250 below 10000

[spngbobsqrpilot]

-2

Inquiry ongoing to find answers for 1420 crash
ANDREA HARTER
ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE

Behind closed doors, the search for the cause of a jetliner crash last year in Little Rock is continuing, despite little public discussion.
The National Transportation Safety Board is more than a year into its investigation of the June 1, 1999, crash landing of American Airlines Flight 1420. Its report is expected this fall. In the meantime, neither the board nor its investigators will discuss their findings.
The crash killed 11 people, including the pilot, and more than 40 lawsuits have been filed. The passengers' lawyers have deposed more than 20 people as they try to pin down blame for the accident, but only a few of those depositions have been made public.
Those few are like a bread-crumb trail.
Take, for example, the deposition of Kenneth Kaylor, the air-traffic controller on duty the stormy night of the crash. His testimony may shed light on what went on when the plane failed to stop at the end of Runway 4R.
Kaylor has not spoken publicly about the crash. In fact, the Federal Aviation Administration said last week that it would encourage him not to talk about it, outside of mandatory interviews with attorneys, until the crash inquiry is complete.
His testimony was expected in January, when the safety board held a public hearing in Little Rock. But Greg Feith, the safety board's chief investigator, announced he'd received a letter from the FAA saying that Kaylor was too sick to testify.
However, Kaylor told the lawyers deposing him that, although he had taken a leave of absence due to post-traumatic stress disorder about the time of the hearing, he had never been asked to testify.
Asked if that was so, safety board spokesman Paul Schlamm said last week that Kaylor's statement had been taken after the crash, and was released in the safety board's preliminary findings.
It was two pages long.
"If the parties to the investigation feel that there is something more that needs to be said or learned about, they will seek him out," Schlamm said. "We were told Mr. Kaylor was ill. That was enough for us."
In May, lawyers questioned Kaylor for five hours. The transcript of his deposition runs 244 pages.
Last month, U.S. District Judge Henry Woods ruled that Kaylor's comments were of interest to the public and should be released, along with the depositions of Kaylor's boss, Michael Holland, and an American Airlines meteorologist, William Orvis.

'CLEAR TO LAND'
Kaylor has been an air traffic controller since 1986, getting his start at busy Midway Airport in Chicago. Since 1992, he's worked at Little Rock National Airport, Adams Field. He testified that he had the experience needed to work several positions at once if the traffic was light, as it was that night.
Kaylor worked an early shift that day, 6 a.m. to 2 p.m., then went home to nap. The FAA requires only eight hours off between shifts, and Kaylor returned to work at 11 p.m.
A storm was edging its way into Pulaski County at that hour. Kaylor soon was spending most of his time calling out wind speeds and changes, including wind-shear alerts, as Flight 1420 made its final approach.
But when he gave 1420's pilots clearance to land, Kaylor wasn't talking about the weather or how bad it was or might get, a point on which attorney Mike Slack questioned him.
"And what does that mean to you when you say 'clear to land'?" asked Slack, an Austin, Texas, attorney who represents the family of two crash victims, Gordon and Joyce McLerran.
"That I'm ensuring to that crew that there is not another airplane, not a vehicle or anything known to me on that runway which would inhibit their landing," Kaylor responded. (1)
He said he could not deny a landing because of the weather, no matter how bad it was. He has a handbook that spells out what he can and can't say to a pilot.
Slack pressed him. "And the handbook does not permit you, nor do standard operating procedures permit you or -- I mean, to allow you to qualify permission to land based on weather conditions, do they?"
"No, sir. That decision is put upon the pilot," Kaylor said.
Slack asked for details. Kaylor replied, " ... From an air traffic controller's perspective, that decision to land is the pilot's."
"Okay. Well, in other words, you're not -- you're not telling American, Weather's bad; don't come in. That's not your responsibility, is it?"
" ... No sir," Kaylor said.
In fact, he confirmed, it would have been breaking the rules to do so.

