InclusiveScope
Well-known member
- Joined
- Mar 14, 2002
- Posts
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RJ Defense Coalition
Ensuring One Level of Representation
www.rjdefense.com
ALPA’s DUTIES and CHANGES in the CORPORATE STRUCTURE
Introduction
Ever since the first airlines were formed, corporate restructurings, mergers, and fragmentations have been an integral part of the corporate landscape. Despite the success of ASA and Comair, we are not immune from changes or the problems that plague our industry. The purpose of this fact sheet is not to speculate on the merits of any proposed changes, but rather to educate the ASA and Comair pilots on the dangers posed by ALPA’s bad-faith conduct and the importance of protecting our rights as ALPA members.
While corporate structures are always subject to change, it’s important to keep foremost in mind that ALPA’s duty to its members is not defined by corporate structures and would therefore remain unchanged. Since change is one of few constants in our industry, it’s one of the reasons why the ASA and Comair pilots employ the services of a union in the first place. Therefore, the prospect of change requires ALPA to uphold its duties to the ASA and Comair pilots—not ignore them. Most importantly, ALPA cannot exploit the problems facing Delta in an effort to “justify” the union’s arbitrary and discriminatory practices.
Pertinent Facts
-- ALPA’s duty to the ASA and Comair pilots transcends the corporate structure.
-- Recent Court rulings affirm that ALPA’s duty is a function of union membership—not the corporate structure.
-- Issues raised in on-going litigation would not be rendered moot by restructuring or a change in ownership.
-- ALPA is responsible for its own conduct.
-- Management’s actions do not justify the union’s bad-faith conduct.
-- The crisis at Delta does not permit the union to favor one pilot group over another.
-- ALPA must bargain for, not against, the ASA and Comair pilots.
-- As the bargaining agent of the ASA and Comair pilots, ALPA is legally and fiduciarily obligated to protect and promote the interests of the ASA and Comair pilots.
---ALPA cannot permit, support, or fund the efforts of the Delta pilots to bargain terms that may violate or undermine the current ASA and Comair pilot contracts.
-- ALPA’s predatory mainline bargaining initiatives, such as “Jets for Jobs,” would still constitute an inherent conflict of interest and a breach of ALPA’s duty.
-- Delta’s pilot leadership cannot “cut off” ASA and Comair flying nor use such threats to extract political concessions.
How to Distinguish Between ALPA’s Demands and Management’s
Several years ago, the RJDC identified the phenomena of “Leftover” bargaining. Leftover bargaining occurs when, during or after mainline scope negotiations, the union’s “regional” members are presented with terms and conditions that are driven more by the union’s own mainline bargaining demands than the legitimate economic needs of the company.
The union’s role in the formulation of such demands can clearly be identified by their linkage to changes in the mainline scope clause, particularly in the number or distribution of “permitted” small jets, or any terms creating special rights for mainline pilots at the expense of the union’s “regional” members. Such terms are the direct consequence of the union’s bad-faith actions and provide further proof of the breach of the union’s duties.
Key Points:
1. ALPA’s Duty Is Not Defined by the Corporate Structure: A common misconception is that ALPA’s duty to the ASA and Comair pilots is defined or limited by Delta’s corporate structure. To quote the Federal Court in Ford v. ALPA: “The notion that a union can impose rules that affect subsidiaries and affiliates has its limits.” ALPA’s duty to the ASA and Comair pilots is a function of our membership in the union and the fact we pay ALPA to protect and promote our interests. Therefore, where ALPA’s actions take place does not change whether or not they are consistent with the union’s duties to the ASA and Comair pilots.
2. Delta’s Economic Crisis Does Not Relieve ALPA of its Duties: ALPA will undoubtedly claim that events at Delta justify the actions of the union’s mainline interests. This is only a red-herring argument designed to mask the union’s bad-faith conduct. In Ford v. ALPA the Court has already identified the difference between a compromise between two competing union groups and “a complete sell-out.” Delta’s economic problems require ALPA to protect the interests of the ASA and Comair pilots, not ignore them.
3. ALPA cannot demand “payment” for scope relief: Four years ago, ALPA was warned that its Delta scope clause created an irreconcilable conflict of interest and would only harm the union’s members. Consequently, ALPA is already duty-bound to enact reforms and correct the injustice. Any demands, contractual or political, requiring the ASA and Comair pilots to “pay” ALPA or the Delta pilots for scope relief is merely a continuation of union’s bad-faith conduct.
4. ALPA’s promises of future rewards do not justify its current conduct: An all too familiar theme is that all ALPA need do in order to justify its bad-faith conduct is to promise the affected members something in return. Not only do such promises invariably go unfulfilled, but they are in fact designed to ensure the very continuation of the union’s objectionable conduct. ALPA’s duties to the ASA and Comair pilots is a 24/7 obligation. Bad-faith conduct today cannot be justified by the promise of good conduct “tomorrow.”
