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Air France Crash - Report out today

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Sorry, that's a bunch of bs. What do you know about AF training and standards? How can you state the NWA and QF A330 incident were identical with AF447? Where they flying through the ITCZ? Late at night? No accident is identical.


Sorry Pepe.

Read the Air France internal report issued prior to the accident that examines training, flight standards and their internal culture. Then read the Qantas and Delta/Northwest incident reports.

Are you aware that Air France had an incident recently on an A340 ? The FO decided to correct an overspeed in the cruise by disconnecting the Autopilot and yanking back on the side stick. This caused a high v/s climb out of their assigned flight level as the crew wondered why the Autpilot wasn't behaving ..... They'd disconnected it themselves.

http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/a340-zoom-climb-inquiry-backs-shock-tactics-372060/
 
Not sure a visual AOA indicator would've helped. The a/c screamed "STALL" 75 times before impact...
 
Not sure a visual AOA indicator would've helped. The a/c screamed "STALL" 75 times before impact...

Agreed. Goes back to the primary causes:

1. F/O had no clue how to fly the plane. (another argument against ab-initio)
2. F/O kept yoke buried full aft and because controls aren't linked, the other pilot didn't know about it until seconds before impact. Piss poor design.
3. Captain absent from flight deck until seconds before impact, figured out problem too late to save it. Can only imagine his last thoughts... someone else killed him and he knew it was about to happen.

Sad, really... just very, very sad.
 
Its been a while since systems class on the 320 but can't you just push the override button and take control? I have not read the report but I have to think that the report will address training and system failures and hopefully the issues will be addressed. One cannot expect to just keep pulling back on the yoke to fix a falling aircraft. This does not work at high altitudes (airfrance) and it does not work at the outer marker in a Q400 (Colgan). We should all hope that our training and experience will make us do the right thing if it should ever happen to us.

I might add that the NWA 330 incident happened in day VFR right?
 
Its been a while since systems class on the 320 but can't you just push the override button and take control? I have not read the report but I have to think that the report will address training and system failures and hopefully the issues will be addressed. One cannot expect to just keep pulling back on the yoke to fix a falling aircraft. This does not work at high altitudes (airfrance) and it does not work at the outer marker in a Q400 (Colgan). We should all hope that our training and experience will make us do the right thing if it should ever happen to us.

I might add that the NWA 330 incident happened in day VFR right?
You can. Glancing over the CVR, the takeover button was pushed two times, because "priority right" is recorded at two different occasions in the accident sequence. Unfortunately, neither pilot gave any prolonged nose down input to break the stall. I just find it hard to believe that three qualified pilots could ignore the synthetic voice "STALL!" 75 times. Not once did any of them even mention the word 'stall.'
 
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" Hey Mr. "Real" Airplane, besides making dumb comments about an airplane you never flew, and obviously don't know much about, what about Aeroperu flight 603 (B757)? Seems like "real" airplanes fall out of the sky as well, with some or full blockage of the pitot-static system."

------------------------------------------------------------------------

( Okay...WHY does FI always have to be a place where people resort to getting personal? )

Please, re-read my previous posts and show me where I said something "dumb" about the Airbus. (?)

I claim no systems knowledge, nor did I try to portray any.

Additionally, note the use of the quotation marks I used around the word "real" and then see how that term is juxtaposed with other paragraphs to show the intent of identifying the Airbus as different, or not generally in convention with, most other aircraft types in airline service.

Nowhere, in any of my posts, did I impugn the integrity of the Airbus product. I simply pointed out a design difference, which yes...could be considered a flaw by some. Especially, in this instance.

However, the ultimate cause of the accident seems to be the erroneous actions of the F/O and the basic flying skills and training issues that are being discussed on this thread.

As well, the design of the Flight Control System of the Airbus was a contributing factor. No judgement call here, just a fact.

NOW....Agreed. many Boeings have crashed in somewhat similar circumstances. But, with very minor, albeit significant, differences.

( How about the 727 where the pitot heat wasn't turned on and the PF pulled the nose up to abate the ever increasing airspeed with altitude gain... and stalled the living KrAP out of the thing all the way to impact? )

In short...I think an airplane is an airplane, and I would like to get my hands on an Airbus. Sounds like fun, and it would also be a great learning experience.

Remember, airplanes don't kill people. Pilots with airplanes do....

:)

Ya'll have a safe flight.

Love,

Whine
 
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I don't care who makes the airplane, if you tape over the static ports (AeroPeru) it won't fly very easily.

It was a chain of events as most crashes are.

They flew into the weather instead of deviating around it. Could have been a dispatch issue as well. The Captain should have been on deck for the ITCZ crossing. A poor pitot anti-ice system design started all the problems. The FO (and AF training) did not educate them in radar usage, "partial panel" or stall recovery, and aircraft design contributed did not allow for traditional cross-deck cross-checking. They were probably over-whelmed by EICAS messages as well.

The one good thing from the AB design is that it didn't flip over in an aggravated stall.

This was an avoidable tragedy on many levels. First rule, fly the airplane.
 
Different stalls for different scenarios . . . . The minimm altitude loss technique is usually an approach stall or a departure stall; not much altitude to lose.

A High-altitude stall is something else entirely and should be practiced in the sim as well. I have flown with a surprising number of pilots who have never hand-flown at FL410 . . . . Not hard to do when it's smooth and you're light, but when you're at the max altitude in moderate or severe turbulence, it's a different animal. Even the engines don't respond as you might think.

I've hand flown at 410 several times and even smooth isn't any piece of cake. You certainly wouldn't be hand flying at 410 in severe turbulence. In fact, in all my time flying, I've only been in severe once. That was in a piston twin in clear air over 40 miles from any storm. I agree with your assertion that there's a difference between low and high altitude stalls.
 
Eh... I agree with Ty, I've hand-flown many times at 41,0 heck even up to 51,0 and it's not that big a deal, whether it's in a Boeing or a Lear...

And in severe turbulence, actually, yes I would be hand-flying. The autopilot can't figure it out and would be pitching back to altitude at the exact WRONG time, when the most important thing is airspeed and angle of attack and you may have to sacrifice some altitude and "go with it" until it stabilizes and you can return to altitude. I've had to do this in moderate turbulence before, twice actually, once with some unforecasted wave action with it as well.

Your experience may vary, but I'll take the controls every time in a situation like that versus letting the autopilot try to figure it out.
 
Eh... I agree with Ty, I've hand-flown many times at 41,0 heck even up to 51,0 and it's not that big a deal, whether it's in a Boeing or a Lear...

And in severe turbulence, actually, yes I would be hand-flying. The autopilot can't figure it out and would be pitching back to altitude at the exact WRONG time, when the most important thing is airspeed and angle of attack and you may have to sacrifice some altitude and "go with it" until it stabilizes and you can return to altitude. I've had to do this in moderate turbulence before, twice actually, once with some unforecasted wave action with it as well.

Your experience may vary, but I'll take the controls every time in a situation like that versus letting the autopilot try to figure it out.

I was saying that you wouldn't be hand flying at 410 in severe turbulence, long... Yes, I agree, in severe, hand flying is the way to go. I was pointing out that few have probably been at 410 in severe hand flying.
 

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