WINDS 'NEAR THE LIMIT'
Kaylor's testimony adds perspective to what was said between tower and plane and between pilot and co-pilot. The safety board has released transcripts of those conversations, although passengers' lawyers are now seeking release of the actual cockpit voice recording; a hearing is scheduled Aug. 1.

 

[spngbobsqrpilot]

-3

According to the transcripts, 17 minutes before the crash, at 11:34, Kaylor tells Capt. Richard Buschmann, "ah we have a thunderstorm just northwest of the area moving uh, through the area now." He tells Buschmann the wind is blowing at 28 knots, gusting to 44 knots, at almost a right angle to the runway.
In the cockpit, Buschmann repeats the numbers Kaylor has given him, but gets them wrong. Co-pilot Michael Origel corrects him. Buschmann notes to Origel that they are "right near the limit" of what the plane can land in.
At 11:42, Kaylor tells the cockpit that a second part of the storm is moving through. The wind is blowing across the runway at a different angle, 30 degrees from being a 90-degree crosswind.
Although pilots land in them all the time, crosswinds steal control. Imagine crossing the Interstate 430 Arkansas River bridge with a stiff wind slamming against the side of the car.
At 11:45, Origel tells Kaylor the plane is getting "pretty close to the storm."
At 11:47, Kaylor tells the cockpit that the wind has shifted again. It is at a 50-degree angle to the runway and gusting to 45 knots.
Origel repeats the numbers but gets them wrong. According to his numbers, 1420 is on a headwind course, which is what the plane needs to stop in heavy rain.
It is part of Kaylor's job to correct him, but Kaylor does not.

'WE'RE DOWN. WE'RE SLIDING'
At 11:48:27, Kaylor gives 1420 clearance to land. Runway visibility has dropped to less than a quarter-mile. The wind is still volatile.
At 11:49:11, Kaylor tells the cockpit the wind is at 330 degrees, blowing at 28 knots. If it were at 310 degrees, it would be a crosswind to a plane landing on Runway 4R.
At 11:49:54, he tells them the wind is at 320 degrees, just 10 degrees from being a crosswind, and blowing at 23 knots.
Buschmann and Origel do not acknowledge Kaylor, but, in the cockpit, one of them tells the other, "Aw [expletive], we're off course." Investigators do not know which was speaking.
Thirty seconds later, Origel says to Buschmann, "We're down."
Quickly, he adds, "We're sliding."
Kaylor can hear none of this. From his crow's nest, he waits, watching his instruments and the rain.
At 11:50:54, he says, "American 1420, report clear of the runway, please."
At 11:51:16, "Amer -- American 1420, tower."
Kaylor repeats that call four more times, but no one answers.
At 11:54:06, he calls the airport's emergency crew.

WHO'S AT FAULT?
While the safety board will determine what likely caused the crash, the legal system will determine American's degree of liability. Many -- attorneys, passengers and aviation officials -- have suggested privately that the air traffic controller bears some responsibility. But he works for the federal government, which generally cannot be sued, (2) so the passengers' attorneys are focusing on American, leaving only the airline to make a case against the FAA.
At January's public hearing, Robert Baker, American's vice chairman, noted that Kaylor was "conspicuous by his absence." He contended Kaylor's recollection was key to getting to the bottom of the story.
At Kaylor's May 18 deposition, American lawyer William C. Brown questioned the controller extensively, grilling him on how he did his job.
For more than 30 minutes, Brown quizzed Kaylor on what he could see that night, the exact readouts of the indicators that measure sight distance on the runway, where those records are kept, why Kaylor couldn't recall every detail.
Kaylor testified that he saw the plane land. "I could make out the type aircraft and the 'American' on the -- "
"On the tail?" Brown broke in.
"Well, whereever it's written. Right offhand I don't recall, but -- "
American's airplanes carry the company's name along the side, in billboard-sized letters -- the name stretches 15 rows. There are two giant initials on the tail, one red, one blue -- the company's logo, AA.

