InclusiveScope
Well-known member
- Joined
- Mar 14, 2002
- Posts
- 385
ALPA DEMANDS ALL PSA RJ-700’s BE FLOWN BY MAINLINE PILOTS
On April 30th, the PSA Master Executive Council (MEC) reported that PSA Management had made a “surprise” proposal that would require that all of PSA’s RJ-700’s be crewed solely by furloughed US Airways mainline pilots. According to at least one report, ALPA also said that management’s proposal came as a surprise to some of its PSA pilot-representatives because ALPA was not “actively engaged” in any negotiations.
But unfortunately for the PSA pilots, ALPA is downplaying its role in crafting “management’s” demands. As the RJDC reported in our April 4th update, documents published more than a month ago by the US Airways MEC reference a pre-existing agreement-in-principle entitled “Attachment ‘C’ Principles to be included in US Airways/PSA Four Party SJ Agreement.” Likewise, sections in the proposed mainline “Consolidated Small Jet Agreement” state that the placement of additional RJ-700’s will be subject to “staffing, pay and seniority for bidding procedures to be agreed by the Association and the Company.”
Therefore, there can be no doubt that management’s “request” was the direct result of ALPA’s mainline bargaining demands and thus hardly a “surprise” to ALPA’s officials. Events at PSA continue to illustrate the ill-affects caused by ALPA’s predatory mainline bargaining as it becomes increasingly obvious that PSA’s pilots aren’t really bargaining with management -- but against their own union. Furthermore, ALPA’s use of management to make proxy demands against the union’s own members constitutes a gross neglect of ALPA’s duties to the PSA pilots if not an outright deception.
ALPA’s apparent double-dealing and its refusal to put an end to predatory bargaining are precisely why an increasing number of ALPA’s “regional” members have looked to the courts for protection against their own union. Any US Airways Express pilot who desires additional information should contact the Pilots for Fair Representation via their web site at the link provided below.
Related Links: www.rjdefense.com/2004/loa91.pdf
http://www.pilots4fair.freeservers.com
ALPA’s “BRAND SCOPE” Initiatives Prove Farcical as US Air Pilots Ratify LOA 91
On May 10th, ALPA announced that the US Airways pilots had ratified the new Consolidated Small Jet Agreement (LOA-91) by a 3 to1 margin. According to ALPA, the agreement gives management more “flexibility” in deploying small jets in greater numbers at US Airway’s affiliates in order to protect the financing. In championing the agreement, ALPA also stated that the new agreement would help prevent the potential “loss” of Jets for Jobs positions.
But for the third time in two years, ALPA has “locked-out” its “regional” members at US Airways as it again unilaterally imposes a multitude of special terms and conditions on a take it or leave it basis. As the RJDC has repeatedly warned, ALPA’s “Brand Scope” initiative is little more than a political smokescreen intended to obscure ALPA’s predatory mainline practices.
The true ugliness of ALPA’s actions will be readily apparent when thousands of ALPA’s “regional” members are told they must accept ALPA’s mainline terms “as is” or the new aircraft on which their futures depend will be diverted elsewhere—with ALPA’s blessings.
Related Link: www.rjdefense.com/2004/loa91_codeaphones.pdf
Contradiction: ALPA Refuses to Draw Legal Conclusions about Its Own Scope Clauses
In 2000, ALPA promised the Delta pilots that small jet restrictions, such as fleet or flying ratios and route restrictions, would protect “mainline” flying and therefore “mainline” jobs. Then again in 2003, ALPA published an editorial entitled, “Scope Works for All Pilots,” in which it extolled the purported virtues of the Delta scope clause.
However, when recently asked to state the same “on the record” as part of the pending litigation, ALPA objected, stating that such questions called for “legal conclusions and/or speculation,” were “vague” and “not relevant,” or were predicated upon “false assumptions.” ALPA made its objections in response to plaintiff’s interrogatories, which are formal essay-type questions that must be answered under oath.
ALPA’s waffling strongly suggests that the union’s previous representations concerning the purported “benefits” of small jet restrictions will not withstand scrutiny. Of course, none of this comes as any surprise to the RJDC leadership as we’ve pointed out for years how ALPA was quick to make claims—but very slow to provide any facts in support of its conclusions.
While plaintiffs have since agreed to rephrase the questions in order to permit ALPA’s officials to provide their “understanding,” ALPA’s members should take note of ALPA’s apparent reluctance to definitively state how the Delta scope clause works. More importantly, if ALPA’s motives were genuine, then one would think the union’s leadership wouldn’t hesitate to say so—under oath.
