C. CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE BUILD MODELS
The primary failing of the CAL proposal's use of only status, to the virtual
exclusion of all other Merger Policy factors, is that it unfairly, inequitably and
disproportionately benefits one pilot group to the consequent detriment of the other. If
either group proposed using any other single Merger Policy factor alone, like longevity,
the resulting list would also be distorted, but in a different direction. Another defect of
the CAL Committee's proposed ISL is that it unjustifiably creates extremely large tiers of
pilots from a single airline. Some such distortions are inevitable in any merger of
seniority lists. But the career-long blocking effect of those spawned by the CAL proposal
could harm morale and employee relations for decades to come.
21
The CAL Committee's use of an April 1, 2013 base list date is manifestly intended
to embrace the windfall of potential Captain upgrades in February 2014, generated by
premerger CAL System Bid 14-02. Memorializing that windfall by treating captains (or
at least some captains) as fungible equals irrespective of aircraft, while treating others as
“unneeded”, is not a bone fide status & category ratio. And simply disregarding
longevity as an equity factor seems engineered to justify the unfair stapling to the
bottom of the list all United pilots in furlough status on May 3, 2010.
On the May 3, 2010 MAD, United had many more pilots on furlough than
Continental. However, United’s furloughees, in the main, had significantly greater
longevity than the Continental furloughees. Those UAL furloughees brought substantial
longevity to the merger, compared to the CAL pilots at the bottom of the CAL list.3
Further, as a consequence of their respective hiring patterns, United’s First Officers as a
whole had greater longevity than, but also were older than, similarly situated
Continental First Officers. A proposal that completely ignores sweat equity longevity
cannot be a plank in our ISL platform.
In our considered judgment, both the methodology of the CAL Committee and its
resultant proposed ISL are incompatible with the revised ALPA Merger Policy. Aside
from the windfall inequities generated by using an April 1, 2013 snapshot date, total
disregard of the longevity factor cannot possibly be justified in the factual circumstances
of this case. Not surprisingly, the ISL produced by the CAL Committee's fatally defective
methodology is neither fair nor equitable.
3 Six hundred twenty-one of the most junior 1445 United pilots had greater longevity than
all 1512 Continental pilots hired after 2005 (i.e., the bottom third of the CAL list). Tr. 2481-83
(Ruark); UX-5 (Ruark), at 18. The next, more junior group of 633 UAL furloughees had longevity
similar to the CAL pilots hired between 2005 and 2007. The final, most junior group of 192 UAL
furloughees had longevity similar to the 148 CAL pilots on furlough at the time of the merger.
22
At the end of the day, despite our best efforts, we were unable to find a way to
adjust or modify the CAL Committee's list build model to produce an acceptably fair and
equitable ISL. Even with a different snapshot date, contrived differentials premised on
post-merger changes inflating premerger career expectations still drive that ersatz
ratioed model. A gerrymandered approximation of a status-only model that uses
assumptions at odds with Merger Policy cannot be used to build our Award.
The primary failing of the CAL proposal's use of only status, to the virtual
exclusion of all other Merger Policy factors, is that it unfairly, inequitably and
disproportionately benefits one pilot group to the consequent detriment of the other. If
either group proposed using any other single Merger Policy factor alone, like longevity,
the resulting list would also be distorted, but in a different direction. Another defect of
the CAL Committee's proposed ISL is that it unjustifiably creates extremely large tiers of
pilots from a single airline. Some such distortions are inevitable in any merger of
seniority lists. But the career-long blocking effect of those spawned by the CAL proposal
could harm morale and employee relations for decades to come.
21
The CAL Committee's use of an April 1, 2013 base list date is manifestly intended
to embrace the windfall of potential Captain upgrades in February 2014, generated by
premerger CAL System Bid 14-02. Memorializing that windfall by treating captains (or
at least some captains) as fungible equals irrespective of aircraft, while treating others as
“unneeded”, is not a bone fide status & category ratio. And simply disregarding
longevity as an equity factor seems engineered to justify the unfair stapling to the
bottom of the list all United pilots in furlough status on May 3, 2010.
On the May 3, 2010 MAD, United had many more pilots on furlough than
Continental. However, United’s furloughees, in the main, had significantly greater
longevity than the Continental furloughees. Those UAL furloughees brought substantial
longevity to the merger, compared to the CAL pilots at the bottom of the CAL list.3
Further, as a consequence of their respective hiring patterns, United’s First Officers as a
whole had greater longevity than, but also were older than, similarly situated
Continental First Officers. A proposal that completely ignores sweat equity longevity
cannot be a plank in our ISL platform.
In our considered judgment, both the methodology of the CAL Committee and its
resultant proposed ISL are incompatible with the revised ALPA Merger Policy. Aside
from the windfall inequities generated by using an April 1, 2013 snapshot date, total
disregard of the longevity factor cannot possibly be justified in the factual circumstances
of this case. Not surprisingly, the ISL produced by the CAL Committee's fatally defective
methodology is neither fair nor equitable.
3 Six hundred twenty-one of the most junior 1445 United pilots had greater longevity than
all 1512 Continental pilots hired after 2005 (i.e., the bottom third of the CAL list). Tr. 2481-83
(Ruark); UX-5 (Ruark), at 18. The next, more junior group of 633 UAL furloughees had longevity
similar to the CAL pilots hired between 2005 and 2007. The final, most junior group of 192 UAL
furloughees had longevity similar to the 148 CAL pilots on furlough at the time of the merger.
22
At the end of the day, despite our best efforts, we were unable to find a way to
adjust or modify the CAL Committee's list build model to produce an acceptably fair and
equitable ISL. Even with a different snapshot date, contrived differentials premised on
post-merger changes inflating premerger career expectations still drive that ersatz
ratioed model. A gerrymandered approximation of a status-only model that uses
assumptions at odds with Merger Policy cannot be used to build our Award.