CREW'S DECISION
In his deposition, Kaylor argued that Buschmann and Origel were better-equipped to monitor the weather than he was from his 75-foot control tower. He had made the same point to Buschmann about 15 minutes before the crash.
"Their weather radar, you know -- from my experience, the airlines -- not just American, but all of them -- have weather radar on board, and they're -- they're good at telling you what it looks like. They have -- they get the colors and all of that," Kaylor testified.
"My equipment, all I get is an outline of a big blob and, you know, no intensity or you don't see anything else; it's just an area with precipitation ... "
American's sophisticated onboard equipment can give pilots a color display not unlike what television viewers get when storm watching. But Origel has testified he saw no change in the weather colors that night, although he allowed that he may not have had his weather radar pointed at the heart of the storm. As it was dark, he had it pointed where he thought was best, straight down at the ground.
If meteorologists' estimates are right, the storm was heaviest right in front or even above the plane when it touched down.
Proving that is the crux of the case against American. Although it does not dispute that there was a storm nearby, the airline maintains it did not fly into a thunderstorm.
Kaylor remembers the touchdown. "I saw them for just a little ways. I lost them somewhere right in this area right here," he testified, pointing to a spot about one-third of the way down the runway on an aerial photo.
"Because of poor visibility?" Slack asked him.
"Yeah, some obscuration out there. I don't know what it was."
Asked again later if there was something he could have said to prevent 1420 from landing, to deny it clearance, Kaylor stood his ground.
"From an air traffic standpoint, weather has no bearing on it. That decision's up to the crew."
Slack asked, "Am I correct, sir, too, that you do not, as an air traffic controller, close runways; is that right?"
"No, sir. I have no authority to close a runway."

FAR FROM OVER
Kaylor is still an air traffic controller. Most days, he trains other controllers, although he still spends some time in the tower.
He may have to tell his story again soon. The first trial -- the McLerrans' case -- is set for Aug. 14. Gordon and Joyce McLerran were part of a Russellville travel group returning from a tour of the British Isles.
Fifteen lawsuits have been settled out of court, and at least four passengers have settled without filing suit.
The most recent court-mediated settlement, on May 31, involved the family of Sgt. Jeffery Stewart, an airman who died from his injuries 10 days after the crash. The mediator, U.S. Magistrate Judge David Young, has scheduled seven more conferences next month.

http://www.ardemgaz.com/prev/crash060299/A4xcrash14.html

Court strategy keeps air-traffic controller from getting apology
ANDREA HARTER
ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE

American Airlines isn't offering an apology for naming an air-traffic controller in a federal lawsuit relating to the doomed landing of American's Flight 1420, despite a union challenge to do so.
Kenneth Kaylor, the air-traffic controller on duty the night Flight 1420 crashed in Little Rock, has been made an "extra victim" of the crash by news media and the airline, his union said this week.

 

[spngbobsqrpilot]

-4

To that end, American Airlines owes Kaylor an apology, John Carr, president of the 15,000-member National Air Traffic Controllers Association, said in a telephone interview from Washington on Tuesday.
The company responded in a statement late Wednesday.
"American Airlines has stated that it was never its intent to hold Mr. Kaylor personally liable at trial in any of the Flight 1420 cases.
"However, there are still several [air-traffic control] issues stemming from the accident that need to be addressed in court, and this will now be possible because the U.S. government has been made a party in these cases," the company said.

An apology would complicate American's position that the Federal Aviation Administration, through Kaylor, (4) did not give out enough weather information about runway conditions on the night the plane crashed.


