Welcome to Flightinfo.com

  • Register now and join the discussion
  • Friendliest aviation Ccmmunity on the web
  • Modern site for PC's, Phones, Tablets - no 3rd party apps required
  • Ask questions, help others, promote aviation
  • Share the passion for aviation
  • Invite everyone to Flightinfo.com and let's have fun

Air France 447, automation and the pilot

Welcome to Flightinfo.com

  • Register now and join the discussion
  • Modern secure site, no 3rd party apps required
  • Invite your friends
  • Share the passion of aviation
  • Friendliest aviation community on the web
Not true. I assume you are referring to Pierre-Cedric Bonin. He had a glider rating. The pilots I have flown with who have a glider rating are a pretty good stick. That makes this whole accident more puzzling. Not accusing or defending anybody. Those are the facts.

2,900-ish total hours and almost 800-900 on the A330. Before that he was very likely to be on the A320. How much did he have starting in a AF flight deck? Not sure but probably 200-500 hrs. A glider rating doesn't mean much, and it certainly didn't help in this case. Let me guess, Sully landed successfully in the Hudson because he had a glider rating :rolleyes:
 
Last edited:
The biggest issue I have with this accident is why did the captain took his rest as they were approaching the area with the biggest threat to the flight??? I just can't understand that one! As we discussed on another tread, RADAR usage is not something that is widely understood and he certainly knew the experience level of the guys with him...., had he taken his rest two hours later we wouldn't be discussing this incident I believe.
 
As we discussed on another tread, RADAR usage is not something that is widely understood

You have a valid point about his choice of rest times, it's already been pointed out he was a bit worn out from his layover and was probably running on empty. My gut feeling is his gut feeling told him to get up and see what was goin on when he felt the airplane entering the "light" turbulence as disseminated by the CVR. By then it was too late. It's been suggested as to why he did not "Take his seat and assume command" I think he was doin all he could to hold on where he was at that time.
 
Last edited:
Anyone who does not understand Radar usage has no business in the left seat of a transport category aircraft
 
Either Seat.

I agree to an extent , except that most folks' first exposure to radar, or a useful radar, is in a transport category airplane. So, you've gotta expect a little bit of learning curve or adjustment and experimentation period. Thus, any PIC should really be proficient and in tune with any pitfalls.
 
Perhaps...but not according to the BEA final report. Also, isn't there debate concerning the whereabouts of the Captain once he left the flight deck?.

If I recall correctly from the book, the Captain didn't acknowledge the repeated calls from the crew with the normal "knock" on the wall. Furthermore, I believe the author (Palmer) remarks about the way the Captain enters the flight deck as if he was not answering a call. Instead, he believes the Captain was returning to the flight deck because of his own curiosity and not from the rest area.

So his actions leaving the flight deck and before returning are questionable, and for me, where he is most culpable - not his actions once he was back in the flight deck.

Again, it was a stall accident above everything else. For two professional pilots unable to maintain straight and level flight for 1 minute while hand flying is baffling to me...and where the blame should be placed.

Finally got around to reading the book. Should have read it before chiming in. Great read and I highly recommend it to all, not just airbus guys. Didn't realize the captain was only gone for about 10 minutes before the event began, or how quickly it became unrecoverable.

Ignore my previous post.
 

Latest resources

Back
Top