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American 587 Final Report

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"Benzon also said that the rudder control system on the aircraft is sensitive at higher air speeds, which is potentially hazardous."

Climb out in wake turbulunce is 72 knots now.

Don't agree with the findings, How come in WWii B-17 with a no horizontal stabilizer were able to land??
 
Mosquito said:
Don't agree with the findings, How come in WWii B-17 with a no horizontal stabilizer were able to land??
because B-17's were easy to fly.
 
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So there is no rudder limiter on the Bus above a certain speed? Seems as if it were a design limitation they would have fixed the problem during the build and installed a Rudder lockout. I don't know alot about large A/C but even on the DO-Jet they have a rudder limiter. Any one know if this was the case?


Jobear
 
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Sounds like a set up to me. It is easy to blame a dead guy. Last time I checked the definintion of Va it read something like this: The airspeed at which full control deflection may be used in which the aircraft will stall before structural damage will occur. This is a constant required for all part 25 certification. (Feel free to correct me if I am wrong)

Not having read the full report, I would assume, seeing as how the A/C crashed occured shortly after take-off that the airspeed was below or close to Va.

It seems to me that this is a better explaination for the public to accept then perhaps talk about the real problem. Perhaps composite materials are not all that they were touted to be. Assuming American Airlines becomes profitable, look for their next order to be placed with Airbus.

Where is the AA union on this issue? I know that if I was a member I would be pi$$ed.
 
G100driver said:
Sounds like a set up to me. It is easy to blame a dead guy. Last time I checked the definintion of Va it read something like this: The airspeed at which full control deflection may be used in which the aircraft will stall before structural damage will occur. This is a constant required for all part 25 certification. (Feel free to correct me if I am wrong)

Not having read the full report,.
Yes...the key here is "not having read the full report".

You are correct in your initial statement about full control deflection. However, this is only true for ONE full deflection. NOT repeated full and opposite deflections. None of the entities involved dispute the fact that if the PF had taken his feet off the rudders at some point before the 5th full and opposite deflection, the tail would not have failed. What is in dispute is the AA training methods and the prior information Airbus had about the effect of rudder movement on the structural integrity.

The article, if you read it all, will address some of this:


By LESLIE MILLER




WASHINGTON (AP) - The co-pilot of American Airlines Flight 587 caused the November 2001 crash that claimed the lives of 265 people, the staff of the nation's airline safety agency reported Tuesday. The safety board itself was expected to rule later Tuesday on the staff's findings.



Investigator Robert Benzon of the National Transportation Safety Board staff said the copilot's response to turbulence, just seconds after the Airbus A300-600 plane took off from New York's John F. Kennedy International Airport, was "unnecessary and aggressive."



Benzon also said that investigators found that American Airlines improperly trained its pilots to use the aircraft's rudder while recovering from upsets and said the problem could have been exacerbated by the airline's simulator training. Benzon also said that the rudder control system on the aircraft is sensitive at higher air speeds, which is potentially hazardous.


On Nov. 12, 2001, First Officer Sten Molin, the co-pilot, moved the plane's rudder back and forth after takeoff, trying to control the climbing aircraft, not realizing he was sealing the grim fate of those on board.

Molin was at the controls when the plane hit turbulence almost immediately after taking off for the Dominican Republic.

"Hang onto it, hang onto it," Capt. Edward States implored.

"Let's go for power, please," Molin said.

A second later came a loud bang, which investigators believe was the tail breaking off. Then came the roar of air rushing against the aircraft and alarms sounding in the cockpit.

"What the hell are we into (inaudible)?" Molin said. "We're stuck in it."

States' last recorded words came five seconds later: "Get out of it! Get out of it!"

Both Airbus Industrie, which manufactured the jetliner, and American Airlines, which trained Molin, agree that if he had taken his foot off the rudder pedal, the tail wouldn't have broken off, the plane wouldn't have plunged into a New York City neighborhood. It was the second deadliest plane crash on U.S. soil.