"We're talking about a wrecked career here. This man's name has been smeared for no good reason. This controller did the best that he could under trying conditions," Carr said. "It is unfortunate that an innocent person had to be made an extra victim."
Kaylor had worked eight hours on June 1, 1999, before taking a four-hour break and returning to work the night shift at the control tower at Little RockNationalAirport, Adams Field.
He had been on duty about an hour when the weather turned violent. Flight 1420, two hours behind schedule, was approaching from Dallas-FortWorthInternationalAirport.
Kaylor called out the erratic winds to the pilots but did not offer an opinion on whether the plane should land. He is prohibited from doing so; that decision is the pilot's.
Heavy rain was beating on the runway as Flight 1420 touched down. The pilots struggled to maintain control. The plane fishtailed, struck a set of instrument poles and careened over a 25-foot embankment, crashing through a steel walkway and breaking apart just yards from the Arkansas River.
The captain and 10 passengers died. Most of the 134 survivors were hurt.
At an Aug. 1 hearing before U.S. District Judge Henry Woods, American's attorneys notified the court that the airline would seek to have the government, specifically Kaylor and the FAA, included as defendants in passengers' lawsuits.
Woods told American's lawyers that he would not permit a suit to be brought against Kaylor, as he is guaranteed immunity from lawsuits as a federal employee. Kaylor was named in four lawsuits, but his name has since been removed, and the government has been substituted as a defendant. (3)
Woods later issued an order explaining his position and noted that American could seek to recover damages from the government only after it had paid the passengers' claims. Then American would have to prove to a judge that the government was at fault and should be liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
In an Aug. 29 letter to Kathlynn G. Fadely, the Justice Department's assistant director for aviation litigation, American's lead counsel, Bob Craft, wrote that American did not want to name Kaylor in its original suits.
The federal government must agree to be sued, and Craft wrote that it would not do so without Kaylor's name being included.
On Sept. 1, Gerald J. Arpey, American's executive vice president of operations, wrote FAA Administrator Jane Garvey with a further explanation, saying, "It was never American's intent to hold Mr. Kaylor personally liable at trial in any of the Flight 1420 cases. In state courts, however, we were required to name the individual controller as a party so that the United States government would substitute itself for Mr. Kaylor."

 

[spngbobsqrpilot]

-5 (last page)

Arpey said the company would not include Kaylor's name on future 1420 cases.
The government's actions are not a factor in the suits set for trial this fall. First up is Allison Hunt, a choir member from OuachitaBaptistUniversity, whose suit against American is scheduled for trial Sept. 25.
Hunt is one of about 40 passengers who were returning from international trips. Because an international treaty prevents those passengers from seeking punitive damages, American has admitted liability in their cases; the government is not a party.
But larger action looms, as attorneys for the passengers traveling within the United States prepare punitive-damage cases against American.
Four cases -- three domestic and one international -- were scheduled for mediation this week before U.S. Magistrate Judge David Young, but they will be rescheduled.
The delay comes because of a reshuffling of attorneys at Hill Gilstrap, an Arlington, Texas, firm that represented 15 of the passengers.
Bob Bodoin, who represented another Ouachita Baptist student, Kristin Maddox, in her successful suit against American, has left the firm. A jury awarded Maddox $11,015,000 last month.
Hill Gilstrap co-founder Frank Hill said that the split was amicable, and Bodoin and a Little Rock lawyer, Matt Warner, wanted to specialize in aviation law.
The firm will still have input on how Bodoin and Warner play out the 15 cases, but Bodoin and Warner are in control. Warner is the lead lawyer representing the family of Debra Sattari, the only domestic passenger killed in the crash.
As a footnote to the litigation, Woods ordered Monday that a portion of passengers' settlements go into an escrow account to pay the expenses of a committee of lawyers gathering evidence and taking depositions for the passengers' cases.
He ordered domestic passengers who filed suit before July 15 to pay in 3 percent of their settlements. Domestic cases filed after that date will have to contribute 5 percent. International passengers must pay 1 percent, up to a maximum of $25,000; that includes Maddox.







Articles reprinted from here:

http://www.ardemgaz.com/prev/crash060299/



(1) ATC= Control of KNOWN Traffic

(2), (3) reference a legal term of “Sovereign Immunity”
http://www.lectlaw.com/def2/s103.htm


SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY - A doctrine precluding the institution of a suit against the sovereign [government] without its consent. Though commonly believed to be rooted in English law, it is actually rooted in the inherent nature of power and the ability of those who hold power to shield themselves.

