Bloomberg on AF447

[Microclimates]

1. Regarding how much experience does it take: there is this book by Gladwell (the guy who wrote freakonomics) that at some point asked the same question, in general: how much experience an expert makes. He came up with a number: 10k hours. Of course his books are screwy and engender a love it or hate it reaction. but interestingly he 'found' (if you believe him) that this number was consistent whether you looked at successful athletes or dancers or musicians (didn't talk about pilots): the ones that 'made' it typically had crossed that threshold of hours practiced... Who knows. 10k flight hours is not a huge amount, but from the little I've seen seems to differentiate a well-shaped career from anything else.

2. regarding the UA DC10 sioux city event... I remember reading the CVR. At one stage the tower says: "clear to land on any runway" and one of the pilots answers: "so now you're getting picky and want us on a runway?" talk about a sense of humor! what a crew

 

[densoo]

Giant line of embedded thundestorms. Heavy aircraft. Night. IMC. Over a dark ocean. Unreliable or inoperative flight instruments cause by severe/extreme icing and turbulence. I'm sorry what are we debating again?

Why a pilot would point the nose 15 degrees up at 35k' when they're already at their max cruise is going to be the debate.

 

[humveedriver]

Why a pilot would point the nose 15 degrees up at 35k' when they're already at their max cruise is going to be the debate.

02:11Z:
Failure of all three ADIRUs
Failure of gyros of ISIS (attitude information lost)

02:12Z:
ADIRUs Air Data disagree

02:13Z:
Flight Management, Guidance and Envelope Computer fault
PRIM 1 fault
SEC 1 fault
02:14Z:
Cabin Pressure Controller fault (cabin vertical speed)


Looks like things went from bad to worse in 3 minutes. What reliable pitch information did the PF have? I dunno looking at those messages. Lost the ISIS? I mean dang, you're having a REALLY bad night here.

 

[jonjuan]

02:11Z:
Failure of all three ADIRUs
Failure of gyros of ISIS (attitude information lost)

02:12Z:
ADIRUs Air Data disagree

02:13Z:
Flight Management, Guidance and Envelope Computer fault
PRIM 1 fault
SEC 1 fault
02:14Z:
Cabin Pressure Controller fault (cabin vertical speed)


Looks like things went from bad to worse in 3 minutes. What reliable pitch information did the PF have? I dunno looking at those messages. Lost the ISIS? I mean dang, you're having a REALLY bad night here.

They replicated all these faults in the sim during the PBS Nova episode, had pitch and power info and were able to keep flying.

 

[densoo]

02:11Z:
Failure of all three ADIRUs
Failure of gyros of ISIS (attitude information lost)

02:12Z:
ADIRUs Air Data disagree

02:13Z:
Flight Management, Guidance and Envelope Computer fault
PRIM 1 fault
SEC 1 fault
02:14Z:
Cabin Pressure Controller fault (cabin vertical speed)


Looks like things went from bad to worse in 3 minutes. What reliable pitch information did the PF have? I dunno looking at those messages. Lost the ISIS? I mean dang, you're having a REALLY bad night here.

Yea, pitching the nose up may have been due to no/unreliable ADI. They may be able to tell from the CVR and data side-by-side. I think this will be where the discussion is for awhile.

 

[...Lost]

Hadn't seen this report posted anywhere, and it includes CVR and FDR data.


http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&sour...I7e5AxE0Q&sig2=wSutV4Y2EfwuUS7NuWfing&cad=rja

 

[SERPICO]

How little time makes you safe? Yes, you're never immune. I guess if they develped a test to determine that a 250-hour pilot will never have an accident then all would be well. I've heard stories of incidents/accidents on retirement flights or those very near retirement. But I don't think the Sioux City accident would have had the same outcome without the immense experience on that flight deck.

I get it. Whats the point to the original post?
I can't compare these accidents though, Souix City, Qantas in Singapore, both heavily crewed by coincidence.
11K for an FO is common here becuase we have been in an industry meltdown for an enternity. That could change on a dime.
If they do develop that test, we will all fail.

 

[cunchos]

So they were on alt law? Direct law would not let this happen....

 

[Stukadriver]

Giant line of embedded thundestorms. Heavy aircraft. Night. IMC. Over a dark ocean. Unreliable or inoperative flight instruments cause by severe/extreme icing and turbulence. I'm sorry what are we debating again?

Exactly. They made it look too easy in the sim on the Nova episode. A bouncy ride and a colorful blob on your ND just can't replicate the feeling of flying into a 55,000 foot tall thunderstorm. For added realism, you need a second instructor. On one hand he wears a boxing glove and uses it to punch the pilot in the jimmy until his family jewels are up in his throat. With the other, he holds a loaded gun to the pilot's head.

 

[mrnolmts]

WOW! the only one drawing conclusions would be you sir...

Really?

we need to teach "pitch+power+configuration=performance"

As a professional pilot you should be able to fly your aircraft without airspeed. This was taught to me in basic training.

 

[humveedriver]

Decent analysis pre-blackbox discovery. Very informative stuff about ITCZ thunderstorms and what the pilots encountered.

http://www.weathergraphics.com/tim/af447/

 

[densoo]

Air France Catastrophe

Victims' Families Propose Grounding All A330s

Gerald Traufetterrs 1 June 2011

Families of victims of the AF 447 crash two years ago say that a technical defect could be to blame for the catastrophe.

