightcrew members
except those from their own airline. The TSA
reinforced this restriction further and regulated the
use of jumpseats through security directives. As a
result, flightcrew members who were previously
allowed to use jumpseats on other airlines were required
to compete for standby seats in the passenger
cabin—often without success. To resolve the
need to maintain security in the cockpit while allowing
interline use of jumpseats, the ARINC Cockpit
Access Security System (CASS)—a service
approved by both the TSA and the FAA—was developed.
CASS not only reestablished reciprocal
access to jumpseats, it also improves cockpit security
by verifying the identity and employment credentials
of persons asking to ride in a jumpseat.
CASS is an operational system that has been used
since July 2004 to provide a reliable means of
real-time verification of the identity and employment
status of airline pilots at the boarding gates
of most major U.S. airports. The system is currently
used by 68 U.S. airlines that could immediately
participate in a demonstration of
CrewPASS at selected airports.
CASS enables gate agents to query the personnel
records of airline employees wishing to use
a cockpit jumpseat. The airline pilot employee
provides the gate agent with the prerequisite
identification, and the gate agent generates an
electronic message requesting cockpit access.
The request is then forwarded to the ARINC
CASS server, which routes the query to the
airline’s designated database. The approval or
denial response is routed back through the
ARINC CASS server, which returns the response
to the gate agent’s computer terminal.
In CASS, each participating airline develops,
maintains, and houses a database of its own employees
who are authorized to fly in the cockpit
jump seats of other airlines. This database, known
as the Airline Human Resources Database
(AHDB), identifies employees by using their passport
information and a photo. In addition, each
airline uses an Airline Host Requesting System
(AHRS) application to generate access request
messages and provide the interface between the
gate agents and the ARINC CASS server.
For CrewPASS purposes, ARINC proposes to
supply an AHRS application to allow access requests
to be made on Internet browsers located at
selected crew portals and security lanes of the
screening area of target airports. This is the simplest
and lowest-cost implementation, using existing
development and the TSA’s own computers.
Biometric Included in CrewPASS
The CASS response message includes an upto-
date photograph of each employee participating
in the program. A photograph is
considered biometric data and provides a TSA
agent with a high level of identity assurance.
The photographs allow the TSA agent to immediately
verify that the person presenting the
airline identification card is currently in good
standing with the airline and should be allowed
access to the airport gate area.
Portability and Scalability
The equipment required at an airport screening
point to use CASS is a PC computer with a web
browser (i.e., Internet Explorer or Firefox) and
The CASS response
message includes an
up-to-date photograph
of each employee
participating in the
program.
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CrewPASS Proposal
access to the Internet. Many currently available
portable devices, ranging from cell phone to
PDAs, could fulfill this requirement.
The current Web-based application would be
modified to allow each additional airport, or computer
at an airport, to have its own log-in account
that would be configured by the TSA.
The primary effect on the ARINC CASS system
of adding additional airports to the system would
be additional message traffic at the CASS server
and, at the database front-end AHDB, for each of
the participating airlines. Additional traffic would
be managed at ARINC by adding more load-sharing
servers and Internet access circuits to the
ARINC Operations Center Server Farm.
The CASS request and response are not large
messages compared to most of the data that is
transferred over the Internet for Web-based applications.
The request averages about 200 bytes
and the response averages 20 kilobytes—the average
time for a request/response is 5 seconds. A
maximum of 20 seconds required response time
could cause some problems if the system grew to
include several hundred airports, but this could
be minimized during growth of the system by including
compression technology. The ARINC
CASS system averaged 3,500 requests per day in
February 2007.
Feasibility
The CASS System is in use at most major airports.
The primary requirement to take advantage
of this system for security screening is a PC with
Internet access. In the CrewPASS concept, ARINC
