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Ameristar Lear preliminary report

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RideTheWind

Well-known member
Joined
Sep 16, 2003
Posts
400
http://www.ntsb.gov/NTSB/brief.asp?ev_id=20030924X01580&key=1


NTSB Identification: FTW03FA229
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Friday, September 19, 2003 in Del Rio, TX
Aircraft: Gates Learjet 25B, registration: N666TW
Injuries: 1 Fatal, 1 Serious.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

On September 19, 2003, at 1710 central daylight time, Gates Learjet 25B, twin-turbo jet transport airplane, N666TW, operating as AmeriStar flight 982 was destroyed upon collision with trees and terrain when it overran the departure end of runway 13 while landing at the Del Rio International Airport (DRT), near Del Rio, Texas. The airline transport rated captain was fatally injured, and the airline transport rated pilot acting as first officer was seriously injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 repositioning flight. The airplane was owned by Sierra American Corporation of Wilmington, Delaware, and was being operated by AmeriStar Air Cargo, Inc., of Addison, Texas, an on-demand air taxi cargo operator. An instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed for the flight which originated from El Paso International Airport (ELP) at approximately 1625, with Del Rio as its intended destination.

Flight 982 had been cleared by approach control for a visual approach to runway 13. There were several eyewitnesses to the accident. One witness, who was standing outside the FBO facilities at the airport, stated that the airplane was "high and fast" and he was expecting the airplane to execute a go-around. Another witness, located on the airport ramp, observed that the airplane was going "too fast that he thought the airplane was taking off instead of landing." A third witness, who was doing some outdoor painting and was concerned with over-spraying aircraft on the ramp, stated that he observed the wind sock at the time of the landing, and added that a slight tailwind was present when the airplane landed. Another witness observed "the airplane was going very fast" and noted that the airplane landed past the intersection for taxiway Charlie. Taxiway Charlie is located about 1,875-feet short of the departure end of the runway. The pilot of a King Air that observed the landing airplane reported the flaps appeared to be fully extended. None of the eye-witness reported hearing the sound of the engines spooling-up in an attempt to abort the landing.

The airplane overran the end of the runway, impacting the airport perimeter fence, proceeded across a roadway, impacting another fence, struck two trees, and multiple headstones. The airplane came to rest in the upright position on a measured magnetic heading of 040 degrees at an elevation of approximately 976-feet, approximately 1,600 feet beyond the departure end of the runway.

Examination of the wreckage by the NTSB investigator-in-charge revealed the all flight controls were accounted for within the debris field. The left wing was separated, and the fuselage forward of the aft pressure bulkhead was consumed by a post-impact fire. The empennage remained intact, with minor fire damage. Examination of runway 13, revealed signs of breaking action approximately 1,247-feet short of the departure end of the runway, and visible signs of skid marks were found throughout the path to the main wreckage. The drag chute was not deployed.

There was no cargo aboard the airplane at the time of the accident. Based on the estimated landing weight of the airplane, the Vref for the landing was calculated at 116 knots. No distress calls were received from the aircraft prior to the accident. Preliminary radar information revealed a ground speed of 190 knots over the approach end of runway 13.

At 1653, the DRT automated surface observation system (ASOS), reported the wind variable at 4 knots, visibility 10 statue miles, skies clear, temperature 28 degrees Celsius, dew point 17 degrees Celsius, and an altimeter reading of 30.03 inches of Mercury.
Index for Sep2003 | Index of months
 
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The first officer died, 2 days ago I think, in the hospital.

It doesn't make any sense whatsoever.

According to newspaper reports, the captain had landed there 60-80 times before, and the first officer 20+ times.

Was the pilot flying trying to kill themselves? Did the pilot flying have a seizure, or something like that?

How can you possibly explain something like this.

Cliff
DTW
 
atpcliff said:
The first officer died, 2 days ago I think, in the hospital.


easy big guy...this is not the case. please make sure when posting this kind of stuff as there are quite a few of her associates that cant get much more info than what is posted here. she is alive albeit still in ICU, immediate family only :(

...thank you
 
Sorry about that. I hope she makes it.

A guy who said she was a freind of hers told us a day ago that she had passed away the day before.

God bless her and her family.

Cliff
DTW
 
no problem man. you arent exactly known as one of the pot-stirrers ;) i just wanted you to know she is still in ICU at the burn center although it sounds like she may be there for a little while :(

...thanks again
 
atpcliff said:


How can you possibly explain something like this.


My best wishes and prayers for the survivor.


Cliff, you can't explain something like this. However, I've darn near done the same thing, and at my home field no less! In my case, I was expecting the NFP, who was sitting right seat but had many more years in a Lear than myself, to speak up if he saw something that didn't look right. He didn't, and I convinced myself that we could bleed off those 30 extra knots in the flare. I was only about three feet from being wrong. In my case, the highly experienced pilot never said a word. I guess he would have let me kill him. To this day, I don't know why he didn't call BS. I guarantee that my MD80 right seaters would have cold cocked me. But my current job holds pilots to higher standards than did my corporate employer. The corporate employers only real concern was whether or not the proper brand of muffins and soft drinks were stocked on the plane. Oh, and that the leading edges were always polished. Go figure.

