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BA 747 crew commended for escaping near-stall on take-off

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UALRATT

Well-known member
Joined
Jun 29, 2006
Posts
214
http://www.flightglobal.com/article...nded-for-escaping-near-stall-on-take-off.html

South Africa's Civil Aviation Authority has praised the airmanship of British Airways Boeing 747-400 pilots who battled to prevent a low-altitude stall after the leading-edge slats unexpectedly retracted during lift-off from Johannesburg.
At 167kt on the take-off roll, fractionally below rotation speed, all the leading-edge slats inboard of the engines on each side automatically retracted, after receiving a spurious indication of thrust-reverser activation.
As the aircraft tried to climb out from Tambo International Airport, known for its 'hot and high' environment, the jet lost a "significant amount of lift", says the CAA, and the stick-shaker immediately engaged, warning of an approaching stall.
Instead of following the typical climb profile, the first officer - whose aerobatic experience meant he was familiar with buffet - controlled the aircraft through the stall warning and buffeting by executing a shallower climb, while the commander supported the manoeuvre by calling out heights above ground.
The slats stayed retracted for a total of 23s. They started to redeploy 7s after the jet became airborne - as the undercarriage was retracting, at a height of 56ft - and were fully extended 9s later. The stick-shaker, which had activated intermittently over a 15s interval, stopped as the airspeed rose to 186kt.
In its inquiry report into the 11 May 2009 incident, the CAA says the crew had "no notion" that the slats had retracted before rotation. There is no separate indication in the cockpit for leading-edge slat position.
"The flying crew should be commended for the professional way that they controlled the aircraft during a critical stage during take-off," it adds. "During [the incident] the flight-deck crew had no indication or understanding of what had caused the lack in performance of the aircraft."
After stabilising the 747's climb, the crew declared to air traffic control that they were experiencing problems with two engines and would be returning to the airport. The aircraft, which had been bound for London Heathrow with 265 passengers and 18 crew members, landed safely.
Investigators have concluded that, during the take-off roll, the slats retracted - as designed - in response to signals indicating deployment of thrust reversers on the two inboard Rolls-Royce RB211 engines. The right-hand reverser signal was triggered at 125kt and the left-hand at 160kt.
But neither reverser had been activated, and British Airways engineers examined the aircraft (G-BYGA) to trace the source of the false signals. The inquiry concluded that, although the reversers were stowed, their translating cowls were nevertheless seated relatively far rearwards.
As the 747's engines wound up to high power, and the aircraft accelerated, sensors monitoring the cowl positions transmitted incorrect 'reverser' signals. The slats retracted because of a logic process designed to prevent them being struck by efflux air from activated reversers.
Boeing subsequently developed a safety bulletin for Rolls-Royce-powered 747-400s to disable this reverser-based automated stowing.
 
Bet that was fairly high on the pucker factor! Great job!
 
16 seconds in that condition would probably seem like an eternity not knowing if you're going to be able to hold onto it long enough for it to fix itself, or even if it IS going to fix itself...

Nicely done!
 
Wait..

So we're supposed to REDUCE the pitch and INCREASE the airspeed???

That can't be right. They told me to pitch for shaker last CQ.
 
I can see in this scenario US airlines have the captain do the flying. I wonder what would've happened had he barked out "My Aircraft!" at a such low alt and a/s. It's a good thing he did not try to emulate Sully and did let his FO do the flying.
 
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I can see in this scenario US airlines have the captain do the flying. I wonder what would've happened had he barked out "My Aircraft!" at a such low alt and a/s. It's a good thing he did not try to emulate Sully and did let his FO do the flying.
Says who?

I have flown for 4 Part 135 carriers and 3 Part 121 carriers. Not a single one has EVER had the CA take the airplane at a low altitude. Engine failure, engine fire, stall recovery, anything.

AFTER the aircraft is STABILIZED, some airlines have the F/O fly while the CA troubleshoots the problem, while some have the PF direct the memory items and checklists, so *that* is different from airline to airline, but I've never seen a carrier with a standardized practice of taking the airplane with a problem right at or after V1.

Not sure what you're talking about here...
 
I can see in this scenario US airlines have the captain do the flying. I wonder what would've happened had he barked out "My Aircraft!" at a such low alt and a/s. It's a good thing he did not try to emulate Sully and did let his FO do the flying.

What airline has a "captain immediatley takes the a/c" in their procedures??
 
I can't imagine any Captain saying "I got it" and trying to transfer control of the aircraft in this situation when the F/O was obviously doing a great job. On the other hand, Sully would have looked like a fool if he didn't take control of the airplane given their circumstances. Finger pointing at Sully sure sounds like petty jealousy to me.
 
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Wait..

So we're supposed to REDUCE the pitch and INCREASE the airspeed???

That can't be right. They told me to pitch for shaker last CQ.

That's windshear recovery, JJ.
 
I can't imagine any Captain saying "I got it" and trying to transfer control of the aircraft in this situation when the F/O was obviously doing a great job. On the other hand, Sully would have looked like a fool if he didn't take control of the airplane given their circumstances.

So following your logic why doesn't BA Capt look like a fool? He "didn't take control of the airplane given their circumstances". Are you saying J.Skiles wasn't doing a great job for Sully to take over???

Being an experienced individual such as yourself, I am sure you realize that when sth happens unexpectedly on t/off, you can't just observe to ensure that your FO "obviously does a great job", to make a decision to transfer controls to you. You either do it at that very moment (like Sully), or you let your FO fly and you deal with situation (like BA CA).