would provide a web-based application that a TSA
screening agent would use to issue an access request
for the airline crew member. Operation of
the CrewPASS prototype would mirror the operation
of CASS, whereby the airline employee
would provide the TSA screening agent with the
prerequisite identification card, and the agent
would generate an electronic message requesting
access to the secure area of the airport. The request
would be forwarded to the ARINC CASS
server, which would route the query to the airline’s
designated database. The approval or denial response
would be routed back through the ARINC
CASS server, which would return the response to
the TSA screening agent’s computer terminal.
Discussion and planning could help define procedures
most likely to improve throughput for
crew members, without compromising security.
This prototype could be demonstrated at a small
number of locations for proof of concept with
minimal investment in development and equipment.
Continental Airlines has volunteered to help
with prototype testing.
Costs
CrewPASS would immediately take advantage of
the ongoing security background screening procedures
in place for each airline as mandated by
FAA and TSA directives and policy. Specific costs
for these items would depend on the actual requirements
mandated by the TSA. As proposed
in this document, the incremental costs to the airlines
and the TSA would be minimized.
Cost considerations would include the following:
? The TSA would require PC(s) with Internet
connectivity. This equipment may be accessible
already, shared, or need to be acquired.
? The TSA would require agent training that
ARINC could provide at a per session cost to
be determined based upon location.
CrewPASS would
immediately take
advantage of the ongoing
security background
screening procedures in
place for each airline as
mandated by FAA and TSA
directives and policy.
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Air Line Pilots Association, Int’l
? Developing a TSA-specific AHRS Web-based
application to provide access request to
ARINC server would require a one-time
startup cost, which would be based upon actual
changes required by the TSA.
? ARINC server access costs would rise because
of increased message load. Message load
would increase incrementally with each additional
airport supported. Current ARINC pricing
for CASS is $600/month/airline. ARINC
is currently analyzing a price model to extend
pricing to the TSA at a similar cost/month/
airport basis.
? Airline AHDB applications could be used at
no additional costs to the TSA by using current
CASS protocols to support a proof-ofconcept
test at selected airports.
? Airline IP circuits might need to be increased
to support additional message load.
? Actual costs for screening airline pilots would
decrease because of the significantly shorter
time needed for CrewPASS screening versus
physical screening.
Adding Other Airline Employees to
CrewPASS
CASS was specified and implemented specifically
to support secure access to the cockpit by
airline pilots. CrewPASS could be implemented
to identify other airline employees to further enhance
security in conjunction with additional security
measures as shown in Table 1. The
implementation for most airlines would provide
access to a more inclusive database that could
include those employees, and a message could
be generated that would confirm them as current
employees in good standing. This method
would prevent a suspended or fired employee
from gaining access to the secure areas of the
airport with an expired ID card.
Growth Versions of CrewPASS
CASS is implemented using open systems that are
extensible and familiar to IT departments throughout
the aviation community. The messages that
are sent as part of CASS are based upon XML.
The formats of these messages allow additional
fields to be added when additional functionality
is required. This will allow the addition of fields
indicating roles or any other identification deemed
relevant to this expansion of the system.
Future enhancements may require adding card readers
to eliminate data entry at the security screening
line. Because airlines do not issue a standard identification
card to their employees, options include adding
UPC stickers that may be optically scanned, or
a separate credential such as a smartcard or magnetic
strip card. In any case, the considerations for
additional technology would be:
• assuring low cost of issuance,
• using COTS software and form factors to reduce
cost of issuance,
• assuring durability, and
• maintaining an option for manual data entry.
Wireless PDA technology could also be used to
improve the portability of the solution. The considerations
mentioned above would still apply.

