Rogue5
Adult Swim junkie
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- Jul 16, 2002
- Posts
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NTSB PRESS RELEASE
************************************************************
National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: May 2, 2006
SB-06-26
************************************************************
CONTAMINATED WING CAUSED FATAL CRASH IN COLORADO, NTSB SAYS
************************************************************
Washington, DC - The National Transportation Safety Board
today determined that the probable cause of a corporate jet
crash in Colorado was the flight crew's failure to ensure
that the airplane's wings were free of ice or snow
contamination that accumulated while the airplane was on the
ground. This failure resulted in an attempted takeoff with
upper wing contamination that induced the subsequent stall
and collision with the ground.
"It is imperative that flight crews adhere to the
ground inspections and deicing guidelines that are in place
when freezing precipitation is present while on the ground,"
said NTSB Acting Chairman Mark Rosenker. "It is paramount
that the aircraft is free of contamination before attempting
to takeoff during periods of freezing precipitation."
On November 28, 2004, a Canadair, Ltd., CL-600-2A12,
registered to Hop-a-Jet, Inc., and operated by Air Castle
Corporation dba Global Aviation as Glo-Air flight 73,
collided with the ground during takeoff at Montrose Regional
Airport, Montrose, Colorado. Instrument meteorological
conditions prevailed, and snow was falling. Of the six
occupants on board, the captain, the flight attendant, and
one passenger were killed, and the first officer and two
passengers were seriously injured. Impact forces and
postcrash fire destroyed the airplane.
The Board's investigation found that the presence of
upper wing contamination is likely because the airplane was
parked on the ground for about 40 to 45 minutes during
freezing precipitation and it was not deiced. Witness
reports state that upper wing surface contamination was
evident while the airplane was parked as well as slush
sliding from the top of the fuselage before takeoff, which
further confirms the presence of contamination.
The investigation confirmed that this type of
contamination can easily accumulate while an airplane is
parked and exposed to freezing precipitation and it
accumulates on upper surface areas that cannot be protected
by the wing leading-edge anti-ice system.
Although it is evident that the upper wing surface
contamination accumulated while the airplane was on the
ground, the Board found that, on the basis of the witness
reports, the flight crewmembers would have seen the
contamination if they had carefully visually examined the
airplane's upper wing surfaces. A tactile examination of
the wings is necessary to detect hazardous accumulation of
ice that may be visually difficult to detect.
As a result of the information found while conducting
the investigation, the Safety Board concluded that the
flight crew attempted to take off with upper wing
contamination that induced a stall and loss of roll control
shortly after lift off. The airplane did not climb but
rolled violently left and right several times before it
collided with the ground.
As a result of its investigation, the National
Transportation Safety Board made the following safety
recommendation:
To the Federal Aviation Administration:
1. Require the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to
develop visual and tactile training aids to accurately
depict small amounts of upper wing surface
contamination. FAA should then require all commercial
airplane operators to incorporate these training aids
into their initial and recurrent training.
To the Department of Transportation
2. Require on Part 135 air taxi flights that the following
information be provided to customers and passengers at
the time the flight is contracted, and at any point
there is a subsequent change: the name of the company
with operational control of the flight, including any
"doing business as" names contained in the Operations
Specifications; the aircraft owner; and the name(s) of
any brokers involved in arranging the flight.
As a result of the investigation of the Montrose
accident, the Safety Board reiterated recommendation A-
03-52:
To the Federal Aviation Administration:
3. Require that 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)
Part 135 on-demand charter operators that conduct
dual-pilot operations establish and implement a
Federal Aviation Administration-approved crew
resource management training program for their
flight crews in accordance with 14 CFR Part 121,
subparts N and O (A-03-52).
A synopsis of the report can be found on the Board's
website, www.ntsb.gov. The complete report will be added to
the web shortly.
-30-
-
NTSB Media Contact: Keith Holloway, (202) 314-6100
[email protected]
NTSB PRESS RELEASE
************************************************************
National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: May 2, 2006
SB-06-26
************************************************************
CONTAMINATED WING CAUSED FATAL CRASH IN COLORADO, NTSB SAYS
************************************************************
Washington, DC - The National Transportation Safety Board
today determined that the probable cause of a corporate jet
crash in Colorado was the flight crew's failure to ensure
that the airplane's wings were free of ice or snow
contamination that accumulated while the airplane was on the
ground. This failure resulted in an attempted takeoff with
upper wing contamination that induced the subsequent stall
and collision with the ground.
"It is imperative that flight crews adhere to the
ground inspections and deicing guidelines that are in place
when freezing precipitation is present while on the ground,"
said NTSB Acting Chairman Mark Rosenker. "It is paramount
that the aircraft is free of contamination before attempting
to takeoff during periods of freezing precipitation."
On November 28, 2004, a Canadair, Ltd., CL-600-2A12,
registered to Hop-a-Jet, Inc., and operated by Air Castle
Corporation dba Global Aviation as Glo-Air flight 73,
collided with the ground during takeoff at Montrose Regional
Airport, Montrose, Colorado. Instrument meteorological
conditions prevailed, and snow was falling. Of the six
occupants on board, the captain, the flight attendant, and
one passenger were killed, and the first officer and two
passengers were seriously injured. Impact forces and
postcrash fire destroyed the airplane.
The Board's investigation found that the presence of
upper wing contamination is likely because the airplane was
parked on the ground for about 40 to 45 minutes during
freezing precipitation and it was not deiced. Witness
reports state that upper wing surface contamination was
evident while the airplane was parked as well as slush
sliding from the top of the fuselage before takeoff, which
further confirms the presence of contamination.
The investigation confirmed that this type of
contamination can easily accumulate while an airplane is
parked and exposed to freezing precipitation and it
accumulates on upper surface areas that cannot be protected
by the wing leading-edge anti-ice system.
Although it is evident that the upper wing surface
contamination accumulated while the airplane was on the
ground, the Board found that, on the basis of the witness
reports, the flight crewmembers would have seen the
contamination if they had carefully visually examined the
airplane's upper wing surfaces. A tactile examination of
the wings is necessary to detect hazardous accumulation of
ice that may be visually difficult to detect.
As a result of the information found while conducting
the investigation, the Safety Board concluded that the
flight crew attempted to take off with upper wing
contamination that induced a stall and loss of roll control
shortly after lift off. The airplane did not climb but
rolled violently left and right several times before it
collided with the ground.
As a result of its investigation, the National
Transportation Safety Board made the following safety
recommendation:
To the Federal Aviation Administration:
1. Require the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to
develop visual and tactile training aids to accurately
depict small amounts of upper wing surface
contamination. FAA should then require all commercial
airplane operators to incorporate these training aids
into their initial and recurrent training.
To the Department of Transportation
2. Require on Part 135 air taxi flights that the following
information be provided to customers and passengers at
the time the flight is contracted, and at any point
there is a subsequent change: the name of the company
with operational control of the flight, including any
"doing business as" names contained in the Operations
Specifications; the aircraft owner; and the name(s) of
any brokers involved in arranging the flight.
As a result of the investigation of the Montrose
accident, the Safety Board reiterated recommendation A-
03-52:
To the Federal Aviation Administration:
3. Require that 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)
Part 135 on-demand charter operators that conduct
dual-pilot operations establish and implement a
Federal Aviation Administration-approved crew
resource management training program for their
flight crews in accordance with 14 CFR Part 121,
subparts N and O (A-03-52).
A synopsis of the report can be found on the Board's
website, www.ntsb.gov. The complete report will be added to
the web shortly.
-30-
-
NTSB Media Contact: Keith Holloway, (202) 314-6100
[email protected]