But Molin didn't know he was putting more pressure on the tail than it could bear. Why he didn't - and who's to blame for that - is the subject of a bitter fight between Airbus and American.

According to investigators, Molin tried to steady the aircraft using pedals that control the rudder, a large flap on a plane's tail. When his initial movement failed, Molin tried again and again. His actions placed enormous stress on the tail.

American, the only U.S. airline to use that type of Airbus plane for passenger service, claims Airbus didn't alert it to the danger of sharp rudder movements until after the crash. The airline also contends the Airbus A300-600 has uniquely sensitive flight controls that can cause more severe rudder movements than the pilot intends.


"Airbus had the ability to truly red-flag the issue," American spokesman Bruce Hicks said.

Airbus says it told American a number of times and in a number of ways that the airline was improperly training pilots about how to use the rudder.

An Airbus spokesman declined to comment on the investigation before the hearing. However, the company has provided the NTSB with a number of documents to support its claim.

For example, a letter dated Aug. 20, 1997, warned American chief pilot Cecil Ewing that rudders should not be moved abruptly to right a jetliner or when a plane is flown at a sharp angle. The letter was signed by representatives from The Boeing Co. (BA), the Federal Aviation Administration and Airbus.

Airbus contends that even people within American Airlines were concerned about how the airline was training its pilots. A letter to Airbus dated May 22, 1997, from American technical pilot David Tribout expressed concern about the airline's then-new training course on advanced maneuvers.

"I am very concerned that one aspect of the course is inaccurate and potentially hazardous," Tribout wrote. His concern: Pilots were being taught that the rudder should be used to control a plane's rolling motion. Hicks countered that Airbus didn't share important safety information about the rudder after a problem with American Flight 903 in May 1997. During that incident, pilots used the rudder to steady an Airbus A300-600 plane on approach to West Palm Beach airport. The plane nearly crashed and one person was seriously injured.

Afterward, Airbus told the NTSB that it included a warning that abrupt rudder movement in some circumstances "can lead to rapid loss of controlled flight," and, in others, could break off the tail.

Hicks said Airbus' comments didn't specifically say the rudder movements on Flight 903 had exposed the tail to so much pressure that it could have been ripped off.

Immediately after the Flight 903 incident, an inspection found no damage to the tail. But five years later, the plane was inspected more closely because of concerns aroused by the crash of Flight 587. Cracks were found and the tail was replaced.

John David, a spokesman for American Airlines' pilots union, said pilots had always thought that they could use rudders to the full extent without hurting the airplane. He also believes Airbus didn't properly communicate what it knew.

American now gives its pilots specialized training on the rudder control system based on information learned during the investigation. ---

 
Sounds like a set up to me. It is easy to blame a dead guy. Last time I checked the definintion of Va it read something like this: The airspeed at which full control deflection may be used in which the aircraft will stall before structural damage will occur. This is a constant required for all part 25 certification. (Feel free to correct me if I am wrong)
I'm in no way trying to form a complete opinion on the matter - and I agree that we shouldn't try to Monday night quarterback...but in regards to your definition of Va, I don't think it encompasses multiple successions of complete control deflection. American Airlines had a course on unusual attitude recovery that focused primarily on full rudder use (this tape was distributed to other airlines as well). That technique works well in tactical and aerobatic aircraft - not as well in large transport jets.
 
G100driver said:
Last time I checked the definintion of Va it read something like this: The airspeed at which full control deflection may be used in which the aircraft will stall before structural damage will occur. This is a constant required for all part 25 certification. (Feel free to correct me if I am wrong)
.
You are wrong. Not that it matters, but your def. is for Turbulance penetration speed. Va is the max. deflection of controls without damaging bla bla..... . Doesn't really matter. As previously stated Va only holds up if one single full deflection occurs and not repeated full deflection in opposite directions.
I agree, it is very wrong to publicly blame a dead pilot for doing what the company was teaching. It is just another way for the ignorant public to lay blame and zealous layers to go after one more defendant (deceased, but they don't care).
 
