Air france pilots getting the blame

[timmay]

But like a previous poster said, it's awfully hard to ignore throttles coming back to idle from a cruise or takeoff/go around power setting. Quick easy push back up, click click disconnect, figure out why later after the plane is safely stabilized.

Tell that to the Delta crew that crashed at DFW.

 

[flythere]

Tell that to the Delta crew that crashed at DFW.

are you refering to the L-1011 that hit the windshear on final? If so, I don't think that was an automation thing, if I remember right, I don't think the crew recognized the weather phenom the encountered. Micro-bursts were not that well understood at the time.

If you are refering to DFW L-1011

 

[timmay]

are you refering to the L-1011 that hit the windshear on final? If so, I don't think that was an automation thing, if I remember right, I don't think the crew recognized the weather phenom the encountered. Micro-bursts were not that well understood at the time.

If you are refering to DFW L-1011

Yep that is the one I was I referring to. If I remember correctly after they encountered the wind shear the FO (who was flying) pushed the throttles up and attempted a go around but didn't disconnect the auto throttles and the engines rolled back without the crew realizing it.
It has been a while but I think there is an animation of the entire event on the FAA website.

 

[flythere]

Yep that is the one I was I referring to. If I remember correctly after they encountered the wind shear the FO (who was flying) pushed the throttles up and attempted a go around but didn't disconnect the auto throttles and the engines rolled back without the crew realizing it.
It has been a while but I think there is an animation of the entire event on the FAA website.

just looked at the NTSB report, it made no mention of auto-throttle's. Just that the F/O was flying and his efforts to maintain control. Also, for what it's worth, wikipedia had some fairly acurate info on it as well! Searched the FAA web site, found nothing! If you find it, could you post the link?

Thanks,

 

[dicko]

Tell that to the Delta crew that crashed at DFW.

Perhaps a better example is the Turkish 737-800 crash in Amsterdam.

The auto throttles (AT) reduced thrust and the speed bled off until the jet stalled. The AT set the thrust at idle for 1 minute and 40 seconds before the stall. That's a long time unless you're in the flare or sitting on the ground.

The thrust levers moved in conjunction with the thrust setting that the computer prescribed. Unfortunately the computer believed the jet was at 27 feet. When it was in fact at 2000 feet.

The Captain intervened at 490 feet. Too late.

 

[Mike man]

Yep that is the one I was I referring to. If I remember correctly after they encountered the wind shear the FO (who was flying) pushed the throttles up and attempted a go around but didn't disconnect the auto throttles and the engines rolled back without the crew realizing it.
It has been a while but I think there is an animation of the entire event on the FAA website.

An interesting note about that accident is that was and still is the only time the Board did not adopt the findings of the investigative team.

The investigation found that the pilots did act prudently based on the information they had available to them at the time.

 

[flythere]

Perhaps a better example is the Turkish 737-800 crash in Amsterdam.

The auto throttles (AT) reduced thrust and the speed bled off until the jet stalled. The AT set the thrust at idle for 1 minute and 40 seconds before the stall. That's a long time unless you're in the flare or sitting on the ground.

The thrust levers moved in conjunction with the thrust setting that the computer prescribed. Unfortunately the computer believed the jet was at 27 feet. When it was in fact at 2000 feet.

The Captain intervened at 490 feet. Too late.

Actually it was a failure of the #1 radio altimeter, which defaulted to zero feet. When that happened, #1 radio altimeter flag displayed, the auto-throttles which were engaged at the time took the zero to mean they were on the ground, so they retarted to idle. (autoland logic) during this time the trim wheel was spinning like crazy trying to trim nose up to stay in the air, that alone should have been a huge clue something was wrong, not to mention the airspeed indicator bleeding off with the stall bars rising.

Apperently there was a jumpseater in the cockpit and the crew was engaged in a pretty deep discussion, (ah`la or something)

The biggest clue would have been the throttles moving all the way back to the stop and the trim wheel spinning like crazy for 20 to 30 seconds while the nose pitched up to 8 to 10 degrees, if not more before they dropped out of the sky!

 

[Lear70]

The biggest clue would have been the throttles moving all the way back to the stop and the trim wheel spinning like crazy for 20 to 30 seconds while the nose pitched up to 8 to 10 degrees, if not more before they dropped out of the sky!

Yup. You can't fix stupid. It's hard to miss that happening, but it has... even here.

We almost lost an airplane a few years ago because the pilots had to go around and didn't hit the TOGA switches and the autothrottles kept bouncing between the low-speed cue and ref while they tried to climb and the crew never disconnected them or shoved them through the forward stop into emergency g/a thrust.

However, for most pilots worth their salt, you're right... thrust levers come back to the stop and the trim wheel starts trimming like crazy to hold altitude... Here's your sign. In the Airbus accidents where the engines have come back to idle, you have to wonder if physically moving auto-thrust levers would have clued them in on the situation in enough time to prevent the accidents.

What a tragic loss of life.

 

[Metrojet]

We have no way of knowing the qualifications of the F/O and the IRO who were on deck at the time of the accident. If it comes out they were some new-hire 500 hour wunderkids (if memory serves, AirFrance still does ab-initio from zero to airline pilot like the rest of Europe), then sure, slam away on the fact that there wasn't a qualified CA on the flight deck.

However, if they were like most U.S. airlines where often-times the F/O is more qualified in terms of flight hours, type ratings, overall experience than the CA (it happens all the time), then it really becomes less of a factor. At some point early in your flying experience you learn to go around the big red and purple blobs on that little screen in front of you. There are few reasons obviously apparent why they didn't do so.

As for the ACARS burst messages, from memory of that thread last year, I think the vast majority of them happened in a VERY short time period, all on top of each other and I remember thinking it sounded like a double flameout followed by the aircraft coming apart shortly thereafter before the antenna lost power and/or data feed.

You have to hope, just for the sake of the families, that SOMETHING comes up that makes it a situation where the flight crew wouldn't have been able to see what was coming. If not,,,

The "SOMETHING" that came up was probably the "Airbus Stare" - where your so consumed with the electronic messages - that you forget that someone needs to still fly the airplane. -

Metrojet

 

[Abernathy]

Plane flies into the trees, test pilots fault.

That wasn't a test pilot, but the incident is a good argument against having passengers fly around in a brand new airplane doing airshow tricks.