Studying Professionalism..warning-3701 content

[regionaltard]

Studying Professionalism..Warning-3701 content!

I came across this paper doing some research on the subject of pulling FDR and CVR data for reasons not related to accident investigation. It deals with some of the issues raised in the 3701 threads in a more analytical, less vitriolic manner.

 

[Wasted]

Many airlines already do this. It's called FOQA, Flight Ops Quality Assurace. FDR type data is downloaded on a regular basis from each aircraft and analysed for unsafe trends. It is deidentified and supposedly cannot be used for disciplinary action, at this point, anyways. Our crewrooms all have bulletin boards with fancy graphs about the current unsafe trend of the month for everybody to look at. Every so often, we'll get memos from above admonishing us to do this or not do this based on FOQA data. In fact, ironically, one memo that came out last fall, before 3701, was one admonishing us to treat ferry and mx flights as if they were regular line flights, as FOQA was showing many of these showed some kind of exuberant maneuvering. Another thing FOQA can do is send an immediate alert to management if certain data is observed. The story is an Airbus that buzzed Orlando at low altitude recently because of a wrong autopilot setting, ACARS'd a message to dispatch after the event. The pilot never filed any ASAP report, thought he got away with it until a day or two later when he was phoned and questioned about whether there was something he needed to talk about. The answer was "um, no" and it went downhill for him from there.

 

[TonyC]

It's called FOQA, Flight Ops Quality Assurace. FDR type data is downloaded on a regular basis from each aircraft and analysed for unsafe trends. It is deidentified and supposedly cannot be used for disciplinary action, at this point, anyways.

...


The story is an Airbus that buzzed Orlando at low altitude recently because of a wrong autopilot setting, ACARS'd a message to dispatch after the event. The pilot never filed any ASAP report, thought he got away with it until a day or two later when he was phoned and questioned about whether there was something he needed to talk about. The answer was "um, no" and it went downhill for him from there.

You just described a program that is supposedly NOT used for disciplinary action, and gave us an example of how it was used for disciplinary action.

Unless there are safeguards against such use, this is NOT a good idea.







.

 

[enigma]

You just described a program that is supposedly NOT used for disciplinary action, and gave us an example of how it was used for disciplinary action.

Unless there are safeguards against such use, this is NOT a good idea.

Tony, Methinks that the ScarBus can rat on its pilots, FOQA or not. Lucky for me, Spirit is most likely too cheap to pay for all of the systems necessary to do the realtime parameter downlink.

Don't get me wrong, I'm about as tame a pilot as pilots get. I don't intentionally do things incorrectly, but I still occasionally screw up and I don't really like the idea of some desk jocky manager getting an email everytime I happen to get one knot fast on approach. But that's just me, I don't do illegal drugs either but am still opposed to "random" drug testing.

regards,
enigma

 

[RP 04]

We have the program at Cathay, no complaints here, although pulling the CVR, or the FDR for that matter is NOT part of the program (it's a separate QAR with no voice recording capability). Also haven't heard of anyone getting e-mails from the CP for busting SOP's.

 

[Rez O. Lewshun]

You just described a program that is supposedly NOT used for disciplinary action, and gave us an example of how it was used for disciplinary action.

Unless there are safeguards against such use, this is NOT a good idea.







.

Tony C.

The system works if the Airbus pilot in question had self disclosed. According to the post, the phone call was his chance to fess up.

He should have made a call himself.. strike one.
When he got the call he was given another chance.. strike two.
Company now in self preservation mode...strike three.

 

[TonyC]

Tony C.

The system works if the Airbus pilot in question had self disclosed. According to the post, the phone call was his chance to fess up.

He should have made a call himself.. strike one.
When he got the call he was given another chance.. strike two.
Company now in self preservation mode...strike three.

You also describe a process where the information collected can be used for disciplinary purposes. Fine, just say so. Don't give anybody the false security that it isn't. FOQA is billed as a non-disciplinary program - - just collecting information, kinda like the NASA ASRS. Wouldn't you be surprised one day if you got, along with the NASA ASRS receipt, an invitation to dance the carpet at your local FSDO? If the program is going to be used for discipline, call it something other than FOQA, like "Big Brother" or "Management's Long Arm." If FOQA works like it's supposed to work, management does NOT have the ability to identify the pilot. Period.