Related Link: www.rjdefense.com/2004/alpa_responses.pdf
www.rjdefense.com/2004/scopewidget.pdf
Scope Fact: Why Seat and Route Restrictions Don’t Work
Prior to the 9/11 downturn, ALPA ignored questions concerning the efficacy and validity of small jet restrictions. Instead, despite the obvious failure of ALPA’s contracts to preserve “mainline” flying, ALPA’s fear-mongers continue to insist that if unrestricted, the small jet would replace larger aircraft in many domestic markets. But an example from Delta’s May 11th timetable illustrates why that’s not the case:
City Pair: ATL-JAX Distance: 270 NM Aircraft: 7 B-767s, 1 B-757, 2 MD-88s Total number of seats: 2228
City Pair: CVG-JAX Distance: 614 NM Aircraft: 2 MD-88s, 1 RJ-70, 2 RJ-50s Total number of seats: 454
Despite the much shorter stage-lengths, Delta uses a substantial number of large aircraft to serve the ATL-JAX market. Why? Market Demand! When there is sufficient passenger demand, the larger aircraft’s lower seat-mile costs will prevail. Conversely, when demand is less, the smaller aircraft’s lower cost-per-departure will mandate its use. This fact holds true throughout the entire fleet range.
Therefore, passenger demand and aircraft economics, not scope restrictions, will always determine which aircraft serves a given market. Attempts to dictate otherwise with a labor agreement will eventually harm the union’s members who depend upon a healthy airline for their livelihoods.
Related Link: www.rjdefense.com/2003/10_Things_About_Scope.pdf
SkyWest’s Pilots Reject In-House Union Bid: Did ALPA’s Apparent Involvement Hurt or Help?
On April 18th, the National Mediation Board announced that the SkyWest pilots had rejected by 3 to 1 a bid by the Unified Pilots Association (UPA) to form an in-house union. Previously, in 1999, ALPA failed in its efforts to represent the SkyWest pilots. This time around, the efforts of the UPA may have been hampered by the specter of ALPA’s active involvement in the “in-house” drive.
The UPA organizers themselves disclosed that they were in close communication with ALPA’s mainline MEC’s and they detailed the involvement of ALPA staff members, attorneys, and elected officials in at least one UPA meeting. Unfortunately for the UPA effort, many of those who claimed to support the SkyWest pilots and their organizing efforts have long histories of working against the small jet and its pilots.
ALPA will not be able to organize “regional” pilot groups or even assist in “in-house” drives until it purges its addiction to small jet restrictions and the commensurate use of “regional” interests as mainline bargaining capital. Just last year, pilots at both Chicago Express and CommutAir rejected ALPA representation.
Related Link: www.unifiedpilots.org
On April 30th, the PSA Master Executive Council (MEC) reported that PSA Management had made a “surprise” proposal that would require that all of PSA’s RJ-700’s be crewed solely by furloughed US Airways mainline pilots. According to at least one report, ALPA also said that management’s proposal came as a surprise to some of its PSA pilot-representatives because ALPA was not “actively engaged” in any negotiations.
But unfortunately for the PSA pilots, ALPA is downplaying its role in crafting “management’s” demands. As the RJDC reported in our April 4th update, documents published more than a month ago by the US Airways MEC reference a pre-existing agreement-in-principle entitled “Attachment ‘C’ Principles to be included in US Airways/PSA Four Party SJ Agreement.” Likewise, sections in the proposed mainline “Consolidated Small Jet Agreement” state that the placement of additional RJ-700’s will be subject to “staffing, pay and seniority for bidding procedures to be agreed by the Association and the Company.”
Therefore, there can be no doubt that management’s “request” was the direct result of ALPA’s mainline bargaining demands and thus hardly a “surprise” to ALPA’s officials. Events at PSA continue to illustrate the ill-affects caused by ALPA’s predatory mainline bargaining as it becomes increasingly obvious that PSA’s pilots aren’t really bargaining with management -- but against their own union. Furthermore, ALPA’s use of management to make proxy demands against the union’s own members constitutes a gross neglect of ALPA’s duties to the PSA pilots if not an outright deception.
ALPA’s apparent double-dealing and its refusal to put an end to predatory bargaining are precisely why an increasing number of ALPA’s “regional” members have looked to the courts for protection against their own union. Any US Airways Express pilot who desires additional information should contact the Pilots for Fair Representation via their web site at the link provided below.
Related Links: www.rjdefense.com/2004/loa91.pdf
http://www.pilots4fair.freeservers.com
ALPA’s “BRAND SCOPE” Initiatives Prove Farcical as US Air Pilots Ratify LOA 91
On May 10th, ALPA announced that the US Airways pilots had ratified the new Consolidated Small Jet Agreement (LOA-91) by a 3 to1 margin. According to ALPA, the agreement gives management more “flexibility” in deploying small jets in greater numbers at US Airway’s affiliates in order to protect the financing. In championing the agreement, ALPA also stated that the new agreement would help prevent the potential “loss” of Jets for Jobs positions.