5. Your “vote” may not matter: Depending upon events, ALPA may seek a “vote” of the ASA and Comair pilots. However, such votes are farcical in view of the fact that the operative terms and conditions are likely to be embodied in the mainline pilots’ contract and thus unaffected by whether the ASA and Comair pilots “accept” the union’s terms. Equally important, the credibility of any such “vote” is seriously undermined when the union itself threatens to disenfranchise its own members by diverting current or future flying to other carriers.
Why True Reform is Desirable, but Not Likely
To any reasonable person, the specter of a corporate restructuring would also appear to bring with it the opportunity for reform and the resolution of issues that divide our union. Unfortunately, history clearly shows that ALPA’s mainline interests have invariably used corporate upheavals to justify their bad-faith conduct rather than changing it. As the RJDC has warned, when faced with crisis bargaining, ALPA’s mainline interests will use the small jet and the interests of ALPA’s “regional” members as bargaining capital in an effort to shore up their declining bargaining power.
If true reform were to arrive on the wings of ALPA’s bargaining at Delta, then the union’s leadership shouldn’t be the least bit hesitant to define and defend the rights of the ASA and Comair pilots. However, the onset of Delta bargaining has predictably been accompanied by mere promises of better things to come; the credibility of which is seriously undermined by ALPA’s simultaneous calls for the appeasement of its mainline interests.
Summary
The mission of the RJDC is to ensure that ALPA upholds its duties to the ASA and Comair pilots. Therefore we will not take a position on management’s plans and whether they should be accepted by ASA and Comair’s pilots. However, the Company’s needs do not give the union’s mainline interests license to bargain against the ASA and Comair pilots; nor does it permit ALPA to ignore its duty of fair representation.
ALPA’s duties to the ASA and Comair pilots are defined by its conduct and cannot be excused or masked by corporate events. As we have witnessed at other carriers, ALPA has used the corporate crisis as a pretext to create “preferred” classes of mainline pilots with special rights and privileges and to use the rights and interests of “regional” pilots as mainline bargaining capital. As events unfold at Delta, the RJDC strongly urges all ASA and Comair pilots to closely examine ALPA’s actions to determine whether the union has been working for or against their interests.
Ensuring One Level of Representation
www.rjdefense.com
ALPA’s DUTIES and CHANGES in the CORPORATE STRUCTURE
Introduction
Ever since the first airlines were formed, corporate restructurings, mergers, and fragmentations have been an integral part of the corporate landscape. Despite the success of ASA and Comair, we are not immune from changes or the problems that plague our industry. The purpose of this fact sheet is not to speculate on the merits of any proposed changes, but rather to educate the ASA and Comair pilots on the dangers posed by ALPA’s bad-faith conduct and the importance of protecting our rights as ALPA members.
While corporate structures are always subject to change, it’s important to keep foremost in mind that ALPA’s duty to its members is not defined by corporate structures and would therefore remain unchanged. Since change is one of few constants in our industry, it’s one of the reasons why the ASA and Comair pilots employ the services of a union in the first place. Therefore, the prospect of change requires ALPA to uphold its duties to the ASA and Comair pilots—not ignore them. Most importantly, ALPA cannot exploit the problems facing Delta in an effort to “justify” the union’s arbitrary and discriminatory practices.
Pertinent Facts
-- ALPA’s duty to the ASA and Comair pilots transcends the corporate structure.
-- Recent Court rulings affirm that ALPA’s duty is a function of union membership—not the corporate structure.
-- Issues raised in on-going litigation would not be rendered moot by restructuring or a change in ownership.
-- ALPA is responsible for its own conduct.
-- Management’s actions do not justify the union’s bad-faith conduct.
-- The crisis at Delta does not permit the union to favor one pilot group over another.
-- ALPA must bargain for, not against, the ASA and Comair pilots.
-- As the bargaining agent of the ASA and Comair pilots, ALPA is legally and fiduciarily obligated to protect and promote the interests of the ASA and Comair pilots.
---ALPA cannot permit, support, or fund the efforts of the Delta pilots to bargain terms that may violate or undermine the current ASA and Comair pilot contracts.
-- ALPA’s predatory mainline bargaining initiatives, such as “Jets for Jobs,” would still constitute an inherent conflict of interest and a breach of ALPA’s duty.
-- Delta’s pilot leadership cannot “cut off” ASA and Comair flying nor use such threats to extract political concessions.
