Colgan 3407 Down in Buffalo

[Britpilot]

Yeh...I know what you're saying. I'm thinking it's been a long day, and he's got "tail stall due to ice" on the brain. A/P kicks off, he's got yoke going forward, and in the heat of battle, disregards the shaker, knowing full well that in a tail stall, he's gonna have to come in with a gut load of back pressure...
Tired....spring-loaded in the wrong direction...thinking loss of hundreds of feet within seconds...

I agree that could indeed be a possibility. However, I think most of us will just think "stall" when the shaker/pusher activates. I agree with what the other posters are saying with regard to "reacting as trained", there could be a lot of truth in that.
I am curious that some of the posts indicate that you are pulling on the yoke during stall recovery. All of the types I have flown require you to push forward at the first indication of a stall due to the amount of aft trim that is present. Our current SOP is for minimal loss or gain of altitude during recovery.

 

[surplus1]

I think the technique taught now for stall recovery - with a flight director - is at the first indication of a shaker is to hold what you have with regards to pitch attitude - this will indicate level flight at the time of approach to stall and to power out of it using all available thrust. Depending on the thrust vector of the engines and the type of airplane, this might require slight back pressure (or slight push over) to maintain desired pitch - but nothing as aggressive as has been suggested might have occurred. The elevator trim as positionned by the autopilot trying to maintain a set altitude with reduced power would also come into play and would have to be countered with - for a rapid increase in thrust.

It appers from what's been said here earlier that the kind of training you get depends on where you get it. I have no idea how Colgan trains. While I agree with what you said, it doesn't seem as though everyone is doing that.

If the alleged extreme back pressure was intentionally applied by the PF - when the shaker went off and BEFORE the pusher - that would mean that pusher activation was the RESULT of the back pressure - not because the pilot was fighting the pusher.

In other words if what they are saying actually occured - then the pilot's reaction to the shaker was the cause of pusher activation and stall.

When the shaker activates the wing is still flying. There are situations that could make the pusher follow the shaker very closely but airplanes don't fall out of the sky because a shaker went off.

As belchfire said - the time line or sequence of events is very important.

If this pilot was trained to hold altitude at all costs after a shaker event - as opposed to holding pitch and powering out of the shaker - that would explain why he pulled so hard (as alleged). A rote reaction to a training enviroment - another version of conditioned reflex. Pavlov had a great theory. It works for dogs but shouldn't be applied (IMO) to pilots.

It should be noted that this airplane has a "common type rating" with several other models. Granted it is 'similar' to those earlier models but it is not the same. For starters, according to the specs the engines have double the shp of the 300 and it is substantially larger. I can only wonder if the same sims are used for all types or if the sim is specific to the Q-400.

It's a personal peeve but I've always had a problem with "common type ratings" for substantially different aircraft. That's driven by economics - not flight safety. A good example is the DC-9. "Differences training" is an excuse, not an answer.

The autopilot nose up trim plus the effect of so much power added suddenly would increase significantly the effects of any pilot applied back pressure - and gravely aggravate the pitch up effects.

If the airplane is trimmed to hold an airspeed the nose isn't going to drop instantly as the autopilot disconnects. It is either going to stay where it was for a couple seconds or pitch-up. Now add full power in those two seconds and it will pitch up a whole lot - even if you don't touch the yoke. Pull on the yoke at the same time and the pitch-up will become extreme.

In the process you will trigger the pusher right away.

Because the elevator already has much nose-up trim, the application of full power will most likely set off the pusher - even if you never touch the yoke.

You need to touch the yoke - but the input required from the pilot is mostly likely going to be forward pressure to hold the attitude and nose-down trim as the aircraft accelerates - not back pressure.

If for whatever reason you don't train that way - you won't fly that way when it happens.

I suspect the traing here may well be the underlying culprit. That dosen't mean the company didn't comply with what the Feds wanted. Most likely it means that the Feds are emphasizing the wrong thing.

This is a fairly big airplane. It's not a Navajo or a King Air.

I can deal with pilot error - but I have problems dealing with errors that result from defective training or poor design.

 

[Newf Dog]

Surplu1 said:

"I can deal with pilot error - but I have problems dealing with errors that result from defective training or poor design."


Fair enough. Excellent point.

 

[ReverseSensing]

Q400 sim is not interchangeable with the 100-200-300 series.

