Ca 1900

[skootertrash]

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

On October 16, 2003, at 0805 eastern daylight time, a Beech 1900D, N850CA, operated by CommutAir as Continental Connection flight 8718, was not damaged during an aborted takeoff at Albany International Airport (ALB), Albany, New York. The certificated airline transport pilot and certificated commercial pilot were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the planned flight to Westchester County Airport (HPN), White Plains, New York. An instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the positioning flight conducted under 14 CFR Part 91.

According to the Director of Safety at CommutAir, the captain initiated a takeoff roll on runway 19 at ALB. As the airplane accelerated to approximately 115 knots, about V1, the captain noted that the elevator control was jammed. He subsequently aborted the takeoff and taxied back to the ramp uneventfully.

The airplane was examined at CommutAir's maintenance facility after the incident. The examination revealed that when the elevator trim wheel in the cockpit was positioned to neutral, the elevator trim was actually in a nose-down position.

A mechanic performed maintenance on the airplane one day prior to the incident, and the incident flight was the first flight after the maintenance. The mechanic stated that part of the maintenance performed on the airplane included removal and replacement of a throttle pin. To accomplish that procedure, the mechanic had removed the elevator trim wheel. However, he did not index the elevator trim wheel before removing it, and reinstalled it incorrectly.

 

[Airpiraterob]

jimmy's gonna be pissed

 

[RIDETHELIGHTING]

nice catch, when is someone going to figuer out how to work on BE1900.

 

[English]

So, the FAA grounds the entire Lear 45 for the hint of a problem, but we have HOW MANY BE1900s with this problem and they can't figure it out?

How many more people have to die?

Air MidWest and Colgan, the obvious ones.

Now a Commutair incident. There was also an incident a few months back with Big Sky at Milwaukee, I believe.

Four incidents/accidents in 6 months.

 

[chperplt]

The difference being all these accidents/incidents were mechanic induced.

 

[CitationLover]

is there a flight control check before they initiate takeoff roll?!?!?

 

[chperplt]

Yes there is, but a flight control check with zero load won't detect any of the problems that have occurred.

 

[Vortilon]

Thats because Bombardier doesn't have as much lobbyist pull in DC as the airlines do. The 737 has been under continual modification of its rudder system for years.....never got grounded either.

 

[cathal]

big sky flies metros, not 1900's. If it was Milwaukee it was skyway.

 

[English]

Skyway...thanks, that was it.

 

[jobear]

Skyway was an unrelated incident. The crank at the end of the Yoke broke and the pilots declared and had to fly the plane with about 45% of deflection. Nothing to do with the trim.
I have taken it upon myself to roll full trim deflections during preflight. Probably wont help but I may be able to see it on the walkaround.

Fly safe
Jobear

 

[B190Captain]

We know of the obvious ones. Here are some flight control related reports.




NTSB Identification: CHI98LA063 . The docket is stored in the (offline) NTSB Imaging System.
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, December 10, 1997 in ROCKFORD, IL
Probable Cause Approval Date: 5/29/98
Aircraft: Beech 1900C, registration: N79GL
Injuries: 4 Uninjured.
The airplane had just been refurbished, and it required a maintenance flight check before being released for flight. The pilot conducted a preflight of the airplane, checking the flight controls for freedom of movement and observing aileron movement up and down, but did not 'see' or notice incorrect aileron movement. The pilot used normal takeoff procedures. During rotation, the airplane's left wing began to drop to the left. The pilot applied right aileron, but with no effect. The airplane struck the left edge of the runway in a left wing low attitude, and the left wing impacted a taxi sign. An examination of the airplane revealed that the aileron cables were incorrectly connected at the turnbuckles in the wheelwell. The aircraft maintenance manual contained the following warning: 'Visually check to assure that aileron travel responds properly to the control wheel movement. When the control wheel is turned right, the right aileron should move up and the left aileron should move down.'

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

improper installation of aileron cables by the maintenance personnel, inadequate inspection by the company's maintenance personnel of maintenance performed, and inadequate preflight by the pilot.

NTSB Identification: NYC97IA123 . The docket is stored in the (offline) NTSB Imaging System.
Scheduled 14 CFR Part 121: Air Carrier MESA AIRLINES, INC.
Incident occurred Thursday, June 19, 1997 in CLARKSBURG, WV
Probable Cause Approval Date: 4/24/98
Aircraft: Beech 1900D, registration: N165YV
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.
The pilot lowered the flaps to 35 degrees while on final approach to runway 21. He noted aileron binding as the flaps traveled to 35 degrees, and at the same time heard a snap under the floor of the cockpit. After landing the flaps were not retracted. The airplane was taxied to the terminal where it was observed that the right outboard flap panel had became detached from the flap aft roller bearings at the inboard flap track. The flap was in contact with the aileron, which interfered with aileron control. The manufacturer had published a Safety Communique during May 1997. The Communique dealt with the inspection of the outboard flap attachment brackets and aft roller bearings of Beech 1900 series airplanes. The incident airplane was scheduled to have the inspection complied with during the next 30 days. The airplane had accumulated about 3,317 flight hours and 7,069 landings. An inspection of the remainder of the operator's fleet of Beech 1900D airplanes revealed that eight additional airplanes failed the inspection criteria, but had not reached the assigned number of cycles specified in the Communique.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this incident as follows:

The right outboard flap detaching from the flap aft roller bearings, at the flap track, which was a result of the manufacturer's inadequate inspection program.

