Just a reminder

[zonker]

Hard limits designed to protect the pilot from himself may have sounded like a good idea, but there have been at least six accidents involving Airbus aircraft that could not have happened on a Boeing.

Care to name them?

 

[EagleRJ]

Care to name them?

Sure- here you go. These were all accidents that happened with A-320s, and you can sense a recurring theme in that the flight control system was a factor in every one of them. Other Airbus models have had issues, too. The A-380 will have the same design philosophy.

Air France, France, 1988

The newly delivered aircraft was to perform a charter flight on behalf of the Mulhouse Flying Club. The crew was to overfly Mulhouse-Habsheim airport two times (first at low speed, gear down at 100ft and the other at high speed in clean configuration) as part of an airshow. The aircraft took off from Basle-Mulhouse at 2:41pm local time and climbed to 1000 feet. The crew started the descent three minutes later and Habsheim was in sight at 450ft agl. The first officer informed the captain that the aircraft was reaching 100ft at 14:45:14. The descent continued to 50ft 8 seconds later and further to 30-35ft. Go-around power was added at 14.45:35. The A320 continued and touched trees at the end of the runway at 14:45:40 with a 14° pitch attitude and an engine speed of 83% N1. The plane sank slowly into the forest and a fire broke out. Failure of the Captain to maintain sufficient altitude and airspeed for recovery after a low approach to a runway with obstacles near the departure end.

Indian Airines, India, 1990

The aircraft departed Bombay at 11:58am local time for a flight to Bangalore-Hindustan. While on final approach after being cleared for a visual approach to Runway 09, the aircraft descended below the normal approach profile. The steep descent continued until the aircraft touched down in a golf course (2300 feet short of the runway and 200 feet right of the extended centerline), skidded for several hundred feet, impacted an embankment, and caught fire. Failure of the pilots to realize the gravity of a high rate of descent at a low altitude, and increase engine power accordingly with the aircraft's Auto-Flight system operating in Idle/Open Descent mode.

Air Inter, France, 1992

While on approach into Strasbourg the aircraft impacted the side of a mountain. The cause of the crash was found to be a faulty design in an autopilot mode selector switch which led the flight crew to inadvertently select a 3,300 foot per minute descent rate on the approach instead of the desired 3.3° flight path angle.

Lufthansa, Poland, 1993

The aircraft skidded off the end of the runway during landing. The aircraft touched down with sink rate low enough that the onboard flight computers did not consider it to be "landing," which inhibited thrust reverse and brake application for nine seconds.

Gulf Air, United Arab Emerates, 1997

A flight control failure at V1 caused the crew to abandon the takeoff, with deceleration beginning at V1+8 knots. The aircraft overran the runway, causing the nosegear to collapse. The flight control problem was traced to a faulty microchip in the aircraft's Fly-By-Wire system.

Philippines Airlines, Philippines, 1998

The aircraft overran runway 4 while landing. A malfunction of the onboard flight computers prevented power from being reduced to idle, which inhibited thrust reverse and spoilers from being used. The offending engine was shut down, and brakes applied, but the aircraft was unable to stop before the end of the runway.

Gulf Air, Baharain, 2000

The aircraft was conducting a normal approach to runway 12 at Bahrain International Airport with autopilot/flight director disconnected upon visual contact with the runway. Approximately 1nm from touchdown, at about 600 feet msl and at an airspeed of 185kt, the crew requested a left-hand orbit (360° turn) because they were too high and fast on the approach. During the tight (36° bank angle) left hand turn the flaps were fully extended and the landing checklist completed. When the aircraft crossed the extended runway centerline the crew reported they wanted to abort the landing. A controller gave the crew clearance to climb to 2,500 feet at a 300° heading to prepare for another approach. The plane's speed began increasing to 185kts as it began to climb to 1000ft in a 5° nose-up attitude. During the go-around at approximately 1,000 feet, the aircraft entered a rapid descent, 15° nose down. As the GPWS sounded, the captain ordered the flaps to be raised and moved the sidestick aft. The Airbus impacted the sea at a 6.5° nose down angle, about 1nm north of the airport. The plane's last recorded airspeed was about 280 knots. The captain had logged 6,856 hours.

 

[EagleRJ]

Forgot to mention: total death toll from these accidents- 327.

 

[Donsa320]

You are pretty fast and loose with the "facts" in your synopsis. And I do not see any 320 time in your past. I suggest you find out a little more about the airplane before you blame it.

D.C.