The 747 incident happened at low alt and on t/off just like in LGA. Neither CA nor the FO knew how flyable the a/c was (just like initially in LGA).

So, Mr. 767 CA with 19,000 flight hours, how is that different?

Finger pointing at Sully sure sounds like petty jealousy to me.

I always wonder why people get personal when someone expresses his opinion that they disagree with. Do you know me? Or being so perceptive, may be you have a degree in psychology? Or may be it's you who is jealous of Sully and suspect everyone else is as well? Geez, I thought this was a section for mature individuals.
 
This incident occurred at rotation, immediately after take-off. Sully & Skiles hit the birds at around 3000' feet. Totally different situations, but I suspect you already know that and are just trying to stir up something from nothing. Either that, or you are an idiot.
 
It helped to have been taking off on a 14,000 feet long runway. Here is some additional albeit better information coming from Avherald...
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The South African Civil Aviation Authority (SACAA) have released their final report concluding the probable cause of the serious incident was:

Loss of a significant amount of lift on rotation during the takeoff caused by the automatic LE flap retraction logic retracting the Group ‘A’ LE flaps on receipt of spurious thrust reverser unlock signals from the no. 2 and no. 3 engines. The possibility of such an occurrence had not been identified during amendment of the retraction logic.

The SACAA wrote as last of their findings:

"The flying crew should be commended for the professional way that they controlled the aircraft during a critical stage during takeoff and thereby ensured the safety of the 283 occupants on board the aircraft."

The airplane was departing Johanneburg's runway 03L. The departure was planned at reduced takeoff power, the first officer was pilot flying. Calculated speeds were V1=150, Vr=168 and V2=176 KIAS at flaps 20. The #3 thrust reverser amber message displayed on the EICAS screen at about 125.6 knots (below V1), the #2 thrust reverser amber message at 159.9 knots (above V1, just below Vr). At this stage the leading edge Group A flaps retracted automatically according to system logic, speed was 164 KIAS. The airplane rotated at 173 KIAS and became airborne at 176 KIAS. The stick shaker immediately activatated at a radio altitude of 4 feet intermittently for 8 seconds during the next 15 seconds, significant buffeting was observed. The pilot flying, having significant experience with aircraft buffeting due to aerobatics flying, continued to fly the aircraft with the captain, remaining pilot monitoring, calling out aircraft height. The landing gear was retracted at 177 KIAS and the leading edge flaps immediately deployed again reaching their normal position at a height of 56 feet AGL, the stick shaker ceased at 186 KIAS. The leading edge flaps reached their deployed position again 23 seconds after retracting, the airplane performance returned to normal thereafter and the airplane climbed out. Whilst climbing through 7000 feet the crew declared PAN reporting problems with the #2 and #3 engine and decided to return to Johannesburg. The airplane continued to climb to FL150, dumped fuel and landed safely 92 minutes after liftoff.

The leading edge Group A flaps (all leading edge flaps inboard of the outboard engines) are designed to automatically retract if the airplane is in ground mode and either reversers #1 and #4 or reversers #2 and #3 are unlocked. This design is meant to reduce wear on the flap panels, that the airflow from the thrust reversers would produce on the extended panels.

The thrust reversers did not unlock and remained in their stowed position all time, however were at the rear end of their permitted travel in high power engine operation. The stow sensors for thrust reversers #1, #2 and #3 were rigged outside the requirements with the target set too far forward thus causing the unlocked indication with the thrust reverser cowls in their permitted yet rear position.

The crew were and remained unaware of the Group A leading edges having retracted due to this automatic retraction only visible on a separate indication. Only the extended flap EICAS display would have provided them with the according information, however the display was not brought up. The only available indication was a color change of the flap display in the regular EICAS display which however is hardly visible.

The SACAA noted in their findings: "During this time the flight deck crew had no indication or understanding of what had caused the lack in performance of the aircraft."

Several safety actions are underway as result of the occurrence. Boeing plans to change the system logic withdrawing the reverser unlock signal from the autoretract logic, which would continue to function based on the reverser handles and air/ground logic. This was put into an Airworthiness Directive by the FAA.

The SACAA released a number of safety recommendations concerning the man/machine interface, spurious alerts and robustness of software and hardware control logic.
 
This incident occurred at rotation, immediately after take-off. Sully & Skiles hit the birds at around 3000' feet. Totally different situations, but I suspect you already know that and are just trying to stir up something from nothing. Either that, or you are an idiot.

Exactly, thanks.
 
We are not trained to take the controls from the Copilot. In contrary I tell them to never stop flying when it is their takeoff and something happens. If for some reason they were not doing the right thing, I would take control but I train with the guys twice a year. I know what they can do and don't expect that an awkward transfer of controls would help a situation like that. PM job in that situation, make sure thrust levers are at the firewall and back up with callouts of airspeed and altitude. Sounds like some great CRM in that cockpit. Now remind me again why we deserve decent compensation for flying these machines? Don't they fly themselves?
 
This incident occurred at rotation, immediately after take-off. Sully & Skiles hit the birds at around 3000' feet. Totally different situations, but I suspect you already know that and are just trying to stir up something from nothing. Either that, or you are an idiot.


I was thinking the same thing. I'm going with number two. :laugh:
 
Bet they dropped the tea and crumpets in thier draws after that one. Nice Job guys!
 

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