NTSB Identification: SEA97IA051 . The docket is stored in the (offline) NTSB Imaging System.
Scheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Incident occurred Tuesday, January 21, 1997 in SEATTLE, WA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 6/26/97
Aircraft: Beech 1900D, registration: N75ZV
Injuries: 7 Uninjured.
While on final approach, the airplane commenced a rapid, uncommanded roll to the right when the 35-degree flap setting was selected. The flying pilot (1st officer) was able to counter the roll by applying almost full opposite aileron, during which time, he felt the aileron jam momentarily and then break free. The airplane landed without further incident. An examination revealed that the inboard, aft end of the right wing outboard flap was detached from the wing flap track. This resulted in flap asymmetry and mechanical interference with the aileron. The flap track roller bearing was seized and the flap mounting bracket was torn and separated from the bearing. The bearing outer roller was loose and could be shifted axially on the bearing outer ring. This allowed the outer roller flange to wear against and eventually tear through the flap mounting bracket. The operator was not using the most recent (revised) Beech 1900D maintenance manuals at the time of the incident and the airplane had not been subjected to a detailed inspection of the flap roller brackets, roller bearings, and attachment hardware as outlined in revised sections of the manual.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this incident as follows:

an axial shift of the aft flap track bearing's outer roller, resulting in erosion and failure of the flap track bracket/bearing assembly. A factor relating to the incident was: inadequate inspection of the flap roller bearing/bracket assemblies.

NTSB Identification: FTW96IA080 . The docket is stored in the (offline) NTSB Imaging System.
Scheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Incident occurred Monday, December 25, 1995 in DENVER, CO
Probable Cause Approval Date: 6/6/96
Aircraft: Beech 1900C, registration: N39019
Injuries: 21 Uninjured.
During landing flare, the elevator jammed. The pilot continued the landing using elevator trim to adjust nose attitude. Investigation revealed that an elevator counterweight bolt had backed out and jammed the elevators. The aircraft was on its first trip after being painted by an outside contractor and undergoing a return-to-service inspection by the operator.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this incident as follows:

failure by the outside contractor to perform adequate maintenance, and failure by the operator to perform an adequate inspection.

NTSB Identification: LAX95IA142 . The docket is stored in the (offline) NTSB Imaging System.
Scheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Incident occurred Friday, March 17, 1995 in LOS ANGELES, CA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 4/19/96
Aircraft: BEECH 1900C, registration: N1568W
Injuries: 19 Uninjured.
WHILE ON FINAL APPROACH, THE AIRPLANE EXPERIENCED A RAPID, UNCOMMANDED ROLL TO THE LEFT WHEN THE 35-DEGREE FLAP SETTING WAS SELECTED. THE PILOT WAS ABLE TO COUNTER THE ROLL BY APPLYING FULL OPPOSITE AILERON AND LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. AN EXAMINATION REVEALED THAT THE WING FLAPS HAD BEEN FULLY EXTENDED IN THE AFT DIRECTION, BUT THAT THE INBOARD TRAILING EDGE OF THE LEFT OUTBOARD FLAP HAD BEEN FORCED UPWARD ABOUT 3 INCHES. THE INBOARD AFT FLAP TRACK ROLLER BEARING ASSEMBLY, INCLUDING THE ATTACHING BOLT AND WASHER, HAD PULLED THROUGH THE SKIN OF THE FLAP TRACK HINGE BRACKET. AN ANALYSIS OF THE FAILED PARTS BY BEECH REVEALED THAT THE OUTER ROLLER WAS LOOSE ON THE BEARING AND COULD BE SHIFTED AXIALLY. A CIRCULAR WEAR PATTERN MATCHING THE DIAMETER OF THE OUTER ROLLER FLANGE WAS FOUND ON THE PORTION OF FLAP TRACK HINGE BRACKET WHICH HAD PULLED OUT. BEECH CONCLUDED THAT THE BEARING OUTER ROLLER HAD SHIFTED ON THE ROLLER ELEMENT BEARING AND ALLOWED THE OUTER ROLLER FLANGE TO WEAR AGAINST THE SIDE OF THE FLAP HINGE BRACKET UNTIL THE BEARING ASSEMBLY WAS PULLED OUT. THE FAILED FLAP TRACK HINGE BRACKET AND BEARING ASSEMBLY IS CONTAINED WITHIN THE INTERIOR OF THE FLAP STRUCTURE.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this incident as follows:

AN AXIAL SHIFT OF THE OUTER BEARING ROLLER FOR AN UNDETERMINED REASON, RESULTING IN EROSION AND FAILURE OF THE FLAP TRACK HINGE BRACKET/BEARING ASSEMBLY. FACTORS RELATING TO THE INCIDENT WERE: THE ROLLER BEARING AND ASSOCIATED BRACKET ASSEMBLY WITHIN THE INTERIOR OF THE FLAP STRUCTURE COULD NOT BE ADEQUATELY INSPECTED WITHOUT DISASSEMBLY; AND LACK OF INSPECTION CRITERIA IN THE MANUFACTURER'S MAINTENANCE MANUAL CONCERNING FLAP ROLLER/HINGE BRACKET ASSEMBLIES.

