CMR Crash CVR released.

[bailout]

Geez, its just horrible.. You can read the whole thing and anyone one of us could have been in either seat..

 

[V-1]

http://www.kentucky.com/mld/kentucky/need_to_map/16482769.htm

Detailed NTSB reports including complete CVR transcript with times, background on the pilots, interview with the controller on duty, the tower manager, etc.

One thing I found interesting is that at no point did the tower controller, or the Comair F.O. use the runway number in their conversations after the taxi clearance. I always thought this was normal procedure, and I've always thought it was sloppy procedure when a controller didn't specify a runway.


RDO-2

"churliser" [at your leisure spoken very fast] Comair one twenty

one ready to go.

06: 05:17.7
TWR ​

Comair one ninety one, Lexington uh, tower, fly runway heading,

cleared for takeoff.

(Deleted for this post, insignificant)​

06: 05:21.0
RDO-1 ​

runway heading, cleared for takeoff, one ninety one.​

Here's an excerpt from the interview with the controller on duty:

When asked if it was good operating practice to restate the runway in a takeoff clearance, he
said, “In hindsight, it should be done. But it’s not required when there is one runway in use.
When it’s busy and we’re using both runways then I do.”​

Controller's sleep in previous 72 hours:​

Mr. Damron’s Sleep schedule in the 72 hours before the accident:
Sleep
Start Time
Sleep
Stop Time
Sleep
Period Duration
Wed-Thurs 0130-0145 0915 07:15
Thurs-Fri 2230 0715 08:45
Fri-Sat 2230 0540 07:10
Sat-Sun 1530 1730 02: 00​

Another excerpt from the controller interview:​

Asked whether there were any sources that could have alerted him to the fact that Flight 5191 was taxiing onto wrong runway, Mr. Damron said, “Not that I’m aware of.” Asked whether it would have been possible for him to detect it visually out the tower window, Mr. Damron said, “It might have been, yeah.”​

The controller also mentions low morale at the facility due to ongoing contract negotiations.​

As posted above, there's a lot of blame to go around on this one.​

Looks like USA Today is planning to run tomorrow with a "Pilots broke sterile cockpit rule" type story. In the article posted online, it mentions, among other things, the Captain remarking "whoa" 1/2 second before initial impact.​

​

 

[Stifler's Mom]

Sorry that this accident even happened, but hopefully we can all learn from it. Fly safe!

 

[Amish RakeFight]

Looks like USA Today is planning to run tomorrow with a "Pilots broke sterile cockpit rule" type story. In the article posted online, it mentions, among other things, the Captain remarking "whoa" 1/2 second before initial impact.

​

​

You know, I was gonna say something about the lack of a sterile cockpit but felt I might be heavily chastised, so refrained, but they did violate the sterile cockpit rule. For what it's worth, yeah it happens people like to chat, but you know what, maybe, just maybe it might have freed up some time to give a second glance at things and allocate more grey matter to the very critical phase of flight.

Here's some interesting fodder about it.

http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/directline_issues/dl4_sterile.htm


I'd suggest we all take a minute to refesh ourselves.


.

 

[LowlyPropCapt]

You know, I was gonna say something about the lack of a sterile cockpit but felt I might be heavily chastised, so refrained, but they did violate the sterile cockpit rule. For what it's worth, yeah it happens people like to chat, but you know what, maybe, just maybe it might have freed up some time to give a second glance at things and allocate more grey matter to the very critical phase of flight.

Here's some interesting fodder about it.

http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/directline_issues/dl4_sterile.htm


I'd suggest we all take a minute to refesh ourselves.


.

You may indeed be chastised and flamed... But that doesn't mean you are not right!

I am as guilty as anyone about staying sterile on the ground. This accident underscores the importance of remaining vigilant even when no percieved threat exists, because that is when good ol' human error will kill you. A lesson learned (again) for me, and I hope everyone else too.

Reading that CVR transcript was a very tough read for me, and I am not afraid to admit it. The poor CA was talking about his kids (same age as mine), then made a simple mistake that could get anyone.

Be careful out there.

 

[Oakum_Boy]

Is it just me, or does this thing make you want to get out of the business. How much garbage can pilots deal with before it starts to invade everything you do. It seems all anyone at the regionals does anymore is contemplate how to get out. This career has gone down the ********************ter farther than can be fished out, I'm afraid.

 

[172driver]

Biggest thing I noticed that can contribute to this thread is that the remark about the lights being out was well after the thrust set call, probably around 60-80 kts. Indicates to me that the rwy appeared to be lit when they were lined up and they only noticed the lack of lights after going up and over the hill at the intersection of 26 and 22. I have mentioned before that the placement of the 22 rwy lights could easily appear to be aligned with 26 since they are at the four corners of the rwy intersection. I doubt if they saw anything suspicious until cresting the hill.

Add to this the constant construction at LEX, vague notams, lax/fatigued controllers, pilots off their sleep rhythms flying together for the first time, and a preconception by the crew of lights being out...somewhere, and you have the chain.

Unless you've seen that hill though, or can picture it, it's hard to imagine the picture they saw when beginning the t/o. I bet it looked completely normal until they were at least 1500 ft down the rwy. Scary. Could definitely have happened to any of us.

 

[Corona]

Biggest thing I noticed that can contribute to this thread is that the remark about the lights being out was well after the thrust set call, probably around 60-80 kts. Indicates to me that the rwy appeared to be lit when they were lined up and they only noticed the lack of lights after going up and over the hill at the intersection of 26 and 22. I have mentioned before that the placement of the 22 rwy lights could easily appear to be aligned with 26 since they are at the four corners of the rwy intersection. I doubt if they saw anything suspicious until cresting the hill.

It's unclear to me whether the lights were on or not. I can't believe that two airline pilots would depart from an unlit runway, since it's illegal at nighttime under 121 or 135.

The media report I saw made a big deal about the non-relevant chat, then mentioned later that it happened before they started taxi, which rendered the criticism moot. (Haven't read the full transcript.)

I have some concerns about the controller, too. First, he changed his story about seeing the airliner on Ry 26, then said he didn't. Second, he didn't watch the airplane taxi out or take off. On the few visits I've done to control towers, the controllers were very observant of the traffic they were managing regardless of the workload. This controller, far as I can read, didn't have a workload. The Comair flight was the only traffic. I rarely rip on ATC; and I could be entirely wrong here, but I do have concerns...

C

 

[SSDD]

I was in the hotel room watching CNN and asking myself if this could happen to me. I mean one of the first things I learned in instrument training was to check the heading indicator against the compass...about two hours later we're taxing out and ground cleared us to 16L. As we approached the parallel taxiway, I started to turn towards 34R until the F/O said "the OTHER 16L"...so yeah on any given day!

 

[mamba20]

Wow, after reading the transcript of that it almost seems like they came damn close to making it.