I remember seeing on Wings, footage of an early B-52 flying sans tail. It had apparently been hit with a moutain rotor or something else extreme. Tail came off. plane flew home. I am sure that crew was glad it was Boeing
 
It Was Terrorism, Not Pilot Error!

AA587 wasn't PILOT ERROR.......IT WAS FREEKIN' TERRORISM!!

FROM DEBKA INTELLIGENCE FILES
[font=Palatino, Georgia, Times New Roman, Times, serif][size=+2]Was Richard Reid
'Shoe Bomber No. 2'?
[/size][/font]

[font=Palatino, Georgia, Times New Roman, Times, serif][size=+1]Experts believe Flight 587 downed by Shoe Bomber No. 1[/size][/font]

[font=Palatino, Book Antiqua, Times New Roman, Georgia, Times][font=Palatino, Times New Roman, Georgia, Times, serif]
[/font]



Was Richard Reid, the Briton indicted this week on charges of attempted murder -- after failing to blow up American Airlines Flight 63 from Paris to Miami on Dec. 22 -- the first shoe bomber?

DEBKA-Net-Weekly reports a spreading conviction among aviation and counter-terror experts that he was Shoe Bomber No. 2, and that American Airlines Flight 587 was brought down 40 days earlier over Queens, N.Y., by Shoe Bomber No. 1.

Their argument springs from a simple question: Why did not Reid simply lock himself in the bathroom and ignite the fuse to the bomb without risk of interference?

The answer is that he was instructed to position himself in window seat No. A 19, next to where the wing attaches to the body of the plane to follow the example of Shoe Bomber No. 1.

A bomb exploding in this position would allow the plastic explosive to erupt through the wall of the cabin and rupture the wing where jet fuel is stored. This position was also close to the center fuel tank in the body of the plane between the wings. If Reid had not been wrestled down by the flight attendants and passengers, the explosives in his shoes would have ripped a hole in the side of the plane and then ignited the fuel stored in the wing.

This, according to DEBKA-Net-Weekly’s sources, is precisely what happened on the AA flight 587 Airbus bound for Santo Domingo, 40 days previously, with tragic consequences. All 255 passengers and crew died, as well as five people on the ground.

The official explanation is that the crash was caused by turbulence from another jet, mechanical defects in the composite materials in the tail of the plane -- causing the tail to fall off -- and pilot error. DEBKA's sources say that explanation does not cover the evidence.

Several witnesses report that a small explosion occurred on the right-hand side of the fuselage, before the second big explosion on the right wing. “It was only then that the plane fell apart.”

As the plane nose-dived, the tail section dropped off and then both engines separated from the airliner, each engine landing over 2800 feet away from the crash site.

One aviation expert says there has never been a crash in the history of accidental aviation disasters in which both engines broke away from the plane at the same time.

According to his explanation – based on the physical axiom that every action produces an equal and opposite reaction -- a high-velocity explosion on one side of an airliner will cause expelling gases to create a rocket effect that will push the plane in the opposite direction, which weakened the tail.

With the damaged tail rudder only partially attached to the aircraft, the pilot tried to correct the plane’s attitude by using the rudder foot controls. When the plane did not respond, the pilot would have attempted to push the right rudder harder alternating between his left and right foot. This would have been recorded in the black box as “over response” and therefore pilot error. The violent sideways motion of the aircraft body, produced by the explosion exhaust, would account for the two jet engines falling to the ground, according to the expert source. Thus, although Shoe Bomber No. 1 got away with carrying out his mission of terror, fortunately for the 197 aboard AA Flight 63 Richard Reid was stopped in the nick of time.
[/font]
 
Boeing schmoeing.......

If this had been a 767 or a 747 the same thing would have happened once the vertical stab broke loose. The reason a B-17 could fly without a VS was due to the fact that it not have a swept wing design, which creates a significant dutch-roll effect in most flight regimes. The VS/rudder's main purpose is to counteract that tendency, usually with a modern yaw damper system which automatically makes inputs for the pilots.

