Welcome to Flightinfo.com

  • Register now and join the discussion
  • Friendliest aviation Ccmmunity on the web
  • Modern site for PC's, Phones, Tablets - no 3rd party apps required
  • Ask questions, help others, promote aviation
  • Share the passion for aviation
  • Invite everyone to Flightinfo.com and let's have fun

Scott Crossfield NTSB report out

Welcome to Flightinfo.com

  • Register now and join the discussion
  • Modern secure site, no 3rd party apps required
  • Invite your friends
  • Share the passion of aviation
  • Friendliest aviation community on the web

bubbers44

Well-known member
Joined
Dec 4, 2005
Posts
468
NTSB Identification: CHI06MA115
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, April 19, 2006 in Ludville, GA
Aircraft: Cessna 210A, registration: N6579X
Injuries: 1 Fatal.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On April 19, 2006, at approximately 1110 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 210A, N6579X, owned and piloted by a commercial pilot, descended into remote mountainous terrain near Ludville, Georgia, after entering an area of thunderstorms. The pilot, the sole occupant, was fatally injured. Instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) prevailed at the time of the accident. The personal flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 while on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. The accident flight departed Prattville - Grouby Field Airport (1A9), Prattville, Alabama, at 1005, and was en route to Manassas Regional/Harry P. Davis Field Airport (HEF), Manassas, Virginia.

At 1018, the pilot checked-on with Atlanta Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) and was subsequently handled by four sectors. The accident airplane was cleared to 11,000 feet mean sea level (msl). The pilot was not issued weather advisories or related SIGMETS, according to Atlanta ARTCC voice communications. At 1109:28, the pilot asked to deviate to the south due to weather. Atlanta ARTCC approved the turn to the south, but radar contact was lost at 1110:02 at 5,500 feet msl. A plot of the aircraft radar track data indicated that the airplane entered a level 6 thunderstorm prior to the loss of radar contact.

The airplane impacted about 3.3 nautical miles (nm) northwest of Ludville, Georgia, in rugged wooded terrain. The associated debris was located in two general areas, situated about 1 nm apart from each other. The wreckage distribution was consistent with a low altitude in-flight breakup.

The main wreckage was situated in a four foot deep crater. There was limited damage to the overhead tree canopy, consistent with a near vertical descent path. The main wreckage consisted of the cockpit, engine, propeller, left and right main wing spars, nose and main landing gear, left and right flap, and portions of the empennage. The second area of wreckage consisted of portions of the left and right wing leading edges, the upper portion of the vertical stabilizer leading edge and tip rib, a small section of aileron and the left cabin door. The two ailerons and the outboard portion of the right elevator were not recovered during the on-scene investigation. Two of the three propeller blades were recovered, both of which exhibit chordwise scratches and blade twist. All four corners of the airplane were identified; cockpit/engine, left wing, empennage, right wing, and fuselage. The major airframe components, engine, and recovered propeller blades were transported to a local Department of Transportation accident reconstruction yard.

A two-dimensional wreckage layout confirmed flight control cable circuit continuity for ailerons, elevators, and rudder. The flaps and landing gear were fully retracted. Functional testing and disassembly of the wet vacuum pump showed no evidence of pre-impact failure. No gyros instruments were found intact. No liberated gyros were found at the accident site. The on-scene investigation did not reveal any pre-impact anomalies that would have prevented the normal operation of the airplane or its related systems.
 
It boggles my mind to see such a skilled aviatior make such a foolish mistake. We lost a legend on April, 19th.

The Discovery Military channel has been running a show on his life. He was a very intelligent, non-conformist. He was never afraid to "tell it how it is", even when it was not the most popular thing to say. And what he said was almost always correct. I have to wonder if the attitude that made him so successful lead him into making the poor decision of taking off into obviously poor weather?
 
Last edited:
Way2Broke said:
It boggles my mind to see such a skilled aviatior make such a foolish mistake. We lost a legend on April, 19th.

The Discovery Military channel has been running a show on his life. He was a very intelligent, non-conformist. He was never afraid to "tell it how it is", even when it was not the most popular thing to say. And what he said was almost always correct. I have to wonder if the attitude that made him so successful lead him into making the poor decision of taking off into obviously poor weather?