In England it was predicated on the concept that "the sovereign can do no wrong", a concept developed and enforced by - guess who? However, since the American revolution explictedly rejected this interesting idea, the American rulers had to come up with another rationale to protect their power. One they came up with is that the "sovereign is exempt from suit [on the] practical ground that there can be no legal right against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends." 205 U.S. 349, 353.





(4) discussed as to who the “Sovereign” is, and who represents “The Sovereign”

http://www.lectlaw.com/def2/s165.htm


SOVEREIGN - A chief ruler with supreme power; one possessing sovereignty. It is also applied to a king or other magistrate with limited powers.

In the United States the sovereignty resides in the body of the people.

SOVEREIGNTY - The union and exercise of all human power possessed in a state; it is a combination of all power; it is the power to do everything in a state without accountability; to make laws, to execute and to apply them: to impose and collect taxes, and, levy, contributions; to make war or peace; to form treaties of alliance or of commerce with foreign nations, and the like.

Abstractedly, sovereignty resides in the body of the nation and belongs to the people. But these powers are generally exercised by delegation.

When analysed, sovereignty is naturally divided into three great powers; namely, the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary; the first is the power to make new laws, and to correct and repeal the old; the second is the power to execute the laws both at home and abroad; and the last is the power to apply the laws to particular facts; to judge the disputes which arise among the citizens, and to punish crimes.


Isn't the intepretation of law fun???

Hope you all have enjoyed it!

 

[Resocha]

Inquiry ongoing to find answers for 1420 crash
ANDREA HARTER
ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE

Spngbob, I'm trying to understand your angle...Are you trying to use newspaper articles to support your contentions? Despite all of the regulatory language and FAA documentation posted here?

 

[spngbobsqrpilot]

Shoot the messenger. What a witty rejoinder.

I had more to say, but I'll leave it at that.

Civics lessons are in the website next door.

 

[A Squared]

Shoot the messenger. What a witty rejoinder.

I had more to say, but I'll leave it at that.

Civics lessons are in the website next door.

Uhhh, spongebob, if you believe that you've done anything other than make yourself appear even more foolish (if that is even possible) you are tragically mistaken.

 

[Flyerjosh]

SpongeBob,

WTF, over?!? What exactly does American 1420 have to do with exceeding 250KIAS below 10000'? I don't get it... but since you think it has something to do with this arguement, I'll connect the two...

Slack asked, "Am I correct, sir, too, that you do not, as an air traffic controller, close runways; is that right?"
"No, sir. I have no authority to close a runway."

Funny. According to you, a controller is the administrators "designee" and therefore he/she has the AUTHORITY to waive the speed limitation. One would think that if they had the AUTHORITY to waive published regulations, they would have the AUTHORITY to close a runway, no?

It's too bad that they don't have an icon that shows a smiley face inserting its foot into its mouth...

 

[spngbobsqrpilot]

SpongeBob,

WTF, over?!? What exactly does American 1420 have to do with exceeding 250KIAS below 10000'? I don't get it... but since you think it has something to do with this arguement, I'll connect the two...





Funny. According to you, a controller is the administrators "designee" and therefore he/she has the AUTHORITY to waive the speed limitation. One would think that if they had the AUTHORITY to waive published regulations, they would have the AUTHORITY to close a runway, no?

It's too bad that they don't have an icon that shows a smiley face inserting its foot into its mouth...

If you are going to attempt to repeat what I said, at least get it right.

I never said "designee".

I quoted FAR 1.1:

Administrator means the Federal Aviation Administrator or any person to whom he has delegated his authority in the matter concerned.

I even highlighted "delegated" I then provided a link that defines delegated.

Should you choose to ignore that definition, here it is, yet again:

1. A person authorized to act as representative for another; a deputy or an agent.

tr.v. del·e·gat·ed,


1. To authorize and send (another person) as one's representative.
2. To commit or entrust to another: delegate a task to a subordinate.

