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Long Day For Corporate Air (AA Connection) J32 Crew

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Sandstorm

Well-known member
Joined
Mar 6, 2002
Posts
145
Not sure how accurate this report is, but i just read that the Corporate Airlines crew had been on duty for almost 15 hours, which makes one wonder how much pilot fatique had to play into this crash. Its unfortunate that even after such a tragedy nothing will ever get done about the horrendous long days we often work. My condolences to the family and friends.

Mo. Plane Crash Crew Said Worked 15 Hours






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Oct 22,
9:35 AM (ET)

KIRKSVILLE, Mo. (AP) - The crew of a commuter plane that crashed, killing 13, had been on duty nearly 15 hours that day, a federal investigator said.

Carol Carmody, who heads the National Transportation Safety Board team investigating the Corporate Airlines crash Tuesday night, said the two crew members had been on duty for 14 hours and 41 minutes, which is within Federal Aviation Administration regulations. The St. Louis to Kirksville flight was the crew's sixth for the day, she said Thursday.

The pilot, Capt. Kim Sasse, and First Officer Jonathan Palmer, both died in the crash, along with 11 of their 13 passengers on the 19-seat, twin-engine turboprop.

Investigators putting together information from the plane's voice and data recorders and traffic control tapes said all indications were that the approach to the Kirksville airport, about 220 miles northwest of St. Louis, was routine.

"The crew activated the runway lights at the airport, and all the lights were operational," Carmody said. "After several seconds of discussion, the captain said, 'Field in sight.' Thirteen seconds later there was the sound of an impact on the recording, and three seconds later the recording ended."

"It was a completely routine approach to the runaway," she said. "There was no change in direction, speed or heading. There was no emergency call from the aircraft."

The NTSB member said the flight data recorder showed the plane was traveling at a normal approach speed of 120 knots (around 140 mph) as it neared the airport. She said its rate of descent was constant before the data recording ended, with the plane climbing slightly in the last four seconds.

"At this point, we don't know the exact terrain of the ground, so we don't know precisely how far above the ground the plane was," she said.

Carmody said a review of maintenance records on the aircraft over the last 30 days was "very unremarkable."

She would not speculate on what role, if any, the weather may have played in the crash. Skies were overcast and misting, with some thunderstorms in the area, at the time.

The two survivors, Dr. John Krogh, 69, of Wallsburgh, Utah, and his assistant, Wendy Bonham, 44, of Spanish Fork, Utah, remained hospitalized at Kirksville. Carmody said it was "remarkable" that the two

 
I just did a 12 hour duty day yesterday that ended with a night approach to an airport after the tower had closed in 3/4 BR and 200' overcast. In good weather I probably wouldn't have though much about it, but I definitely felt fatigued afterwards. In these conditions combined with tired eyes calling approach lights in sight, I can see how easily there's room for error. I'm not implying that the crew made any mistakes or called runway in sight for something that wasn't the runway, just the fact how much of a role being tired and overworked can have on you. Especially in night IMC conditions with poor visibility after a long day...
 
Lets see...they had been on-duty for about 15 hours. They had a wake-up call two hours before show, and were still likely, at the time of the crash, two hours from hitting the bed. If the previous day was the same, it's a good be they were operating on 5 hrs sleep, MAYBE???

Heck, they prly just freaking fell asleep.

Great, just great!!!!
 
I think we are all dancing around the same thing but no one will say it so I will:

People have died and will continue to die until something is done about duty limits. Period. Yes, there is always something else that causes the crash, but more often than not, an alert crew likely would have not commited the errors that led to the crash.
We all like to glorify our job by saying how easy and boring it is (and there is some truth to it), but the fact remains that an airplane is a machine that requires intelligence and alertness to operate.
Having it operated, especially in tough conditions, by someone who has been awake for nearly 20 hours because it is "legal" is something that neither the FAA nor the NTSB will ever change.
All we can do as pilots is have enough guts to face the company's music when we refuse to fly from fatigue.
 