I am sure he has at some point said the same thing you just did about other peoples accidents. Do you think you are so skilled that you would never make the same decisions at some point in your aviation career? Get over yourself.


ak
 
Aviation Week & Space Technology has him on the cover this week, a black bordered picture of him standing in his silver spacesuit with the X-15 on the ramp behind him. They wrote up a nice tribute to him inside the back cover:

A Tribute To A. Scott Crossfield, 1921-2006
04/30/2006

Not too long ago, at an event at the National Air and Space Museum, we found ourselves chatting with Steve Squyres, the chief of Mars rover science operations. There we were, by the X-15. As if on cue, Scott Crossfield walked up. We realized the men had never met. Introductions made, we stepped aside and watched as two light bulbs lit up. Boyhood hero, meet the man on Mars.

Crossfield will, of course, be remembered as a pilot's pilot. Many think of him as the first astronaut in the space-capable X-15. But Scott was more than the X-15. He spanned--and bridged--eras in aviation and space.

If anyone ever led a full life centered on aviation, it was Crossfield. He took his first ride in an airplane at age 6, received his first flying lesson at 12 and left this life on Apr. 19 while piloting his Cessna 210A at age 84. He worked on the Apollo program, and at Eastern Airlines. He advised Congress, promoted aerospace education and instructed Wright Flyer pilots during the 100th anniversary of powered flight.

But it was as an engineer and designer that Crossfield felt he made his biggest contributions. "I am an aeronautical engineer, an aerodynamicist and a designer," he told this magazine in 1988. "My flying was only primarily because I felt that it was essential to designing and building better airplanes for pilots to fly."

More intangible, but no less important, is the inspiration Crossfield provided to many as one of the main icons of a golden age of aviation progress. He was an approachable icon, always willing to talk or sign autographs. He told students how great it is to fly, but reminded them they first need to crack the books.

Crossfield was a strong believer in manned flight test. He distrusted the limits of simulation, and believed unmanned aircraft could not be taken as close to the edge of the envelope. But there was a more basic reason as well. "My view is that if you do not make a manned vehicle and have a man ride in it . . . what use is it to the human experience?"

An inspiration for Crossfield himself was watching Boeing's famed test pilot Eddie Allen make an early flight of the Boeing Clipper on Seattle's Lake Washington. The Crossfields had moved to southern Washington. Family friend Carl Lienesch, who was a pilot, had taken high-school student Scott to the event. Lienesch emphasized that Allen was Boeing's consummate engineer as well as test pilot and told Crossfield, "Allen's job is the one you want to shoot for. Be an engineer. Help build the airplanes. Then fly them and find out what you did wrong."

"I was profoundly impressed," Crossfield wrote. So, too, he was keenly impressed by the Wright brothers' methodology and involvement in all phases, from design to construction to flight test. "On the X-15, I was very fortunate in being able to complete that whole circle."

After the University of Washington and World War II as a Navy pilot and instructor, Crossfield was hired as a research pilot at the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics' High-Speed Flight Research Station at Edwards, Calif. He flew a variety of rocket and jet aircraft there, including the Bell XS-1, Northrop X-4, Bell X-5 and Convair XF-92. But he achieved the most fame in November 1953, when he flew the Douglas D-558-II Skyrocket to Mach 2.005, becoming the first man to break Mach 2, and just before the 50th anniversary of the Wright brothers' flight. This stole some thunder from the Air Force, which was priming Chuck Yeager for the same anniversary record. Yeager struck back the next month, going Mach 2.4 in the more capable X-1A.

The X-15 was beginning to appear on the horizon, the ne-plus-ultra of rocket planes, and Crossfield knew it was time to press toward his Eddie Allen ideal and become more involved in engineering and design. He had far more rocket plane flight hours than any other pilot, and X-15 contractor North American Aviation hired him in 1955.

The shape of the X-15 was already fixed but Crossfield took leadership of human factors design, such as an armrest that prevented violent g forces from upsetting the pilot's control of the stick. He was able to repel a USAF mandate for an escape capsule so heavy that it would have ruined the program.

Throughout his time at NACA and on the X-15, Crossfield was working with the David Clark Co. to develop a full-body pressure suit, which evolved into the Project Mercury astronaut suit.

Crossfield made the first gliding flight of the X-15 in June 1959, which involved a pilot-induced oscillation in pitch that almost wrecked the aircraft during the flare. It was followed by the first powered flight in September. Crossfield reached his maximum speed ever on Nov. 15, 1960, attaining Mach 2.97. Crossfield's last X-15 flight was on Dec. 6, 1960, as the government pilots fully took over. He made 14 flights in the aircraft.

