chperplt
Registered User
- Joined
- Nov 25, 2001
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The final report on the accident is complete and awaiting a sign off from the board. The report is expected to be signed sometime in May.
The findings I am writing below may change slightly once the full board meets to issue the "final" stamp on the AAR.
First of all.. Colgan Air has been found to be at fault in this accident
The sited facts in the AAR are nearly 200 pages long.
In a nutshell.... The elevator trim was installed backwards and the mechanics that worked on the trim were not authorized to perform the work. They also skipped numerous steps within the maintenance manual procedure.
The only fault found with the crew was the failure to perform a first flight of the day check.
Some notes about the CVR. There was over 2 hours of information on the CVR. The aircraft was getting work done for 2 days prior to the accident. Some of these 2 hours were conversations between the mechanics.
The CVR tells us that they knew immediately after takeoff that they had a problem. They assumed the problem to be a runaway trim. The Captain told the FO to roll the trim back... He then is heard saying roll it all the way back and pull the breaker. Since no two breakers are in the same place on a Colgan airplane, the FO had some trouble finding the correct CB. The Captain directed him to the CB and then told him to help him on the controls and that he was having a hard time holding on. As they attempted to return to the airport, the control pressure was too much and the controls jerked from the crews hands. They were not able to recover.
The AFM for the Beechcraft 1900 says the required force to hold control pressure and maintain control in this situation is approximately 100 pounds. The NTSB very recently did their own testing in a full motion simulator and found the actual amount of pressure required to maintain aircraft control was approximately 260 pounds of pressure. You do the math..
In addition to finding the required pressure, the accident profile was flown by pilots who were expecting the problem and had an idea in their minds how to keep aircraft control. None of the sim experiments resulted in a successful landing contrary to what was published in a recent newspaper article.
Shortly after the accident, the DO sent a memo out telling all pilots that checklists are mandatory and might save our lives one day. The intent of the memo in my mind was to shift blame to the flight crew and away from Colgan. Just to reiterate, the only fault given to the crew was not completing a first flight of the day check.
Some additional facts...
The aircraft was not given a test flight prior to being released on it's supposed repositioning flight.
The aircraft did not have a valid airworthy release
Other maintenance discrepancies were found within the maintenance log recovered from the accident.
More to come when the AAR is officially released.
The findings I am writing below may change slightly once the full board meets to issue the "final" stamp on the AAR.
First of all.. Colgan Air has been found to be at fault in this accident
The sited facts in the AAR are nearly 200 pages long.
In a nutshell.... The elevator trim was installed backwards and the mechanics that worked on the trim were not authorized to perform the work. They also skipped numerous steps within the maintenance manual procedure.
The only fault found with the crew was the failure to perform a first flight of the day check.
Some notes about the CVR. There was over 2 hours of information on the CVR. The aircraft was getting work done for 2 days prior to the accident. Some of these 2 hours were conversations between the mechanics.
The CVR tells us that they knew immediately after takeoff that they had a problem. They assumed the problem to be a runaway trim. The Captain told the FO to roll the trim back... He then is heard saying roll it all the way back and pull the breaker. Since no two breakers are in the same place on a Colgan airplane, the FO had some trouble finding the correct CB. The Captain directed him to the CB and then told him to help him on the controls and that he was having a hard time holding on. As they attempted to return to the airport, the control pressure was too much and the controls jerked from the crews hands. They were not able to recover.
The AFM for the Beechcraft 1900 says the required force to hold control pressure and maintain control in this situation is approximately 100 pounds. The NTSB very recently did their own testing in a full motion simulator and found the actual amount of pressure required to maintain aircraft control was approximately 260 pounds of pressure. You do the math..
In addition to finding the required pressure, the accident profile was flown by pilots who were expecting the problem and had an idea in their minds how to keep aircraft control. None of the sim experiments resulted in a successful landing contrary to what was published in a recent newspaper article.
Shortly after the accident, the DO sent a memo out telling all pilots that checklists are mandatory and might save our lives one day. The intent of the memo in my mind was to shift blame to the flight crew and away from Colgan. Just to reiterate, the only fault given to the crew was not completing a first flight of the day check.
Some additional facts...
The aircraft was not given a test flight prior to being released on it's supposed repositioning flight.
The aircraft did not have a valid airworthy release
Other maintenance discrepancies were found within the maintenance log recovered from the accident.
More to come when the AAR is officially released.
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