Difference between shaker and pusher is .05 Vso (shaker 1.1, pusher 1.05).

I don't know what Colgan's manual says about altitude loss in a stall recovery in the Q400, but Horizon's says:

"Stall recovery is prompt following relaxation of rearward pressure or application of gentle forward pressure on the control column. Altitude loss during recovery can be minimized by the simultaneous application of power and positive control of pitch."

In other words, the operator of the largest fleet of 400's in the world does not consider stall recovery and "no altitude loss" maneuver. I think if an FAA inspector or check airman tried to ding someone for some altitude loss on a stall, the candidate could make a very reasonable case that such an expectation is unwarranted, unsupported by the FOM, and probably not a great idea in terms of ingrained reactions in the real world.

 

[ImbracableCrunk]

In other words, the operator of the largest fleet of 400's in the world does not consider stall recovery and "no altitude loss" maneuver. I think if an FAA inspector or check airman tried to ding someone for some altitude loss on a stall, the candidate could make a very reasonable case that such an expectation is unwarranted, unsupported by the FOM, and probably not a great idea in terms of ingrained reactions in the real world.

At Mesaba, if memory serves, they were worried about a net loss, ie at the end of the maneuver get back to the same altitude. At some point, I think the training department finally said something like, "Get it flying again and worry about the altitude bust later with an ASAP."

They weren't concerned with flying the same altitude the whole time.

 

[Raskal]

At Mesaba, if memory serves, they were worried about a net loss, ie at the end of the maneuver get back to the same altitude. At some point, I think the training department finally said something like, "Get it flying again and worry about the altitude bust later with an ASAP."

They weren't concerned with flying the same altitude the whole time.

Agreed, it is a "minimal loss" goal, not a constant altitude.

This is developing a feeling of going way off on a tangent now. Different aircraft have different recovery technique mostly dependent upon power available. The saab is underpowered-it actually requires a nose drop to recover. The two hawkers I'm typed in, one (800) was pretty much a light lessening of back pressure with power and the 1000 would just fly out of any of them by holding pressure.

I just don't see it, if it's a tail stall there will not be a shaker, and since the ap kicked off with the shaker (and not forces), regardless of training, pitching the nose up is just not something I can see this guy doing-especially to the degree the plane did. If anything, he came out of a saab and had a short time in the Q, wouldn't instinct after years of dropping the nose while sim-stall training override the new technique?

Nah, something else is going on-maybe the forgot power thing, I don't know. What I keep coming back to is the extremely low speed the gear came down at. Right now there is no good explanation for that.

 

[firstthird]

From his remarks and demeanor in the hearing I think Chealander has a real disdain for regional pilots.

Anyone else notice that his name is not featured prominently in the stories the last couple of days, I think finally someone told him to STFU. Damage is done though, NTSB spokesmen shouldn't be speculating, period. that is a right you lose when you get privileged information as part of the accident investigation team. imho.

 

[surplus1]

In a 121 training program the way you recover from a stall, and the required performance, is dictated by the FAR's. Appendix F of FAR 121 specifically states the three stalls you will be tested on (clean configuration, take off configuration and landing configuration) and the performance requirement - no loss or gain of altitude and clean up on a specific schedule. It is a constant altitude maneuver. The FARs require you to hold a lot of back pressure on the yoke and power out of it. That is the only FAA acceptable way to complete a Proficiency Check that a Captain must pass every six months. Since that is the requirement to pass a checkride that is the way hours and hours are spent training the maneuver. ​

I’m not going to say you’re wrong sinkrate – because knowing a little about the FAA you’re probably dead on right. But, that does NOT equal the right thing to do in stall recovery training. Please don't take this personal - it has nothing to do with you on that basis.​

I’ll confess I don’t remember when the last time I looked at 121 Appendix F was, or more importantly – cared much about what it said. Yes, I’ve been a Sim instructor & a training captain but never by choice wanted to be a Check Airman. Turned it down whenever offered, which was more than once. That was precisely because of conflicts with the FAA.​

The reason for that isn’t arrogance – I’m about as far as you can get from being a pilot with an ego or a know-it-all attitude.​

In fact every airliner I’ve ever flown as captain was especially modified for me. Right next to that hook where you hang your hat – there was a special two-position switch (ON/OFF) installed. It was labeled - Ego Switch. ​