But for the third time in two years, ALPA has “locked-out” its “regional” members at US Airways as it again unilaterally imposes a multitude of special terms and conditions on a take it or leave it basis. As the RJDC has repeatedly warned, ALPA’s “Brand Scope” initiative is little more than a political smokescreen intended to obscure ALPA’s predatory mainline practices.
The true ugliness of ALPA’s actions will be readily apparent when thousands of ALPA’s “regional” members are told they must accept ALPA’s mainline terms “as is” or the new aircraft on which their futures depend will be diverted elsewhere—with ALPA’s blessings.
Related Link: www.rjdefense.com/2004/loa91_codeaphones.pdf
Contradiction: ALPA Refuses to Draw Legal Conclusions about Its Own Scope Clauses
In 2000, ALPA promised the Delta pilots that small jet restrictions, such as fleet or flying ratios and route restrictions, would protect “mainline” flying and therefore “mainline” jobs. Then again in 2003, ALPA published an editorial entitled, “Scope Works for All Pilots,” in which it extolled the purported virtues of the Delta scope clause.
However, when recently asked to state the same “on the record” as part of the pending litigation, ALPA objected, stating that such questions called for “legal conclusions and/or speculation,” were “vague” and “not relevant,” or were predicated upon “false assumptions.” ALPA made its objections in response to plaintiff’s interrogatories, which are formal essay-type questions that must be answered under oath.
ALPA’s waffling strongly suggests that the union’s previous representations concerning the purported “benefits” of small jet restrictions will not withstand scrutiny. Of course, none of this comes as any surprise to the RJDC leadership as we’ve pointed out for years how ALPA was quick to make claims—but very slow to provide any facts in support of its conclusions.
While plaintiffs have since agreed to rephrase the questions in order to permit ALPA’s officials to provide their “understanding,” ALPA’s members should take note of ALPA’s apparent reluctance to definitively state how the Delta scope clause works. More importantly, if ALPA’s motives were genuine, then one would think the union’s leadership wouldn’t hesitate to say so—under oath.
Related Link: www.rjdefense.com/2004/alpa_responses.pdf
www.rjdefense.com/2004/scopewidget.pdf
Scope Fact: Why Seat and Route Restrictions Don’t Work
Prior to the 9/11 downturn, ALPA ignored questions concerning the efficacy and validity of small jet restrictions. Instead, despite the obvious failure of ALPA’s contracts to preserve “mainline” flying, ALPA’s fear-mongers continue to insist that if unrestricted, the small jet would replace larger aircraft in many domestic markets. But an example from Delta’s May 11th timetable illustrates why that’s not the case:
City Pair: ATL-JAX Distance: 270 NM Aircraft: 7 B-767s, 1 B-757, 2 MD-88s Total number of seats: 2228
City Pair: CVG-JAX Distance: 614 NM Aircraft: 2 MD-88s, 1 RJ-70, 2 RJ-50s Total number of seats: 454
Despite the much shorter stage-lengths, Delta uses a substantial number of large aircraft to serve the ATL-JAX market. Why? Market Demand! When there is sufficient passenger demand, the larger aircraft’s lower seat-mile costs will prevail. Conversely, when demand is less, the smaller aircraft’s lower cost-per-departure will mandate its use. This fact holds true throughout the entire fleet range.
Therefore, passenger demand and aircraft economics, not scope restrictions, will always determine which aircraft serves a given market. Attempts to dictate otherwise with a labor agreement will eventually harm the union’s members who depend upon a healthy airline for their livelihoods.
Related Link: www.rjdefense.com/2003/10_Things_About_Scope.pdf
SkyWest’s Pilots Reject In-House Union Bid: Did ALPA’s Apparent Involvement Hurt or Help?
On April 18th, the National Mediation Board announced that the SkyWest pilots had rejected by 3 to 1 a bid by the Unified Pilots Association (UPA) to form an in-house union. Previously, in 1999, ALPA failed in its efforts to represent the SkyWest pilots. This time around, the efforts of the UPA may have been hampered by the specter of ALPA’s active involvement in the “in-house” drive.
The UPA organizers themselves disclosed that they were in close communication with ALPA’s mainline MEC’s and they detailed the involvement of ALPA staff members, attorneys, and elected officials in at least one UPA meeting. Unfortunately for the UPA effort, many of those who claimed to support the SkyWest pilots and their organizing efforts have long histories of working against the small jet and its pilots.
ALPA will not be able to organize “regional” pilot groups or even assist in “in-house” drives until it purges its addiction to small jet restrictions and the commensurate use of “regional” interests as mainline bargaining capital. Just last year, pilots at both Chicago Express and CommutAir rejected ALPA representation.
Related Link: www.unifiedpilots.org
