Shutting off the Fuel In a Senecca Redux

[efiscompmon]

Since the previous thread has goten a little nasty, I thought I'd start a new one.

I had copied the start of this thread for my wife, who had just finished getting her MEI in a PA34 a few days before the thread was started. Three days later, the following happened:

LAX04CA173

On March 31 2004, about 1255 Pacific standard time, a Piper PA-34-200, N74SA, collided with terrain while attempting a go-around at Brackett Field Airport, La Verne, California. Air Desert Pacific was operating the airplane under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91. The certified flight instructor (CFI) and student pilot were not injured; the airplane sustained substantial damage. The local instructional flight originated from La Verne about 1150. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and a flight plan had not been filed.

In a written statement, the CFI reported that he was overseeing the student's landing attempt on runway 26R. While inbound, about 4,000 feet mean sea level, the CFI turned the right engine fuel selector to the "off" position, in an effort to simulate an engine failure. The student followed the proper procedure by correctly identifying the failed engine and positioning the left throttle, mixture, and propeller controls in their full forward position, and the right throttle control in the idle position. While on the downwind portion of the traffic pattern, the air traffic control tower cleared them to land on runway 26L. On final approach, the student configured the airplane with full flaps and the landing gear in the extended position.

On short final, about 100 feet above ground level, the airplane was high and not properly aligned with the runway. The CFI opted to make a go-around, and the student inputted full throttle on both engines. The student was unable to maintain airspeed and establish a positive rate of climb. The CFI communicated that he would take over the controls, and attempted to continue the go-around. The airplane would not climb and drifted to the right, across runway 26R. The airplane continued in a gradual decent, and the stall warning horn sounded. The right wing impacted terrain, and the airplane spun around on the ground.

The CFI stated that he had become distracted, and did not remember to turn the fuel selector back to the "on" position after the student had identified the failed engine while inbound. He thought this was the reason that the right engine did not respond to the throttle input during the go-around. He added that it was possible that he could not maintain directional control of the airplane because the student may have failed to relinquish the controls. The CFI reported no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane.

IMHO, I would never mess with the fuel of any a/c below 3500AGL. But that's just me. Everyone was okay, but I am told the plane was a sight to see--anyone who has pics please PM me--I got about 130 hours in that plane back in the nineties.

Regardless, be carefull out there. These two got lucky.

 

[Timebuilder]

The student followed the proper procedure by correctly identifying the failed engine and positioning the left throttle, mixture, and propeller controls in their full forward position, and the right throttle control in the idle position. While on the downwind portion of the traffic pattern, the air traffic control tower cleared them to land on runway 26L. On final approach, the student configured the airplane with full flaps and the landing gear in the extended position.

The mistake was going below that glass floor that keeps you out of trouble, the 3000 or greater AGL. The only thing you should experience "while on the downwind portion of the traffic pattern" is an engine in a "fake feather" configuration of zero thrust. If you were trained correctly, you don't begin an approach to a field with an engine off and windmilling.

Always start the approach with a fully functional airplane, and then pull a throttle to simulate the failure. Run the basic procedure, and then set the engine for zero thrust.

There is nothing to be gained but grief if you do this any other way.

 

[nosehair]

simulating emergencies

"correctly positioned engine controls", huh? Nothing was said about the position of the prop on the right side failed engine. Was it still windmilling? Probably was - the CFI said he forgot to put the fuel selector back to "on". Probably forgot because he had no realistically induced engine failures during his training, and all his simulated engine outs were simulated with throttle and therefore the prop control was full forward with MP set for zero-thrust with the prop still "windmilling". Of course, this CFI was operating outside of his level of experience, but, to me, this shows exactly why we should do actual engine failures with shutting the fuel selector valve off. But NOT IN THE TRAFFIC PATTERN. I am 100% in agreement not to do an actual fuel valve shutdown below approximately 3000' AGL. But we should most certainly do them at a safe altitude and distance from thje airport, and then start it back up before descending.
Do not let training accident statistics fool you into thinking we should not do the training. Let it alert you that this training can be more dangerous than other kinds of training, and requires more effort and attention.

 

[labbats]

Re: simulating emergencies

Apparently he learned that bad habit from a previous instructor who thought he was invincible. I'm willing to bet he's lost that bad habit now. Good to hear everyone was safe, but I don't envy that CFI on his future job interviews.

 

[IP076]

We used to say only use the fuel selector above 4000' AGL. That leaves you a fairly large margin just in case you can't get it started again.

It wasn't so much where this guy failed the engine by the fuel selector, it was the fact that he forgot that he did it.

When I got my MEI, and I told this to people I gave MEIs to, I would leave my right hand down next to my leg and the door. I'd raise 1 finger for everything I failed. If you entered the pattern, or turned final, and you still had fingers up.....you knew you better start looking for what you did, and not land.

But, failing an engine with a fuel selector at low altitude is just plain dumb!

 

[CaSyndrm]

I seem to recall that engine out procedures, especially in a senneca due to the location of the valves, include verifying those valves are on first, then moving your hands up to the power quadrant.

I think the thought was that passengers in the back could bump them with there feet or something like that.

 

[Timebuilder]

I seem to recall that engine out procedures, especially in a senneca due to the location of the valves, include verifying those valves are on first, then moving your hands up to the power quadrant.

I think the thought was that passengers in the back could bump them with there feet or something like that.

A child could conceivably do this, but it would be difficult for an adult.

The seats in the row behind the pilots in the Seneca are very close to, and almost on top of, the pilot seats. A child's short legs could move selectors with a heel of a sneaker. All the more reason for the pilots to be vigilant.

Verifying the fuel selector position IS a checklist item, which makes me wonder hyow you would "forget," since checklist usage is a big deal when training for a certificate or rating.

 

[CaSyndrm]

When I taught in those planes it was a required memory item for the student.

 

[EDUC8-or]

There's some rich kid that just bought a Duchess that parks on our ramp. He likes to tell stories about how he likes to do single engine patterns with an engine shut down. He's working on his MEI and on our first (and last) flight together we climbing about 50 FPM at blue line. He decided to pitch up, make right traffic in a busy left pattern, and of course bank into the dead engine. He pitched up until I heard the stall horn and the plane started to roll. At that point, I saw enough and took the controls.

After all of this he still wanted to shut down an engine in the pattern. I informed him I would not sign him off to go out and kill someone, yet alone fly with him again. He thought I was a "wimp" because I only shut off the gas above 3,000'.

 

[tathepilot]

LAX04CA173


The CFI stated that he had become distracted, and did not remember to turn the fuel selector back to the "on" position...

I guess the cfi would be the one to blame.
When I posted 'this' the same potential situation could have happend. I'm glad everyone was ok !