After hanging the hat, the 1st thing on the before-start checklist was to select that switch to the OFF position. It stayed there for the duration of the flight. The last thing on the shut-down checklist was: Don Hat – Ego switch – ON.​

Now back to the FAA. The FAA is made up of people – and they’re just like you and me. Some of them are very bright. Many of them work there because they couldn’t get hired anywhere else. Some of those turn out to be POI’s.​

In the good ol’ days we didn’t have FSDOS. We had GADO’s and ACDO’s. ​

GADO’s (General Aviation District Office) were for light aircraft – they took care of the small planes, gave check rides to new pilots, appointed examiners, and told us all how to fly. New pilots and CFI’s thought of them as demigods and hung on their every word. Most of the inspectors had precious little more experience and sometimes a lot less than the pilots they supervised. 135 POI’s came from the GADO.​

ACDO’s (Air Carrier District Office) were for the airlines. They did most of the same things that the other folks did, but there were some major differences. 1) All of the pilots in the ACDO were experienced airmen. 2) They were regarded as equals (if that) and not gods. 3) They didn’t try to tell us how to fly – they usually asked us. 4) They were typed in the aircraft in/for which they gave check rides. 5) Most (though not all) had flown the line before they got the job. The POI’s always came from the ACDO.​

Once in a while you’d get the proverbial AH. Usually that was an X-military jock of field-grade rank that was accustomed to “giving orders” and thought he could do the same in the civ, world. Usually it didn’t take long for us to run them off – usually to some 3rd world country. [No, I have nothing against the military – that’s where I learned the trade – or thought I did; I was wrong.]​

Then one day somebody had the bright idea of consolidation, and the result was the FSDO, which made one out of two. In short order just about everything went to h-ll in a breadbasket. We had people telling us how to fly airplanes that they couldn’t fly themselves. People giving check rides and line checks that were not rated in the type. People with backgrounds in light airplanes serving as POI’s with airlines. Training regimes and modules that had everything to do with “rules” and little to do with the real world in which we worked every day. The one-size-fits-all concept may have pleased FAA managers but airlines that got the GADO types were not pleased at all.​

I recall one instance where a former GADO dude giving a check ride in a 72 in which he wasn’t rated nearly resulted in the temporary shutdown of EAL. I also remember a PAA crew walking off the airplane and leaving the FAA to figure out what to do next. The ‘white hats’ just weren’t going to put up with the nonsense.​

The regional carriers usually got stuck with the newbies and the GADO types. Well, the regional carriers have evolved. They are not flying Bandeirantes and Metros any more. The equipment is every bit as sophisticated as that of the legacy carriers, even if not as heavy. ​

Over the years a lot of that has gone away, particularly in the large airlines. However, a whole lot of the BS is still present in the regionals – or at least the one that I worked for. When I first started there I had to unlearn a whole lot of things to keep up with the FAA circus and fill in the squares. At the time the company didn’t have the cojones to tell the FAA when to bug off. Eventually most of that was overcome but only after the company started changing the equipment. From what I hear, some of the residue is still left.​

All of that war story relates to why I think that training for recovery from an approach to a stall or a stall - that requires it to be “a constant altitude maneuver” [your words] is bad training – whether or not it says that in Appendix F of FAR 121. If it says that (I believe you) then it needs to be changed, and now.​

While training does have to comply with the rules, that is not and should not be its primary purpose.​

I believe that making stall recovery’s primary focus ‘a constant altitude maneuver’ is not only a bad training procedure but a dangerous procedure.

The FAR’s are not written in granite; they can be changed and have been many times over the years. Training manuals are written by operators and approved by POI’s. They can be changed too and often are.

If you know or sincerely believe that something in the FARs is wrong you don’t just acquiesce and go with it. You fight to get it changed. The FAR’s are not intended to assist in killing us. They are intended to keep us safe. As long as you can show that you know what you’re talking about, you can find people that will listen and make things happen.​

I sincerely hope that method of training did not contribute to the upset of 3407. Unfortunately it looks like that possibility is lurking in this tragic accident.​

PS. Kudos to Horizon for what appears to be a prudent and sensible training policy.​

 

[Singlecoil]

If they added full power and pitched up aggressively that would be the ground prox escape maneuver. Fatigue can do strange things.

 

[airplane wizard]

To my knowlege - correct me if wrong - SAAB 340s do not have a stick pusher.

Saab has a stick pusher

I though they were only for T-tails because of the deep stall?