 

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VI. Operational Considerations
A number of operational considerations must be
addressed in the prototype phase of implementing
CrewPASS, including the following:
• The location of CrewPASS monitors and/or
other associated equipment would depend on the
amount of space available at the installation site.
• The TSA must decide whether pilots or Transportation
Security Officers would enter the
data needed to make a CrewPASS request.
• Personnel who verify CrewPASS identification
results would need minimal training.
Crewmembers would be given similar training
on how to use CrewPASS.
Wireless PDA technology could also be
used to improve the portability of the
solution.
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CrewPASS Proposal
• CrewPASS should be tested at large, medium,
and small airports during the prototype phase
to ensure that all issues that may arise are adequately
addressed. Areas at each airport that
can be used to facilitate CrewPASS screening
must be selected.
• The CrewPASS prototype should be used to
determine whether the best data entry device
is a keyboard, as is used for CASS, or some
other type of device. An assessment of this
issue should focus on ergonomics, speed, accuracy,
and ease of use.
VII. CrewPASS Benefits
Use of a biometric-based system to identify and
screen pilots would reduce the TSA’s airport
screening staffing requirements and increase the
screeners’ operational efficiency. Considering the
significant number of pilots traversing checkpoints
on a daily basis, reduction or removing of
flightcrew member traffic through checkpoint
portals would position TSA screeners to better
focus technological and human resources on the
unknown commodities presented by the traveling
public. The TSA’s ongoing random employee
screening would add another layer of security to
CrewPASS.
With a biometric-based screening system, TSA
security equipment and personnel currently used
at dedicated crew screening portals could be redeployed
for passenger screening purposes.
Airports and airlines would derive the customer
service benefit of reduced waiting times at checkpoints.
In addition, expedited passenger throughput
would reduce the potential for a security event
that might target or affect clogged checkpoint
waiting lines. Airport operators would not be required
to implement any new security technologies
or alter their existing access control systems.
A wireless-based system could offer significant
flexibility to airports and airlines in siting biometric-
based access portals. They could be situated
outside the view of the traveling public and
away from crowded terminal areas. A portable
system would offer flexibility to use airport areas
that provide a convenient gateway for crew access
to sterile areas. Because of the unique characteristics
of individual airports, local challenges
could more readily be addressed and resolved with
the portability and simplicity of a biometric-based
access system.
Personnel needed to operate the system would
be supplied by the TSA. The simplicity of the
system’s design allows flexibility in this regard.
The amount of training required for those operating
the system would be minimal when compared
to the training required of checkpoint
screeners. The amount of training required for
flightcrew members using the system would also
be minimal.
Security Considerations
CrewPASS, a biometric-based crew identification
system, would provide real-time verification
of a pilot’s identity and employment status,
With a biometric-based screening system,
TSA security equipment and personnel
currently used at dedicated crew
screening portals could be redeployed
for passenger screening purposes.
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Air Line Pilots Association, Int’l
two highly critical areas of concern. CrewPASS
would virtually eliminate the possibility of a pilot-
impostor with hostile intent entering the secured
area, including the cockpit.
The system would also provide a more secure
method of screening federal flight deck officers
(FFDOs). CrewPASS would eliminate the need
to follow, at passenger checkpoints, certain law
VIII. Recommendations
CrewPASS could bring several benefits:
. . . for the TSA—
• real-time verification of pilots’ identification and employment status,
• a more secure method of screening FFDOs,
• elimination of the need to follow certain law enforcement protocols at
passenger checkpoints,
• reduced airport screening staffing requirements,
• increased screener operational efficiency, and
• opportunities to redeploy TSA security equipment and personnel from dedicated
crew screening portals to passenger screening;
. . . for passengers—
• reduced waiting times at security screening checkpoints;
. . . for airports and airlines—
• significant flexibility of wireless-based systems in siting biometricbased
access portals;
. . . for flight crew members—
• less time spent in security screening, and
• less likelihood that screening would reveal FFDOs to terrorists.
ALPA therefore recommends that the TSA implement a prototype CrewPASS
program and, after successful testing, deploy the system nationwide to electronically
screen flightcrew members.
enforcement protocols that make FFDOs readily
identifiable by the public. Identification of FFDOs
by the traveling public, and possibly by would-be
terrorists, makes those pilots into targets because
they are bringing firearms into the secure area of
an airport. Another benefit of CrewPASS would
be less likelihood that terrorists would identify a
pilot as an FFDO and intentionally avoid flying
on that pilot’s airplane.
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CrewPASS Proposal
APPENDIX 1
S.4
Improving America’s Security Act of 2007
(Engrossed as Agreed to or Passed by Senate)
SEC. 1475. SECURITY CREDENTIALS FOR AIRLINE
CREWS.
Within 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator
of the Transportation Security Administration shall,
after consultation with airline, airport, and flight crew representatives,
transmit a report to the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation and the House of Representatives
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on the status of
its efforts to institute a sterile area access system or method that
will enhance security by properly identifying authorized airline
flight deck and cabin crew members at screening checkpoints and
granting them expedited access through screening checkpoints.
The Administrator shall include in the report recommendations
on the feasibility of implementing the system for the domestic
aviation industry beginning 1 year after the date on which the report
is submitted. The Administrator shall begin full implementation
of the system or method not later than 1 year after the date on
which the Administrator transmits the report.