I used to practice this maneuver manually in a simulator when I flew B707s and it is not easy for most pilots to master let alone not having any vertical stab at all to provide some inherent aerodynamic stability. The only reason the B-52H that lost it's VS from a mountain wave incident didn't crash was due to the quick actions of the flight crew to lower the main gear which created enough yaw stability to allow the crew to land safely.

The vast majority of commercial airliners today could not replicate that same capability as the BUFF; Boeing or Airbus. BTW, this is not the first time that this has happened in commercial aviation. In August 1985 520 killed people were killed when JAL B747SR crashed into a mountain near Tokyo, Japan after it lost its VS when the aft-pressure bulkhead blew apart inflight.
 
One aviation expert says there has never been a crash in the history of accidental aviation disasters in which both engines broke away from the plane at the same time.


I guess this "expert" never studied the BOAC B707 inflight breakup near Mt Fuji in the late 1960s when it encountered mountain wave turbulence. In that incident all four engines were torn away from the aircraft after the vertical stab failed and separated from the aircraft. In that accident the pilots purposely flew at low altitude (16K) to accomplish a sight-seeing pass of Mt. Fuji for the passengers.
 
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A few months after the accident, my company sent out an article on "rudder reversals" to all the pilots (too big to post here). It hit home pretty hard since FedEx is the largest operator of A300/310s.

Anyway, the gist of the article illustrated how an excessive angle of attack can occur on the vertical stab if the rudder is deflected to the opposite direction from a fully deflected position while the airplane is in a sideslip.

I'm not trying to be Tuesday morning quarterback here, but a full blown rudder reversal adds some validity to the NTSB report.
 
The NTSB is not the final word on accident causes, in my opinion. The aircraft manufacturers participate in the NTSB investigation. Further, manufacturers often have the opportunity to review and help write the final report! This is a conflict of interest that is accepted in this process in exchange for the expertise of the manufacturers on their own products. I don't know that they are wrong in this case, but look at the initial mistakes the NTSB made on Boeing 737 crashes where they later changed their conclusions.
 
Last time I checked the definintion of Va it read something like this: The airspeed at which full control deflection may be used in which the aircraft will stall before structural damage will occur. QUOTE said:
Is an aerodynamic expert here? Is the above statement true only for the pitch (longitudinal) axis of an aircraft. Related to Va, an airplane at a speed below VA will stall before the aircraft's structural limits are exceeded.

Is the above an incorrect statement?

Thanks in advance,
Matt
 
screw the NTSB and Airbus

NTSB (news - web sites) investigator Robert Benzon said Molin's use of the rudder was "unnecessary and aggressive." He said the only time pilots should use the rudder is when they're landing or taking off in a crosswind, which was not the case for Flight 587.

"The rest of the time, your feet should be on the floor," he said.

what kind of piece of sh^T airplane loses a tail with full rudder deflection.


And this Robert Benson must be an idiot. IE "you should have your feet on the floor during all phases of flight unless there is a cross wind." Can any one say V1 cut or engine failure right after V1.
I have personlly hit wake on approach at DFW, (and yes we were on GS) where if it wasnt for the rudder combined with asymetrical thrust I'd hate to think of the out come may have been.
Anyway I doubt the tail would have departed on a boeing product.
 
What a bunch of B.S.! They have their scapegoat and now it is time to address the real problems (the airplane, procedures, etc.). I would like to see these "experts" at the controls when the sh!t hits the fan. Airbus builds a pretty good airplane but apparently there is/was some refining to do. Just my $0.02.
 
With this sort of 'finding',everybody wins.

AIRLINE - "We'll add rudder training to prof checks!'

AIRBUS - "We'll have the airlines add rudder training to prof checks!"

FAA - " We'll verify that the airlines are conducting rudder training!'

IGNORANT GEN PUBLIC - "D-mn stupid pilots - they should learn how to fly! And they are paid too much!!'



Why do I feel that we will never know the truth?
 

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