BTW, I took a vow to never again fly a long straight in visual without being configured and slowed by at least a three mile final.
regards,
enigma
 
How can you possibly explain something like this.

I recall a couple of years ago an older Lear went off the end at Lexington, KY. I think there are three possibilities:

1) Too fast at touchdown

2) A mechanical failure after touchdown with brakes or reversers

3) A combination of the two

We will learn another expensive lesson from this. I hope the FO pulls through so her account can help keep another similar accident from happening. Of course, I DO hope she pulls through period!
 
I recall a couple of years ago an older Lear went off the end at Lexington, KY. I think there are three possibilities:

1) Too fast at touchdown

2) A mechanical failure after touchdown with brakes or reversers

3) A combination of the two

were you thinking of this crash, time builder...I couldn't find the one for Lexington? (full NTSB narative on the link below)

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief2.asp?ev_id=20010119X00328&ntsbno=ATL01FA021&akey=1

NTSB Identification: ATL01FA021. The docket is stored on NTSB microfiche number DMS.
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Sunday, January 14, 2001 in Troy, AL
Probable Cause Approval Date: 7/23/03
Aircraft: Learjet LJ-60, registration: N1DC
Injuries: 2 Serious.
According to witnesses, the airplane collided with the deer shortly after touchdown and continued down the runway with the tires smoking, and veered off the right side of the runway near the end, crossed a taxiway, and impacted into a ditch and burst into flames. With an estimated empty weight of 15,800 pounds and estimated fuel of 1,100 pounds, it was calculated that the airplane traveled 1500 feet after touchdown in 4.2 seconds before striking the deer, the performance group at Learjet using the weather reported at Troy, Alabama (variable winds and temperature at 14 degrees Celsius) the airplane landed with a ground speed of 210 knots.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

On ground collision with deer during landing roll.
 
I guess I spoke too soon, my search of the database was limited by a datafield when I did the initial search. I think this is the accident you were thinking of timebuilder...

NTSB Identification: NYC02FA177
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Friday, August 30, 2002 in Lexington, KY
Aircraft: Gates Learjet 25C, registration: N45CP
Injuries: 1 Fatal, 4 Serious, 1 Minor.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On August 30, 2002, at 1307 eastern daylight time, a Gates Learjet 25C, N45CP, operated by American Air Network, Incorporated, doing business as (dba) Care Flight International, was destroyed when it overran a runway at Blue Grass Airport (LEX), Lexington, Kentucky. One passenger was fatally injured. The captain, first officer, flight nurse and another passenger were seriously injured, and a truck driver received minor injuries. An instrument flight rules flight plan had been filed for the flight, between Marco Island Airport (MKY), Marco Island, Florida, and Lexington. The air ambulance flight was conducted under 14 CFR Part 135.

According to the flight nurse, the deceased passenger was en route Lexington to receive medical treatment. The passenger was belted into the seat on the left side of the cabin, just aft the cabin door. The other passenger was seated directly behind her. The flight nurse was seated on the right side of the cabin, immediately forward of the medical stretcher, which was not occupied.

According to a Lexington Tower controller, the airplane landed about 2,000 feet beyond the approach end of runway 04. The nose of the airplane touched down, then rose, as if the pilot was conducting aerodynamic braking.

A parking garage camera recorded the landing in stop-frames. A review of the poor-quality recording resulted in an estimated touch-down point between 1,500 feet and 2,500 feet from the approach end of the runway.

After touchdown, the airplane continued down runway 04, until it left the camera's view near taxiway Charlie. Shortly thereafter, the camera panned to the departure end of runway 04, and to the heavy smoke emanating from just beyond the runway, on U.S Route 60.

A review of tower transmissions revealed that shortly before the airplane went off the runway, one of the pilots keyed the microphone and shouted "brakes, brakes!"

The accident occurred during the hours of daylight, when the airplane departed the end of runway 04 at 38 degrees, 02.56 minutes north latitude, 84 minutes, 35.9 minutes west longitude.

PILOT INFORMATION

The captain held an airline transport pilot certificate with multi-engine and Learjet ratings. According to company records, his latest FAR Part 135 proficiency check was on July 19, 2002. The captain's latest Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) first class medical certificate was dated July 16, 2002.

During the accident, the captain suffered head trauma, and subsequently could not remember any part of the accident flight after its departure from Florida.

The first officer held a commercial pilot certificate with multiengine and instrument ratings. According to company records, his latest FAR Part 135 proficiency check was on June 22, 2002. The first officer's latest second class FAA medical certificate was dated February 12, 2002.