 

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TSA, AAAE, ACI-NA and NATA Announce
Industry-Cooperative Employee Screening
Plan
April 18, 2007
Media Contact:
TSA Public Affairs—(571) 227-2829
WASHINGTON—The Transportation Security
Administration, American Association of Airport
Executives (AAAE), Airports Council International–
North America (ACI-NA) and National Air
Transportation Association (NATA) today announced
plans to measurably maximize the effectiveness
of screening employees at airports. The
six-point plan to harden and bolster employee
screening utilizes a risk-based approach.
“Our strategy is to be nimble, flexible, mobile, and
above all, dynamic,” said TSA Administrator Kip
Hawley. “Effective security requires partners working
together within a network of overlapping measures
around which terrorists cannot easily
engineer. For that reason, we achieve a better overall
security result by using our resources flexibly,
not tied down at checkpoints checking and rechecking
people that work at the airport every day.”
Over the next 90 days, TSA, ACI-NA, AAAE and
NATA, through a working group, will develop the
standards and solidify the implementation
timeline for the plan. The plan will include testing
of six key measures, followed by a phased
rollout to the 452 commercial U.S. airports.
The six key measures include:
1. Behavioral recognition: growing the population
beyond TSA to include airport employees
trained to recognize hostile intent.
2. Employee training: raising awareness of suspicious
behavior and implementing incentives
for reporting anomalies.
APPENDIX 3
3. Targeted physical inspection: building upon
TSA’s random, unpredictable employee screening
measures to include roving security patrols.
4. Biometric access control: expanding current
use of fingerprint, iris, limited access and recorded
access control measures.
5. Certified employees: creating a new level of
employees that are subject to a more rigorous,
initial level of scrutiny on a voluntary
basis, allowing them to be removed from the
regular, but not random, screening regimen.
6. Technology deployment: continuing to support
the development of security technology
including cameras and body imaging.
The collaborative employee screening plan builds
upon the layered approach already in place at the
nation’s airports, which includes perpetual vetting
of employees against watch lists, badge and keypad-
protected entry points, and TSA employee
screening patrols and surges.
“Airports must have a multi-layered security system
for employees on the airside of airports precisely
because it’s an environment with many
potentially dangerous ‘things’ including tools, fuel
and other objects that are critical to normal airport
operations,” AAAE President Chip Barclay
said. “Targeted, unpredictable physical screening
is an important part of that system, but our top
priority must be to eliminate dangerous people
through strengthened vetting and background
checks. We have to know the employees, improve
background checks, and use targeted physical
screening that isn’t predictable if we want to effectively
screen this critical population.”
“Airports believe that the most effective security
measures are ‘risk-based,’ focusing resources to
provide the highest level of security,” said Greg
Principato, president of ACI-NA. “The six-point
program being developed by airports and TSA will
allow us to evaluate different combinations of programs
and technologies. We can then implement
? 16 ?
Air Line Pilots Association, Int’l
the measures which provide the greatest security
benefits for airports and the traveling public.”
“NATA’s airline service companies and fixed-based
operators recognize the importance of improving
employee screening at America’s commercial airports,”
NATA President James K. Coyne stated. “We
TSA Enhances Security With Employee Screening
Layers Of Security
While passengers around the nation are very familiar with the security
checkpoint, they may not be as familiar with one of the newest enhancements
to aviation security, roving patrols of Transportation Security Officers
screening employees on the secure side of the airport.
The program, started last fall, deploys officers anywhere, anytime to inspect
workers, their property and vehicles. These officers ensure workers
follow proper access procedures when entering secure areas, display the
appropriate credentials, and do not possess items unrelated to their work
that may pose a security threat.
“Anyone accessing sterile and secure areas of the airport should expect that they could be
screened at any time,” said Earl Morris, TSA’s Deputy Assistant Administrator for Security
Operations. “This initiative is one more measure that adds to our strong, layered approach to
aviation security.”
Outside the airport, random inspections include scrutinizing delivery trucks or personal vehicles at
access gates. Inside the airport, roving patrols screen workers with hand held metal detectors and
examine property for threat items that are unrelated to their work. Temporary checkpoints are also
created beyond access points to ensure access protocols are followed and workers are screened
before entering the terminal. These measures do not impact wait times at security checkpoints.
Airport employees receive a security threat assessment prior to receiving credentials and access
privileges. Security threat assessments consist of a criminal history records check and
vetting against terrorist watch lists and are required for not only airport personnel but also
individuals with access to public areas that possess airport credentials. This includes taxi drivers,
parking lot attendants, vendors and shuttle bus drivers who have identification issued by
the airport.
Airports are also required to develop Airport Security Plans that lay out physical security measures,
procedures for safeguarding access control and other protocols specific to the facilities
and area around an individual airport.
Individuals who violate security protocols may receive a civil penalty that varies depending on
the action and circumstance.
believe that this new initiative will bring together
the key stakeholders to address employee screening
and provide effective solutions to ensure that
America’s commercial airports remain the safest in
the world. NATA and its member companies look
forward to participating in the development of these
new voluntary measures over the next 90 days.”
? 17 ?