 

[zonker]

Sure- here you go. These were all accidents that happened with A-320s, and you can sense a recurring theme in that the flight control system was a factor in every one of them. Other Airbus models have had issues, too. The A-380 will have the same design philosophy.

With that sort of irrefutable "proof", it's a wonder Airbus is even in business.

Air France, France, 1988

They delayed the selection of TOGA thrust long enough to crash the airplane. Clearly, flying 30 feet off the ground completely configured, in a 14 degree nose up attitude with obstacles at the departure end is is the fault of the airplane's flight control system". LOL

Indian Airines, India, 1990

The aircraft departed Bombay at 11:58am local time for a flight to Bangalore-Hindustan. While on final approach after being cleared for a visual approach to Runway 09, the aircraft descended below the normal approach profile. The steep descent continued until the aircraft touched down in a golf course (2300 feet short of the runway and 200 feet right of the extended centerline), skidded for several hundred feet, impacted an embankment, and caught fire. Failure of the pilots to realize the gravity of a high rate of descent at a low altitude, and increase engine power accordingly with the aircraft's Auto-Flight system operating in Idle/Open Descent mode.

Let's see...If I select thrust idle/open descent on a visual approach....the airplane will do exactly as it's been told. It will descend at idle power at the selected/managed airspeed...straight into the ground. An obvious design flaw.

Air Inter, France, 1992

While on approach into Strasbourg the aircraft impacted the side of a mountain. The cause of the crash was found to be a faulty design in an autopilot mode selector switch which led the flight crew to inadvertently select a 3,300 foot per minute descent rate on the approach instead of the desired 3.3° flight path angle.

From what I understand, that switch design was modified. But really, was that the cause of the crash? If I put my hand on the FCP and dial in 110 on the airspeed...when what I really meant to do was turn to a 110 degree heading (entirely possible as they're right next to each other)...Guess what? The airplane is going to do exactly what I told it to do. If you don't have the skills necessary to recognize you've made a mistake at a critical time, and you need to correct it fast...You're probably going to kill a lot of people.

Anyway, The Bus isn't bulletproof and it's not perfect. But it's a pretty solid jet and guess what? You can turn off the autopilot and autothrust and it flies just fine.

 

[EagleRJ]

You are pretty fast and loose with the "facts" in your synopsis.

With that sort of irrefutable "proof", it's a wonder Airbus is even in business.

Donsa320 and Zonker
I'm not trying to hurt your feelings by dissing your plane! I'm simply pointing out that the fly-by-wire Airbus models seem to have a higher occurence of unwanted or unanticipated interface between the aircraft and the crew. I've heard that both in training and on the line, pilots are being heard more often saying things like 'What's it doing now?' or 'How do I stop it from doing that?'. In many cases, the crew's system knowledge has been deficient, although in the heat of the moment, they make a mistake because the corrective control input required by the computer is counter-intuitive.

The accident at the airshow was a good example of the crew not knowing or forgetting a system parameter, and having it end up biting them. The captain was attemepting to demonstrate the low-speed envelope protection, and had briefed that he would make a pass at 100' AGL with the power levers retarded. Once the aircraft slowed to the limit speed or AOA, the autothrottles would increase power automatically, and they would climb out. He ended up decending to around 30' AGL instead, and since the computer protection was inhibited below 50', it was too late when he realized the airplane wasn't doing what he expected it to.
Pilot error- yes, but the crash was made possible by a flight control system that changes behavior based on where in the envelope it is. Requiring pilots to memorize the different Control Laws raises the possibility of this precise situation- that the pilot will make a mistake concerning his expectations of how the aircraft will respond.
Had this pilot performed the same maneuver in a 737, the results would be 100% predictible, and maybe there's safety in predictibility!

I had a NWA A-320 FO tell me once that flying a 'Bus and dealing with the Control Laws was 'like a box of choc-lits. You never know what you're gonna git'.

 

[Donsa320]

Well, I was in the original A-320 upgrade class at NWA in 1988 and we did NOT memorize control laws then and I bet they don't now because there are countless combinations of possible falilure modes. But "degraded" modes are annunciated. All that happens is a loss of some "protections" to some degree or the other. But the airplane still flies fine. There are several SEC (spoiler and elevator) and ELAC (elevator and aileron) computors all working for you and even multiple losses will not be disasterous. Crew stupidity, though, may be.

You seem to forget that B-737's have a tendency to rollover and die, a 747 lands short in the hills of Guam, etc etc. If a body count is your measure, try adding Boeing's numbers up.

D.C.