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Airbus Admits Problem on 320!

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The report you just mentioned is the report I was referring to in my post. If the airplane had let them stall, would that have been better?

I just can't think of any reasons why I would ever need to exceed the protections of the airplane, i.e. stall. The only time I can think of would be when there is an instrumentation problem, at which time the flight control laws degrade and the protections become stabilities, or soft limits.
 
Either you didn't really read them or your love for the scarebus blinded you, either way I ask the same question: How many more undiscovered software problems are there? Odds are there are many more. The computer is only as good as the human engineer that does the programming and nobody can think of everything. [/QUOTE]








Question answered by an unqualified person.
 
Metro752 said:
You're comparing a World War TWO Boeing B-17 to a "state of the art" Airbus 300-###

lol.....mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmk

Not really, just the fact that they both will break their vertical stabilizers off if you apply full and abrupt rudder in one direction and then suddenly the other direction, even at speeds below Maneuvering speed. The FAA simply does not require airliners to withstand this sort of rudder application in order to be certified.

The 'state of the art' (not) A300 wasn't certified to withstand the stress of a fully deflected rudder one way and then the other because the FAA didn't require it. They darn sure should have required it though.

I'm not trying to bash AA, I'd love to work there, but I was in class with a now extinct airline and we watched an AA video on escaping wake turbulence and unusual attitudes. The instructor promoted pretty aggressive maneuvering, including uncoordinated use of rudder to raise the nose in a banked, nose low situation and to lower the nose in a banked, nose high situation. First time I'd heard that advice, my current airline teaches coordinated wings level, then pitch recovery. Did the NTSB recommend any changes to AA's training program after 587?
 
SuperFLUF said:
How many other software flaws are there? Can an engineer sitting at a desk really anticipate every single possible scenario that might occour in flight? Could even the world's best pilot do that? I think not. SOFT limits are necessary for FBW so that glitches may be over ridden.
That's why Airbus switched to soft limits in the 380.

Even Airbus' own test pilots have crashed the electric Airbus. Twice. Both times due to confusion with the automation and flight control laws. So obviously it's a very complex aircraft. Kudos to North American Pilots who have a much better record that the rest of the world, in that they haven't crashed one yet.

Back to the original broadcast. A friend/CA, with whom which we landed a CRJ200 with disonnected nosewheel steering, asked an A320 friend if if had a nosewheel centering device in the event the scissors (torque links) aren't connected. Answer: no. Does the CRJ? Yes, he asked maint after our adventure, it isn't in our books. Ramp connected our scissors but the pins didn't engage in the holes, just rubbed the sides. Nosewheel steering worked until TO, the strut extended as we broke ground and the torque link came apart. Gear unsafe warn msgs (nose gr down, mains retracted) and WOW input fail caution msgs. QRH: manual gr ext, land. After an hour to make our ldg wt we saw 9R lit up like xmas with the trucks. Ldg was fine, nosewheel rattled a little, pax clapped, then at about 40 kts "BAM BAM BAM BAM BAM . . ." Nosewheel was skidding, jumping, skipping, skittering, and doing the shopping cart wheel dance, I believe the banging was from the strut bottoming out or the scissors hitting something. CA stopped the plane with more brake pressure and we got towed in eventually.
 
mynameisjim said:
The report you just mentioned is the report I was referring to in my post. If the airplane had let them stall, would that have been better?
The Iberia Bilbao accident had nothing to do with letting them stall the aircraft, nor was a stall imminent. The stall protection logic MALFUNCTIONED and did not allow them to perform a go around/windshear escape manuver when it was necessary.

If there was nothing wrong with the software/logic why did Airbus revise the control logic?

I just can't think of any reasons why I would ever need to exceed the protections of the airplane
The accident above is a good reason, they were lucky that it didn't end up much worse.

Here's another: Say you're in an A318/19/20 and the wake of the great white elephant A380 rolls you on your back. Who's flying the airplane? And what exactly is HAL9000 doing to recover? Are you comfortable with that? I'm not.

Given the large number of scenarios that don't involve the aircraft automatically reverting to soft limits, are you willing to bet your life (and your passengers) that the engineer thought of everything?
 
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Please stop, you have no idea what you are talking about. The pilot has full authority to recover from an upset. Go to ground school or read a manual before you attempt to ground the fleet. Sounds like you really work for CNN.
 
Hey Superfluff,

Without going into a lenghty technical explanation, the 320 has certain flight "laws" that are part of the flight control logic. One of those "laws" is specifically designed for the exact problem of an inflight upset, like wake turbulence, so that the protections are inhibited and the pilot can take control and right the aircraft. As to the Paris Airshow crash of the 320, the test pilot pulled circuit breakers of the flight computers to prevent the logic during a low pass, thus inhibiting the protections built in. I think he's still serving time in a French prison for killing the boy who was a passenger during that flight.

Regardless, if it's built and maintained by man, there's still a possibility of human error, no matter who the aircraft manufacturer is.
 

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