 

[Nevets]

CrewPASS Proposal
HR 1413:
Mrs. LOWEY (for herself, Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi, Ms.
GINNY BROWN-WAITE of Florida, Ms. JACKSON-LEE of
Texas, and Mr. MARKEY) introduced the following bill; which
was referred to the Committee on Homeland Security
A BILL
To direct the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security (Transportation
Security Administration) to address vulnerabilities in aviation
security by carrying out a pilot program to screen airport
workers with access to secure and sterile areas of airports.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. ENHANCED PERIMETER SECURITY
AND ACCESS CONTROL THROUGH COMPREHENSIVE
SCREENING OF AIRPORT WORKERS.
(A)Pilot Program—Not later than 120 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Assistant Secretary of Homeland
Security (Transportation Security Administration) shall carry
out a pilot program at 5 service airports to screen all airport
workers with access to secure and sterile areas of the airport in
accordance with section 44903(h) of title 49, United States Code.
(B) Participating Airports—At least 2 of the airports participating
in the pilot program shall be large hub airports (as defined in
section 40102 of title 49, United States Code). Each of the remaining
airports participating in the pilot program shall represent
a different airport security risk category (as defined by the
Assistant Secretary).
(C) Screening Standards—
(1) IN GENERAL—Except as provided under paragraph (2),
screening for airport workers under the pilot program shall
be conducted under the same standards as apply to passengers
at airport security screening checkpoints and, at a minimum
of 2 airports, shall be carried out by private screening
companies that meet the standards in accordance with section
44920(d) of title 49, United States Code.
APPENDIX 4
? 18 ?
Air Line Pilots Association, Int’l
(2) DESIGNATED SCREENING LANE—In addition to the
requirements under paragraph (1), each airport participating
in the pilot program shall designate at least one screening
lane at each airport security screening checkpoint to
be used exclusively to screen airport workers under the
pilot program.
(D)Vulnerability Assessments—As part of the pilot program under
this section, the Assistant Secretary shall conduct a vulnerability
assessment of each airport participating in the pilot program.
Each such assessment shall include an assessment of vulnerabilities
relating to access badge and uniform controls.
(E) Technology Assessments—Airport operators at each airport at
which the pilot program under this section is implemented shall
conduct an assessment of the screening technology being used
at that airport and submit the results of the assessment to the
Assistant Secretary. The Assistant Secretary shall compile the
results of all the assessments and provide them to each airport
participating in the pilot program.
(F) Duration—The pilot program shall be carried out for a period
of not less than 180 days.
(G)Authorization of Appropriations—There are authorized to be
appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this
section.
(H)Report—
(1) IN GENERAL—Not later than 90 days after the last day of
the pilot program, the Assistant Secretary shall submit to
the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives
and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation of the Senate a report on the results of the
pilot program.
(2) CONTENTS OF REPORT—The report shall include the
following:
(a) An assessment of the effect of screening all airport workers
with access to secure and sterile airport areas on
screening and logistical resources.
(b) An assessment of the security improvements that are
achieved from screening such workers.
(c) An assessment of the costs of screening such workers.
(d) The results of the vulnerability assessments conducted
under subsection (d).