How to Distinguish Between ALPA’s Demands and Management’s
Several years ago, the RJDC identified the phenomena of “Leftover” bargaining. Leftover bargaining occurs when, during or after mainline scope negotiations, the union’s “regional” members are presented with terms and conditions that are driven more by the union’s own mainline bargaining demands than the legitimate economic needs of the company.
The union’s role in the formulation of such demands can clearly be identified by their linkage to changes in the mainline scope clause, particularly in the number or distribution of “permitted” small jets, or any terms creating special rights for mainline pilots at the expense of the union’s “regional” members. Such terms are the direct consequence of the union’s bad-faith actions and provide further proof of the breach of the union’s duties.
Key Points:
1. ALPA’s Duty Is Not Defined by the Corporate Structure: A common misconception is that ALPA’s duty to the ASA and Comair pilots is defined or limited by Delta’s corporate structure. To quote the Federal Court in Ford v. ALPA: “The notion that a union can impose rules that affect subsidiaries and affiliates has its limits.” ALPA’s duty to the ASA and Comair pilots is a function of our membership in the union and the fact we pay ALPA to protect and promote our interests. Therefore, where ALPA’s actions take place does not change whether or not they are consistent with the union’s duties to the ASA and Comair pilots.
2. Delta’s Economic Crisis Does Not Relieve ALPA of its Duties: ALPA will undoubtedly claim that events at Delta justify the actions of the union’s mainline interests. This is only a red-herring argument designed to mask the union’s bad-faith conduct. In Ford v. ALPA the Court has already identified the difference between a compromise between two competing union groups and “a complete sell-out.” Delta’s economic problems require ALPA to protect the interests of the ASA and Comair pilots, not ignore them.
3. ALPA cannot demand “payment” for scope relief: Four years ago, ALPA was warned that its Delta scope clause created an irreconcilable conflict of interest and would only harm the union’s members. Consequently, ALPA is already duty-bound to enact reforms and correct the injustice. Any demands, contractual or political, requiring the ASA and Comair pilots to “pay” ALPA or the Delta pilots for scope relief is merely a continuation of union’s bad-faith conduct.
4. ALPA’s promises of future rewards do not justify its current conduct: An all too familiar theme is that all ALPA need do in order to justify its bad-faith conduct is to promise the affected members something in return. Not only do such promises invariably go unfulfilled, but they are in fact designed to ensure the very continuation of the union’s objectionable conduct. ALPA’s duties to the ASA and Comair pilots is a 24/7 obligation. Bad-faith conduct today cannot be justified by the promise of good conduct “tomorrow.”
5. Your “vote” may not matter: Depending upon events, ALPA may seek a “vote” of the ASA and Comair pilots. However, such votes are farcical in view of the fact that the operative terms and conditions are likely to be embodied in the mainline pilots’ contract and thus unaffected by whether the ASA and Comair pilots “accept” the union’s terms. Equally important, the credibility of any such “vote” is seriously undermined when the union itself threatens to disenfranchise its own members by diverting current or future flying to other carriers.
Why True Reform is Desirable, but Not Likely
To any reasonable person, the specter of a corporate restructuring would also appear to bring with it the opportunity for reform and the resolution of issues that divide our union. Unfortunately, history clearly shows that ALPA’s mainline interests have invariably used corporate upheavals to justify their bad-faith conduct rather than changing it. As the RJDC has warned, when faced with crisis bargaining, ALPA’s mainline interests will use the small jet and the interests of ALPA’s “regional” members as bargaining capital in an effort to shore up their declining bargaining power.
If true reform were to arrive on the wings of ALPA’s bargaining at Delta, then the union’s leadership shouldn’t be the least bit hesitant to define and defend the rights of the ASA and Comair pilots. However, the onset of Delta bargaining has predictably been accompanied by mere promises of better things to come; the credibility of which is seriously undermined by ALPA’s simultaneous calls for the appeasement of its mainline interests.
Summary
The mission of the RJDC is to ensure that ALPA upholds its duties to the ASA and Comair pilots. Therefore we will not take a position on management’s plans and whether they should be accepted by ASA and Comair’s pilots. However, the Company’s needs do not give the union’s mainline interests license to bargain against the ASA and Comair pilots; nor does it permit ALPA to ignore its duty of fair representation.
ALPA’s duties to the ASA and Comair pilots are defined by its conduct and cannot be excused or masked by corporate events. As we have witnessed at other carriers, ALPA has used the corporate crisis as a pretext to create “preferred” classes of mainline pilots with special rights and privileges and to use the rights and interests of “regional” pilots as mainline bargaining capital. As events unfold at Delta, the RJDC strongly urges all ASA and Comair pilots to closely examine ALPA’s actions to determine whether the union has been working for or against their interests.