Due to the severity of his injuries, the first officer was not interviewed for the preliminary report.

OPERATOR INFORMATION

According to the director of operations, the operator managed 17 contracts, in which, "dba's" obtained their own customers, charged and collected fees for services under their own Department of Transportation-registered dba name, and incurred all expenses. The operator received signing and monthly flat fees, and provided FAR Part 135 operational control, including pilot training/records oversight, scheduled and unscheduled maintenance, crew scheduling, and dispatch flight following.

The operator managed 47 aircraft and 85 pilots.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the airplane was owned by Henry Air, Limited.

The airplane had a Dee Howard XR conversion, which included thrust reversers. According to the XR maintenance manual, the thrust reversers consisted of upper and lower "clam shell" doors that pivoted near the engines' horizontal centerlines. Reverser deployment was hydraulically actuated and electrically controlled. There was also an accumulator, which allowed deploy/stow cycling in the event of hydraulic system failure. The system would not have been armed unless the airplane was "firmly on the ground."

Maintenance records revealed that the airplane's left main tires were replaced on August 19, 2001, the nose tires were replaced on September 19, 2001, and the right main tires were replaced December 13, 2001. On December 28, 2001, 200/400/600-hour inspections were completed on both thrust reversers. On March 12, 2002, the airplane's hydraulic pumps and brake assemblies were removed and replaced. On June 6, 2002, a nose wheel tire was replaced and the drag chute was inspected.

On June 19, 2002, the airplane was placed on American Air Network's approved airworthiness inspection program (AAIP).

According to the captain and first officer who had flown the airplane the previous week, there were no maintenance deficiencies. The captain, who had almost 2,000 hours in Lear-20 series airplanes, further stated the accident airplane was "one of the best, if not the best, [Lear 25s]" that he had flown.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

Weather, recorded at Blue Grass Airport at 1319, included a broken cloud layer at 4,300 feet, visibility 10 statute miles, winds from 050 degrees true, at 7 knots, temperature 81 degrees Fahrenheit, dewpoint 64 degrees Fahrenheit, and a barometric pressure of 30.19 inches HG.

AIRPORT INFORMATION

Runway 04 was 7,003 feet long. Elevation at the approach end was 944 feet above mean sea level (msl), and rose to 979 feet msl about 2/3 along its length. Elevation then decreased, to 972 feet msl at the departure end.

At the departure end of the runway, there was a paved overrun area, about 100 feet in length, followed by a grassy area at the same elevation, about 50 feet in length. The grassy area then dropped off, about 50 feet, at an angle of approximately 60 degrees. About 200 feet from the end of the paved overrun area (about 150 feet from the beginning of the drop-off) there was an instrument landing system (ILS) platform which was constructed of telephone poles and heavy crossbeams, and which rose about 50 feet in height. Beyond the ILS platform, about 60 feet, there was a drainage ditch. The drainage ditch ran along U.S, Route 60, which was, with the median included, about five lanes in width, and bordered on both sides by paved shoulders.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

No skid marks were found on the runway; however, light, straight-line skid marks matching the width of the jet's main landing gear, were found on the last part of the paved overrun, for about 40 feet. The skid marks, along with added marks matching the position of the jet's nosewheel, continued through the grass, to the edge of the drop-off. There were no tire tracks beyond the edge of the drop-off.

The northwest (left) half of the ILS platform was cut off horizontally, with the tallest remaining structure rising to almost 1/3 its original height. The majority of the platform top had fallen straight down, into the remaining support structure.

A debris and soot trail began at the ILS platform, crossed the drainage ditch, and veered toward the right, across Route 60, to the main wreckage. The airplane came to rest on the opposite shoulder, facing 080 degrees magnetic.

The airplane's right wing was detached from the fuselage, and the empennage was burned from the engines, aft. Both main landing gear were detached from the wings, and the nose landing gear was collapsed. One of the four main landing gear tires exhibited a bald spot, which did not penetrate to the cord. The thrust reversers were out of the stowed position, but were not deployed. The drag chute was also not deployed. Flap position could not be determined due to ruptured hydraulic lines.

In the cockpit, the throttles were at idle, and the flap handle was in the down position. The drag chute handle and the emergency brake handle were in the stowed position; however, the "emergency air" gauge indicated zero.

The flap position indicator was up, and landing reference speeds were 123 knots on the captain's side, and 121 knots on the first officer's side.

The brake calipers were tested with compressed air, and operated normally. Brake disc pads were measured, and found to be within limits.

A subsequent cockpit voice recorder review revealed no mechanical anomalies.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

On August 31, 2002, the wreckage was released to a representative of the owner's insurance company
 
I heard what happened is the guy never checked the hydraulic pressure on final, landed, hit the brakes, and nothing happened.
Then the rest is in the print.

I would claim amnesia too if that happened to me.
 

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