 

[Nevets]

[FONT=&quot]We weren’t kidding when we said that ALPA would put an end to the senseless passenger-style security screening of pilots. [/FONT] [FONT=&quot]As you know, an evaluation period of CrewPASS ends on Monday. We haven’t forgotten that deadline. We are pressing TSA hard to ensure that the evaluation continues to run past its planned 60-day evaluation. Jointly with the presidents of the Air Transport Association and Association of Flight Attendants, we sent a letter to Transportation Administrator Kip Hawley presenting a strong case for continuing the current evaluation of CrewPASS. The letter notes that CrewPASS is a “win-win” for government and industry and that the TSA contractor for the program, ARINC, has agreed to continue operating it at no charge for at least an additional 120 days beyond the 60-day evaluation mark of September 15, 2008. The organizations further encouraged the inclusion of a biometric management component to CrewPASS and nationwide implementation. Separately, ARINC and ChoicePoint, a biometric provider, this week formally proposed to TSA a new CrewPASS-biometric access service to be operated in an evaluation mode at PIT, BWI, and CAE. Stay tuned! [/FONT]

 

[Nevets]

September 10, 2008

The Honorable Kip Hawley
Administrator
Transportation Security Administration
601 South 12th Street
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Administrator Hawley:

The Crew Personnel Advanced Screening System (CrewPASS) demonstration program, which
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) deployed with the support of the Air Line
Pilots Association, Int’l and ARINC in July, has been an unqualified success. More than 20,000
pilots will have been processed at the CrewPASS screening checkpoints at three separate
locations when the evaluation reaches the scheduled 60-day conclusion mark on September 15, 2008.

CrewPASS has received rave reviews from pilots, airlines and TSA personnel. Pilots appreciate
the additional layer of security provided by CrewPASS’s validation of identity and employment
verification, and the speed with which this alternative screening is done compared to traditional
screening. Airline operators like CrewPASS for the same reasons, but also because it reduces
passenger screening queues and frustration levels. We have also heard from several Federal
Security Directors who enthusiastically support CrewPASS and are looking forward to getting it
at their own facilities. Senior TSA management has repeatedly referred to CrewPASS as a “winwin”
for government and industry – we cannot agree more. Flight attendants are aware of the
benefits of CrewPASS and have informed the agency that Congress intended it to include all
crewmembers, both cabin and flight deck, and that it must add a biometric identity validation
capability before program development is completed.

Although some questions have not been fully addressed about funding the continued operation of
CrewPASS, and how a biometric capability will be added to it, both of those issues are currently
being studied by ARINC, the program contractor. ARINC has informed us that they are willing
to continue operating the evaluation at the three locations gratis until those questions are fully
answered and the program is ready to be implemented nationwide. In our view, it makes no
sense to shut down a security enhancement that is provided at no cost to the TSA when all
affected parties are benefiting from it and want to keep it operational. If CrewPASS were put
into a non-operating status, it could take many months to bring it back on-line again, especially
with a new Administration taking charge of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in
early 2009.

For these reasons, we, the undersigned, urge the TSA to continue operating the CrewPASS
demonstration program at Baltimore (BWI), Pittsburgh (PIT) and Columbia (CAE) airports for at
least another 120 days, while the open issues are being resolved. We also urge TSA to authorize
airlines, on their own initiative and in cooperation with FSDs, to install and use CrewPASS at
additional checkpoint locations. And, we recommend that TSA expeditiously develop and
provide a biometric capability to CrewPASS, add flight attendants as participants, and implement
the system nationwide.

We would be pleased to discuss these recommendations and we look forward to your earliest
reply.

Sincerely,
John H. Prater James C. May Patricia Friend
President President and CEO International President
Air Line Pilots Association, Air Transport Association Association of Flight
International Attendants - CWA

 

[Nevets]

As was announced last week, ALPA co-signed a joint industry letter with the leadership of the Air Transport Association and the Association of Flight Attendants, requesting that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) continue its evaluation of CrewPASS beyond the planned duration of 60 days. Last week, TSA announced that it will extend the CrewPASS test program, but for an additional 180 days instead of the requested 120 days. Administrator Hawley has been so pleased with the program’s positive results that he has taken this action to ensure that CrewPASS will endure through the transition to a new government administration.

 

[j41driver]

As was announced last week, ALPA co-signed a joint industry letter with the leadership of the Air Transport Association and the Association of Flight Attendants, requesting that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) continue its evaluation of CrewPASS beyond the planned duration of 60 days. Last week, TSA announced that it will extend the CrewPASS test program, but for an additional 180 days instead of the requested 120 days. Administrator Hawley has been so pleased with the program’s positive results that he has taken this action to ensure that CrewPASS will endure through the transition to a new government administration.

Source?