Airbus believes pilot error caused the crash of Air France flight AF 447 two years ago. But the families of some victims think it might have been a technical defect. They have filed a petition with a Paris court which could result in a temporary grounding of all A330s.

An initial report released by the French aviation accident investigation agency BEA, based on a preliminary analysis of flight AF 447 data recorders, provided plenty of insight into the causes of the Air France crash into the Atlantic Ocean two years ago. But plenty of questions remain open -- and they have provided fuel to an intense debate currently raging among Air France, Airbus and the families of crash victims.

The central questions are clear: Did the pilots react incorrectly once the speed sensors on the outside of the plane iced up and the automatic pilot disengaged? Or was an additional technical error to blame?

Lawyers and technical experts for the families of German crash victims suspect that a hidden software error in the automated flight control system -- specifically concerning a vital stabilizer flap on the plane's tail -- doomed to failure all pilot efforts to regain control of the plane. They are demanding that the Parisian court investigating the crash take action. "We petition that appropriate action be taken to prevent a catastrophe similar to that which befell AF 447 from happening again," reads the letter submitted to Judge Sylvie Zimmermann, which SPIEGEL has obtained.

The families' attorneys are demanding that the court require Airbus to undertake "technical improvements" so that "speed sensors can no longer ice up in the future." Should that not be possible, then Airbus planes must be "outfitted with software for the electronic flight control system that precludes the sudden occurrence of an uncontrolled flight situation."

The letter also raises the possibility that the entire fleet of Airbus A330s as well as that of the sister model A340 might have to be temporarily grounded. More than 1,000 planes would be affected by such an order.

A Strange Anomaly

The Hanover legal practice of Ulrich von Jeinsen, which composed the letter, and the Berlin aviation law expert Elmar Geimulla made mention in the letter that there could be "criminal consequences" should indications of a software error not be thoroughly investigated and another Airbus crashes for the same reason.

Von Jeinsen's motion is primarily based on the expert opinion of Gerhard Hüttig, a professor at the Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics at the Technical University in Berlin. Just over a year ago, Hüttig recreated the Air France crash in a flight simulator. In the course of the exercise, Hüttig noticed a strange anomaly in the plane's reaction once it goes into a stall. The trimmable horizontal stabilizer, a flap instrumental in keeping the plane on an even keel, automatically adjusted to push the nose of the plane skyward.

Hüttig, a former Airbus pilot himself, and other pilots present for the test were unable to push the nose of the airplane down and thereby escape the stall.

When the BEA released its preliminary report last Friday, Hüttig immediately zeroed in on data relating to the trimmable horizontal stabilizer. During the final minutes of flight AF 447 as it plunged toward the Atlantic, the flap moved from a 3 degree deflection to a 13 degree deflection, almost the maximum possible. "The phenomenon is startlingly similar," he told SPIEGEL.

A Quiet Reaction

Hüttig passed along his simulator findings to Airbus, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and to BEA. On Oct. 27, 2010, Hüttig received a response from EASA which said that Hüttig's theory was inconsistent with the "current state of knowledge." "We suspect that the anomaly you found originated with the simulator you used in the study rather than with the airplane model A330," the response read.

Hüttig and Jeinsen told SPIEGEL that the data recovered from the wreck of flight AF 447 would now seem to have corroborated the simulator findings. Furthermore, Airbus has quietly reacted to the safety loophole. In a communiqué to airlines, Airbus provided a new version of pilot instructions for dealing with a stall. Furthermore, in the January issue of its internal safety magazine, there is a mention of manually trimming the horizontal stabilizers.

In response to a SPIEGEL query, Airbus rejected Hüttig's theory. The company has said that the deflection of the stabilizers can be explained by pilot attempts to pull up the nose of the aircraft.

 

[wrigley23]

LJ45 has not been pounding his chest as you suggest and has not said he could have handled it perfectly. I think when this is all over he will be proven right. I am sure the investigaters know exactly what happened, just haven't put it in their report yet.

Not being Airbus trained, by choice, I had the same questions LJ45 had and have no idea with a stall warning why you would pull back in any airplane. I have flown 74 different types of aircraft including Lear Jets and 4 different airliners and not once have I been encouraged to pull back with a stall warning. Windshear is the exception because of proximity to the ground. Never at altitude. I know Airbus preaches their airplanes can't stall so you can pull full back during stall recovery but how well did it work this time? Did it go into alternate law or direct law so the computer removed all protections? If so why would they teach to pull back on stall recovery? By the way I noticed Airbus just changed their stall recovery procedure to reduce pitch first. Too bad they didn't do that two years ago.

Probably one of the most intelligent and thought provoking posts I've ever read on this forum. Thank you.

In addition:

Never flown a Bus, but have jumpseated countless times and always wondered why the wing ice was never used. I was told because the wing is not super critical like the crappy rjs. Well, was severe clear ice encountered here as the reports indicate and was the wing ice ever turned on? Seems the stall envelope would be affected by that for sure? Amongst all the other countless caution messages occurring.

 

[mrnolmts]

probably one of the most intelligent and thought provoking posts i've ever read on this forum. Thank you.

roflmao!