NTSB Identification: CHI95IA066 . The docket is stored in the (offline) NTSB Imaging System.
Scheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Incident occurred Thursday, January 12, 1995 in WILLISTON, ND
Probable Cause Approval Date: 8/31/95
Aircraft: BEECH 1900D, registration: N118UX
Injuries: 6 Uninjured.
DURING AN INSTRUMENT DESCENT FROM CRUISE, THE ELEVATOR TRIM CABLE FAILED. THE CREW EXPERIENCED INCREASING NOSE DOWN PITCH REGARDLESS OF INPUT. A SAFE LANDING WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY BOTH PILOTS PULLING AFT ON THE YOKE TO OVERCOME PRESSURE, AND LOWERING FLAPS AND LANDING GEAR 50 AND 20 KNOTS ABOVE THEIR RESPECTIVE OPERATING SPEEDS TO REDUCE THE TRIM FORCES AND HELP SLOW THE AIRPLANE. INSPECTION REVEALED THAT THE TRIM CABLE HAD BEEN INCORRECTLY ROUTED AROUND A CABLE GUIDE DURING INITIAL PRODUCTION, AND HAD NOT REACHED THE FIRST REQUIRED INSPECTION WHICH WOULD HAVE ALLOWED THE DISCREPANCY TO BE DISCOVERED.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this incident as follows:

the improper installation and inadequate quality assurance inspection of the elevator trim cable during original manufacture, which resulted in fraying and failure of the cable prior to the first routine scheduled inspection of the system.

 

[B190Captain]

Yes there is, but a flight control check with zero load won't detect any of the problems that have occurred.

But the manual trim wheel check may have. I emphasize may!

 

[shamrock]

Ahh, good old FrankenBeech 850CA. The queen of the fleet.

Really glad they figured out the problem before they lifted off.


B190Captain,

What is the manual trim wheel check? All I remember doing was the normal control check with the yoke. It's been a while though.

 

[B190Captain]

The check is usually performed by the Captain during first flight cockpit checks.

Part of our first flight of the day checks consists of:


1. Manually turning the trim wheel to full fwd and full aft position to ensure full unrestricted travel.

2. Then we check it electrically (full fwd and aft) by using the electric trim switch for both the Captain and FO side. During this check we also ensure that the Captain's electric trim overrides the FO's.

3. Disengage the electric trim from both sides by pushing on the button on the yoke and reset it with the trim switch on the pedestal aft of the power quadrant.

 

[chperplt]

All the manual trim wheel test will do is show you movement fore and aft of the wheel. There is still no way of telling if a full wheel movement equated to a full trim movement, or if that movement is rigged properly.

 

[B190Captain]

All the manual trim wheel test will do is show you movement fore and aft of the wheel. There is still no way of telling if a full wheel movement equated to a full trim movement, or if that movement is rigged properly.

Very true. As for the relation between the wheel setting and the trim tab itself, you're right, you can't tell.

It has been suggested that someone should stand at the tail while you are conducting this test and visually confirms proper trim movement. That could help but obviously that is not precise.

If the trim was rigged improperly to full aft or forward setting you could tell because the wheel would stop turning to a position indicated by the tick marks that could give us an idea that the rigging was set improperly.

 

[great cornholio]

Past few first flights of the day Ive done I started doing this. First put the trim to full nose down then look at the trim tabs they should be above the elevator. Then put the trim in full nose up now the tabs should be below the elevator. You cant really tell if they are at true full travel but you can atleast tell that the trim will move the the right direction. Also for the take off setting the tabs are usually just barely below the elevator. Like I said its not too scientific but it at least its something. Oh yeah I just remembered something that I heard in recurrent but forgot to try so Ill throw it out here so more people can try it and see if it really happens. One of the pilots said that he noticed that if he pushed and held the trim disconnect switch on the yoke down and held it that he could not move the trim wheel with his hand until he let go of the button. Ill have to remember to try that next time I fly but anyone else try this yet? Can you move it or not?

 

[chperplt]

What you heard is true... Also.. If either electric trim switch is engaged, you cannot manually trim the airplane. How many times do the switches stick open???

 

[ktthomas11]

I'm not familiar with the civilian checks in the 1900, but wouldn't a full AP check be completed following maintenance work? I'm a military guy and my procedures are different... I just wanted to know what is required.

Don't take my question as criticizing the pilot, either, since we all hate that when it is done to us.