There was already another crash several years ago in LIT where they were trying to get in after an approx. 14 hour duty day. Absolutely nothing was done to change duty times then. I don't expect anything to be done now.
Those that make the rules don't face them. It's real easy to fly a desk, having never flown Part 121, and feel that a 14 hour duty day is perfectly O.K.
 
Individual pilot groups can negotiate to have a limit on duty times. I know of at least one airline contract that limits duty time to 12 hours, with a required 12 hours of rest between duty periods.

If you can't get the FAA to give it to you, have your union fight for it.
 
acaTerry said:
I think we are all dancing around the same thing but no one will say it so I will:

People have died and will continue to die until something is done about duty limits. Period. Yes, there is always something else that causes the crash, but more often than not, an alert crew likely would have not commited the errors that led to the crash.
We all like to glorify our job by saying how easy and boring it is (and there is some truth to it), but the fact remains that an airplane is a machine that requires intelligence and alertness to operate.
Having it operated, especially in tough conditions, by someone who has been awake for nearly 20 hours because it is "legal" is something that neither the FAA nor the NTSB will ever change.
All we can do as pilots is have enough guts to face the company's music when we refuse to fly from fatigue.
Well said.
 
Be careful of what you ask for. If the FAA "clamps down" on duty limits, they may very well include commuting time. The best answer here is a fatigue policy that both the pilots and management will adhere to. I am fortunate to work were the fatigue policy is simply when you are fatigued, call crew scheduling and there response will be what can we do to help? (hotel room). I realize the financial margins at many carriers may make this difficult, but it is still cheaper than dealing with the tragic aftermath of an accident were fatigue is a major factor.
 
English said:
Individual pilot groups can negotiate to have a limit on duty times. I know of at least one airline contract that limits duty time to 12 hours, with a required 12 hours of rest between duty periods.

If you can't get the FAA to give it to you, have your union fight for it.
A very great idea in theory, English. In better times where every ounce of negotiating capital is not going to "fight the race to the bottom" and "scope" issues, it would probably be easier to turn the attention of the pilot groups to fatigue/duty time issues. Unfortunately, regulatory changes to duty time limits have also been resisted by pilots who wanted to fly more, make OT, and etc.

In my opinion, the change really does need to come from the regulators and be applied across the board. That way, a company has much less incentive to bend/coerce an employee to fly against the FARs vs. coerce them to fly against the contract. It would also affect all carriers relatively equally (keeping the company from whining about not being competitive). Writing the limits in as regulation also shields duty limits from bankruptcy re-writes of contracts and associated bad faith negotiating.

I'm floating around a few ideas for an "industy whitepaper" on fatigue and pilot error issues, and a very detailed plan for a regulatory change. It would fix not only total time on duty but also circadian rhythm problems. I need to do more researching and thinking on it before releasing a draft, but I'm really hoping to come up with a solution that will be at least livable for everyone.
 
Last edited:
rest times should reflect "ACTUAL" NOT scheduled times...

extend debrief time and show time from 45 mins(combined) to longer....
 
Way back when I was just a young F/O I had a Captain who showed me an article on fatigue. It cited a study that showed impairment from lack of sleep is worse than from intoxication.

Needless to say, any time that idiot Chief Pilot of ours gives me a hard time about calling off fatigued (granted, I have only had to do it twice--and both times I got a phone call) I cite that study.

Now I will, sadly, cite the Corpex accident as well. What an unfortunate accident.
 
Oh, go to the second clip about the coffee...the rest of this site is pretty funny too.
 
Sandstorm said:
She would not speculate on what role, if any, the weather may have played in the crash. Skies were overcast and misting, with some thunderstorms in the area, at the time.
Like many of you I am not crazy about pilots speculating the cause of aircraft accidents, however the more I read about this crash it seems that these pilots might have succumb to the "black hole" illusion. This, coupled with fatigue is the same situation that is thought to have caused the crash of the FedEx B-727 in Tallahassee a few years ago. Overcast and misty skies can intensify this effect.