At North American, Crossfield was in charge of reliability engineering, systems test and quality assurance for projects that included the Apollo Command and Service modules and Saturn V second stage. He put his concerns in writing about the use of 100% oxygen in the Apollo capsule during ground tests. Program officials did not listen. About a year later, the Apollo 1 fire killed three astronauts. Federal investigators collected the Apollo 1 documentation and that was the last Crossfield saw of his warnings.

Crossfield left North American in the finger-pointing that followed and went to Eastern Airlines in 1967 to work on technology development. In 1977, Crossfield became a technical consultant to the House Committee on Science and Technology. He supported the National Aero-Space Plane and played a large role in resurrecting high-speed aeronautics research. But later, he came to see NASP as having become merely a "management exercise."

Having set the Mach 2 record during the Wright brothers' 50th anniversary, Crossfield backed off to about Mach 0.05 for the 100th anniversary by leading the training of pilots who were going to fly the "Wright Experience" reproduction of the 1903 Flyer.

The image of Crossfield, in his silvery suit, standing by his rocket plane will forever be etched in our minds. He was the epitome of "larger than life." But Scott was so much more.
 
AngelKing said:
I am sure he has at some point said the same thing you just did about other peoples accidents. Do you think you are so skilled that you would never make the same decisions at some point in your aviation career? Get over yourself.


ak

At no point did I imply that I am some type of "super pilot." However, I can tell you that I would hope that I would never take off into a known line of level 5's and 6's. (I use to have a picture of the radar at the time but the webpage's cache has since expired)

The point I was trying to make was that it always has, and always will astonish me how even the greatest pilots are still capable of making poor decisions. If anything we should all learn for this. We are all perfectly capable of catching "get there itis." And yes that includes myself! There is an old quote, "Learn from others mistakes, because you will not live long enough to make them all yourself." That is why you will find NTSB reports in most aviation magazines, so we can read them and doeverything we can not to duplicate the actions that lead to the accident.

I know that 99.9% of us will never contribute as much to aviation as Scott Crossfield did (With a 100% chance I will not). Now he is flying in heaven's cloudless sky with tailwinds in every direction. For that and for what he contributed to all of us we are all blessed.
 
Last edited:
This might be what you meant, but it is not what you said. Nothing worse than someone with much less experience, questioning someone with much more experience, especially his experience, as if you would never make such a "poor" decision.
If you really didn't mean it that way, then its all good :beer:


ak
 
Last edited:
There is absolutely nothing wrong with asking a question about how attitude relates to decision making. All I did was ask a question to get some possible insight and instead of elaborating on how you feel about attitude in relation to decision making all you told me to do was "get over myself." It was a question, not a statement. However, I can see that in the way I posed it that is could be confused with a statement. For that I appologize. We would be doing ourselves a great disservice if we did not scrutinize the events that lead to EVERY accident. And yes, in my opinion, taking off into that weather was a poor decision. It is my opinion and I am intitled to it, just like you are intitled to yours. :)

I absolutley did not mean to take anything away from his amazing career, and coragous contributions to our industry. I can only adspire to have a fraction of his carisma and sucess.

So I'll cheers to that! :beer: I think we understand my intentions now. Sorry if it came out the wrong way. I will give it a rest now, because I did not mean to detract from a great lost.
 
Last edited:
Scott died doing what he loved and had a wonderful life. The decisions he made on his last flight were his and nobody elses. He made those decisions his whole life doing things a lot more risky than that day. I don't think he should have any regrets about decisions made in his life including his last one. How many of us would still be around going through what he went through?

Let him go in peace. He deserves it for what he did for all of us.
 
From what I read, he did not just takeoff into the T-storm. He had been handed off through 4 controllers and was diverting from weather when he got into the big one. Who knows what type or radar he had on board. I wonder what the controller was painting and what he thought when Scott turned into a level six storm... and even though he's not required to do so, if he issued any advice?
I flew through some buildups back in 97 in an warrior without radar on board. The controllers helped me out quite a bit once I told them I had no radar.
 
I use to fly through that area all the time withbank checks in the back. The center controllers can tell that there is precipitation, but can not tell you the type or intensity. (This could haev changed) I wish there was a way that we could view the entire radar loop around the time of the accident. I have seen the still frame of the radar at the time of the crash and it was pretty nasty. I know in that area there can be alot of pop up t-storms. Maybe they were not there when he took off and developed while he was enroute. Anyone know if these storms were associated with a from or if they were your run of the mill afternoon heating type storms? One thing that has always scared me is getting caught by unforecasted pop-up storms with no real out. It could happen to anyone. Flying is inherintly risky. Especially when t-storms are around.
 

Latest resources

Back
Top