Now, an ATC Specialist (Controller) is tasked (by the Administrator) with the matter of the control of known traffic, and issuing clearances which provide for the safe, orderly and expiditious control of that known traffic. Again, you conveniently leave out the definition found in FAR 1.1 which defines what Air Traffic Control is which states:

Air Traffic Control means a service operated by appropriate authority to promote the safe, orderly, and expeditious flow of air traffic.

That defintion does NOT say anything about closing a runway, so the Controller cannot close a runway.

The FAA, administrator or otherwise does not decide when a runway is too contaminated for traffic operations. Both a pilot and the airport authority decide if the runway is too contaminated. A pilot has the option to divert, (or not attempt to depart) whereas the airport authority has the obligation and authority to close the airport for snow removal, for example. When the local port authority or airport commisioner closes the airport for snow removal, the airport / runway / individual taxiways as needed are closed by the local airport authority.

I dunno. Maybe it's been said before, but if not I'll say it:

"Where common sense ends, the law begins."

It's been said that most of the FARs are written in blood because someone at one point ****** up, and couldn't use common sense. But, likewise they were written in such a fashion which practically guarantees that the Administrator, or his DELEGATE (which are both severally and jointly the same as the United States government) could be protected under any interpretation of the laws (FARs), and the individual (pilot --not the government) would be in violation of the law or regulation which was written to provide immunity for the government. See the reference to the legal concept of "Sovereign Immunity".

That leads us to FAR 1.1 again:

Air traffic clearance means an authorization by air traffic control, for the purpose of preventing collision between known aircraft, for an aircraft to proceed under specified traffic conditions within controlled airspace.

Which brings us to 91.123:
(a) When an ATC clearance has been obtained, no pilot in command may deviate from that clearance unless an amended clearance is obtained, an emergency exists, or the deviation is in response to a traffic alert and collision avoidance system resolution advisory. However, except in Class A airspace, a pilot may cancel an IFR flight plan if the operation is being conducted in VFR weather conditions. When a pilot is uncertain of an ATC clearance, that pilot shall immediately request clarification from ATC.
(b) Except in an emergency, no person may operate an aircraft contrary to an ATC instruction in an area in which air traffic control is exercised.

91.123(a)....When a pilot is uncertain of an ATC clearance, that pilot shall immediately request clarification from ATC. requires us to question a clearance we are unsure of, but 91.117(d), which states "If the minimum safe airspeed for any* particular operation is greater than the maximum speed prescribed in this section (this section includes 91.117(a) which is what your sole argument is based on), the aircraft may be operated at that minimum speed." allows the pilot to operate at that minumum safe airspeed. Safety, in my opinion, includes not being involved in a mid air because a controller needs a certain speed greater than maximum speed prescribed in this section, which includes 91.117(a).

*any

1. One, some, every, or all without specification: Take any book you want. Are there any messages for me? Any child would love that. Give me any food you don't want.
2. Exceeding normal limits, as in size or duration: The patient cannot endure chemotherapy for any length of time.

I guess the Judge doesn't know what he is talking about either.

At an Aug. 1 hearing before U.S. District Judge Henry Woods, American's attorneys notified the court that the airline would seek to have the government, specifically Kaylor and the FAA, included as defendants in passengers' lawsuits.

Woods told American's lawyers that he would not permit a suit to be brought against Kaylor, as he is guaranteed immunity from lawsuits as a federal employee.

And that is what this case has to do with this.

(Controller) is delegated (committed or entrusted) by the Administrator to carry out the task of the Control of Air Traffic on behalf of the Administrator and the United States Government.

So I guess the Judge and the earlier referenced professor both don't know what they are talking about.

rrrrrrrrriiiiight.

 

[A Squared]

well, spongebob,

I gotta hand it to you, not too many guys would continue arguing that ATC has the authority to waive 91.117(a) after they have been shown a docket from the Federal Register which states in plain english that ATC does *not* have that authority, but you don't let that slow you down, you keep on arguing. I've got to admire your tenacity, if not your intelligence, or powers of reasoning, or sanity.

You do know, though, don't you, that anyone still reading this thread is just laughing thier @sses off at what a fool you're making of yourself?