There is a big article on the FedEx crash as well as this illusion coupled with fatigue in either Professional Pilot Magazine or other trade magazine a few months ago. It's very interesting.

I would bet that they were on an approach without vertical guidance.
 
Crossair lost an Avro jet a couple years ago on a nonprecision approach. Captain started a descent while not in a position to land:

"The plane, which was flying from Berlin to Zurich on the night of November 24, 2001, crashed into woodland just short of the runway, killing 24 of the 33 people on board.

The report confirmed that the pilot of the Jumbolino Avro RJ-100 jet had dropped below the minimum descent altitude, ignoring automatic alarm signals.

It said the 57-year-old pilot of Crossair flight LX 3579 was too tired to concentrate fully or make crucial decisions.

The pilot had been working for more than 13 hours when the crash occurred and had also exceeded maximum duty times in the two days before the accident."
 
I flew under part 125 hauling auto parts. We were on call 24/7 with no days off. I had months where i flew 180+ hours over a 30 day period, and some months where i flew 2 hours. under 125 all you need is 8hrs of rest in a 24 hour period. sometimes we would be up all day, crawl into bed at 10pm and the phone would ring, dispatch telling you that you are flying down to mexico city (4hr), after waiting for freight for (3hrs), you would fly to laredo to clear customs (2.5 hrs), then fly to norfolk (chesapeake bay) maybe another (4.5 hrs). plus misc. ground time (17 hours total)....then if you want a hotel room you have to fly to knoxville because jet fuel is cheaper and there are no hotel rooms near cheasapeake bay (another 2.0hrs). is it legal??? well you dropped the freight off, so now you are part 91.....i think you get the point....this sheeit happens, and it is legal.
keep in mind what the FAA/NTSB will say.


this is a very unfortuante accident and i pray for the families and the tired pilots out there.
 
16 hour duty is a FAR.

To change this rule will take an act of congress, literally....

It is all politics

How do you influence legislators to change the code?

ALPA-PAC......
 
Why am I not suprised they were maxing out on duty:

I think that fingers should be pointed at the FAA and the ATA for what is a blatant safety hazard. People ask me all the time what I believe is the most dangerous thing about the airlines. I do not hesitate to explain just how bad fatigue can be and how much we are pushed to the limit legally. If they walk away scared by this conversation, GOOD, cause this needs to be changed now.

There have been plenty of accidents where fatigue was a huge factor, but FOR CRYING OUT LOUD LOOK AT AA 1420 IN LITTLE ROCK! A chief pilot at the controls blasts into dogsh!t weather in order to get it in. What a coincidence they were pushing 16 hours of duty!?!

Shame on the FAA and greedy ATA for refusing to accept the reality that we can be too beaten down under the current system. Sometimes the possiblity of calling fatigue does not save the day, you need an altered limit. I have no fears about calling in fatigued but others might. My sympathies to the Corpex crew and victims. When you go 15 hours esp in the Jetstream you are beat period. Could of happened to any of us.

BTW, I back the PAC for reasons like this...
 
Are there funds set up for the crewmembers?

I'd like to help out here, just as I will with the PCL families.
 
nimtz said:
There have been plenty of accidents where fatigue was a huge factor, but FOR CRYING OUT LOUD LOOK AT AA 1420 IN LITTLE ROCK! A chief pilot at the controls blasts into dogsh!t weather in order to get it in. What a coincidence they were pushing 16 hours of duty!?!
Just for accuracy sake, the crew in AA1420 was pushing the 14 hour contractual duty limit, not the 16 hour FAA limit. The Board did cite fatigue as a factor in their performance.

NTSB Ops Chairman's Factual Report page 3 said:
"Flight 1420, the accident flight, was scheduled to depart DFW at 2028 as flight 1420. The airplane scheduled for use on the flight was delayed due to weather and according to the dispatcher of flight 1420, using the original airplane, would not allow the flightcrew to remain within the contractual crew duty day limit of 14 hours2. As a result, the accident airplane, N215AA, was substituted for flight 1420."







 

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