We treat cockpit voice recordings as sacred -- the day we start using them for disciplinary purposes will be a very sad day. The effect will be chilling. Use them for the purpose of enhancing safety, determining the causes of accidents, preventing future accidents, but not for discipline.


FOQA data must be similarly protected. When management gets to pick through the data to single out pilots for discipline, the safety advantages of the program are rendered null and void.





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[Wasted]

You just described a program that is supposedly NOT used for disciplinary action, and gave us an example of how it was used for disciplinary action.

Unless there are safeguards against such use, this is NOT a good idea.

One thing I forgot to mention was that the FAA was also pursuing action, so the company probably also knew about it outside of their FOQA.

Where I am at, so far the FOQA seems to work, people do get called on things. But the call is made by the union gatekeeper, who is the only person who knows the identities of any FOQA event. I know of no disciplinary action on anybody yet on anything that was purely FOQA and did not involve ATC knowledge.

 

[TonyC]

One thing I forgot to mention was that the FAA was also pursuing action, so the company probably also knew about it outside of their FOQA.

Where I am at, so far the FOQA seems to work, people do get called on things. But the call is made by the union gatekeeper, who is the only person who knows the identities of any FOQA event. I know of no disciplinary action on anybody yet on anything that was purely FOQA and did not involve ATC knowledge.

If the crew was identified by something other than FOQA, that's another story entirely. You described FOQA, and then a "FOQA incident" where management called a specific pilot in to "interview." THAT's not how FOQA is supposed to work.







.

 

[Wasted]

If the crew was identified by something other than FOQA, that's another story entirely. You described FOQA, and then a "FOQA incident" where management called a specific pilot in to "interview." THAT's not how FOQA is supposed to work.

Well then I apologise for messing up the details. Maybe somebody from Indy Air can chime in and clear up the exact details of their FOQA or any other reporting system they might have aboard that Airbus.

 

[regionaltard]

The story is an Airbus that buzzed Orlando at low altitude recently because of a wrong autopilot setting, ACARS'd a message to dispatch after the event. The pilot never filed any ASAP report, thought he got away with it until a day or two later when he was phoned and questioned about whether there was something he needed to talk about. The answer was "um, no" and it went downhill for him from there.

I think that any reasonable professional would agree that the pilot's actions are problematic, but I think you're missing the forest for the trees here.

From a global perspective, anything that decreases confidence in the confidentiality that is an integral part of programs like FOQA and ASAP has a far greater net negative effect on "Safety" than catching and punishing a miscreant like this 'Bus pilot could ever hope to offset.

This is a subject that's near and dear to my heart. I work at an airline that has placed a high priority on implementing an ASAP, but resolutely refuses to acknowledge that there are serious cultural obstacles standing in the way. Our pilots want it too, but there's just no way we can see past the accumulated history to find a way to make it work.

 

[Wasted]

I agree with what you say about the integrity of FOQA reporting. I think it may have been an entirely different system, asides from ATC, that snitched on the Airbus. From what I heard second hand, is that 1. Dispatch knew immediately that an incident had occured because the type of GPWS warnings being generated that day caused some ACARS module to send an automatic message to dispatch. 2. ATC already had started making phone calls and writing up paperwork. So I think the company found out by way of other than FOQA as it is. Since if it was through FOQA, they would have not known until the QAR was downloaded at its next scheduled download.

I guess that opens up the realization that there are possibly other aircraft mounted systems in place that already allow us to be snitched on......

 

[Rez O. Lewshun]

We treat cockpit voice recordings as sacred -- the day we start using them for disciplinary purposes will be a very sad day. The effect will be chilling. Use them for the purpose of enhancing safety, determining the causes of accidents, preventing future accidents, but not for discipline. .

Not sure what Fred is doing Tony, but where I come from ACA/IDE management did use CVR/FDR data for disciplinary. Management owns the information and doesn't have to give it to the Feds (NTSB) until a defined accident/incident.


Just like you own the data on your computer....

The company would hear about an event and download the data. It is thier information. At ACA we had to negoatiate protection language.....